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PREFACE 
FROM THE AMERICAN viewpoint, the tragedy of Soviet-Amer-
ican relations may very well be not the tension that has existed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union but the use of 
polemics by overzealous historians. The 1917-1933 period, when 
relations seemed less important than they have been since Ameri-
ca's entry into the Second World War, has lent itself quite easily to 
ideologues who have used the cold war as a springboard for a 
study of relations between the two nations. The result has been a 
distortion of the record by an emphasis on three American deci-
sions: refusal to recognize Soviet Russia in 1917, intervention in 
1918, and recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. Scholars and 
dilettantes have focused upon these events to show America's at-
titude toward socialism, the influence American intervention had 
on the direction of the Russian Revolution, and the advantages or 
disadvantages realized by the United States in establishing dip-
lomatic relations with the ussR. 
The present study is undertaken to improve the historical 
perspective of Soviet-American relations in the period 1917-1933 
through a recounting of the life of Alexander Gumberg. Without 
any desire or compulsion to reform the world, Gumberg strove to 
improve the climate of opinion between Russians and Americans. 
He did not desire to Americanize Russia or to Bolshevize America. 
In this characteristic he was unusual among those who sought to 
influence Soviet-American relations. He firmly believed that closer 
ties between the two countries would redound to their mutual 
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benefit by assisting in the stabilization of international affairs and 
ensuring world peace. Of the three individuals most frequently 
mentioned as seeking to better Soviet-American relations in the 
1920s-Raymond Robins, Senator William E. Borah, and Gumberg 
-only Gumberg devoted his life to this project. He influenced 
nearly all the principal events shared by America and Russia when 
official relations did not exist. 
A Russian emigre, Gumberg formed the key friendship of his 
life when he returned to his native land in 1917. He became an ad-
viser, translator, and confidant to Raymond Robins, at first a ma-
jor and then a colonel in charge of the American Red Cross in 
Russia. Through Robins, Gumberg gained entrance into the politi-
cal and financial leadership which exercised some influence over 
relations between the United States and Russia: William Boyce 
Thompson, Reeve Schley, Thomas Thacher, Dwight Morrow, 
Governor James Goodrich, and Senator Borah. Gumberg's associa-
tions with Wall Street and the hierarchy of the Republican party 
enabled him to exert his own subtle but persistent influence for 
improved relations. This influence existed on several and fre-
quently interrelated levels: public relations, politics, and business. 
Despite requests for speaking engagements, Gumberg shied 
away from the public forum. He preferred that others speak and 
write about Russia while he gave encouragement and advice and 
remained in the background. He did, however, become a general 
clearinghouse for articles and books on Russia. Gumberg's per-
sonal knowledge and his large collections of primary materials on 
Russia made him an invaluable source for many prominent au-
thors, including Upton Sinclair and Edward A. Ross. On intimate 
terms with Gum berg, the editorial staffs of both the Nation and the 
New Republic often sought his assistance with manuscripts on Rus-
sia; so did such institutions as the Foreign Policy Association. 
The least productive and most frustrating of Gumberg' s efforts 
was his attempt to persuade the several Republican administra-
tions to recognize the Soviet government. Throughout the 1920s, 
Gumberg acted as a one-man lobbyist. He provided material and 
advice to those, particularly Robins and Borah, who kept the rec-
ognition issue alive in the political arena. Many congressmen and 
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senators called on him for expert counsel or to use his Russian con-
nections. Many constituents of these same politicians had their 
questions and problems solved by Gumberg. His important politi-
cal friendships notwithstanding, Gumberg made no significant 
contribution to the actual negotiations leading to recognition in 
1933. The close ties he formed with Republicans separated him 
from that Democratic administration which finally achieved recon-
ciliation with Russia. 
The most successful of Gumberg's endeavors occurred within 
the business community. Gumberg reorganized the cotton export 
trade with Russia as the American manager, 1923-1926, of the 
All-Russian Textile Syndicate. He served as the personal adviser to 
Reeve Schley, vice president of Chase National Bank, and their 
combined force enabled them to reinvigorate the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce in 1926. As a director of the 
chamber, Gumberg became the driving force behind the organiza-
tion which sought to increase American business interest in Rus-
sian trade. His daily consultations with America's financial and in-
dustrial leaders established a more sympathetic body of opinion in 
regard to the Soviet experiment. 
Finally, Gumberg, a naturalized American citizen, retained 
close ties with the Soviet peoples and their leaders. His brother 
Veniamin remained in Russia to become vice president of the 
Chemical Syndicate. For a while Gumberg represented the Petro-
graci Telegraph Agency, the precursor to TASS, in America. He also 
worked for Alexander A. Yazikov, chairman of the Special Trade 
Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic. Later he aided Boris E. 
Skvirsky and the Russian (later, Soviet Union) Information Bureau. 
Gumberg helped sponsor the visits of numerous Russian dig-
nitaries to the United States and he assisted in cultural exchanges, 
such as the visit of the Russian author Boris Pilnyak. Thus he at-
tempted to improve Soviet Russia's knowledge and understanding 
of the United States as well as America's comprehension of Russia. 
That responsible individuals in both countries valued Gumberg's 
lifelong efforts can be illustrated in the period following recognition 
when he frequently exchanged visits with the Soviet ambassador 
and briefed the American ambassador to the ussR. 
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Gumberg did not seek to start a revolution, to change the 
world, or to alter the morality of man. He did quietly contribute to 
a better understanding between the country of his birth and the 
country of his livelihood. He became a conveyor belt, a link be-
tween the future superpowers when their normal ties had been 
broken. Gumberg facilitated unofficial relations between the 
United States and the ussR at a time when their governments 
lacked official means of communication. 
Although no one else can accept responsibility for my conclu-
sions, my study of Alexander Gumberg has been blessed with the 
aid of many individuals and institutions. The University of Ken-
tucky provided, through travel grants and a Dissertation Fellow-
ship, some of the money and time I required to accomplish the 
necessary research. My wife, Joyce, read the manuscript in draft 
form. It is my good fortune to possess such a patient, but persis-
tent, critic. Those scholars who joined her in this thankless, and 
sometimes dreary, task included Gene Forderhase, Eastern Ken-
tucky University; John Gaddis, Ohio University; and Mary Wilma 
Hargreaves, George Herring, Richard Lowitt, Robert Warth, Uni-
versity of Kentucky. Professor Herring consistently provided en-
couragement and generously shared his intense knowledge of dip-
lomatic history. 
Many other members of the history profession gave their time, 
expertise, and thought to answering questions, providing valuable 
information, or making cogent suggestions about the direction of 
my research. Following an excellent diplomatic precedent, these 
scholars will be mentioned in a scrupulously alphabetical listing: 
William Berge, Eastern Kentucky University; Robert F. Byrnes, 
Russian and East European Institute, Indiana University; William 
Chambliss, University of Kentucky; Nelson Dawson, Kentucky; 
Nancy Forderhase, Eastern Kentucky University; George F. Ken-
nan, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University; Ivan 
Krasnov, Institute of General History of the Academy of Science of 
the ussR; Robert Myers, Illinois; George Robinson, Eastern Ken-
tucky University; Neil Salzman, New York; William A. Williams, 
Oregon State University. 
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In the course of my research I had the pleasure of correspond-
ing with, or interviewing, many individuals who either knew 
Gumberg or possessed information about him, his activities, or his 
acquaintances. There is little value in discussing the relative merit 
of each contribution. My grateful appreciation is extended to all 
those who took the time to answer my inquiries. The text bears 
witness to the usefulness of their information. 
The bulk of the research occurred in manuscript collections 
held by several libraries. I would like to thank the institutions and a 
few of the individuals who so ably gave their aid. Without excep-
tion, the following eased and made pleasant the pursuit of my re-
search: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Josephine L. 
Harper, Reference Curator, assisted by Kay Thompson and a grad-
uate assistant, Susan B. Davis; The Law Library of the University 
of Kentucky, Paul Willis, then Director, and a graduate assistant, 
Laura Kostyo; University of Virginia Library, Edmund Berkeley, 
Jr., Curator of Manuscripts; Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
Thomas T. Thalken, Director; The Lilly Library, Elfrieda Lang, 
Curator of Manuscripts, and an assistant, Wilma Etnier; The Uni-
versity of Chicago Library, Mary Janzen, Manuscript Research 
Specialist; Oral History Project, Columbia University, Louis M. 
Starr, Director; Columbia University Libraries, Kenneth A. Lohf, 
Librarian for Rare Books and Manuscripts; Yale University Library, 
Judith A. Schiff, Chief Research Archivist; The University Library, 
University of California at Los Angeles, Saundra Taylor, Historical 
Manuscripts Librarian; Indiana State Library, John Selch of the 
Manuscript Division and Martha Wright of the Indiana Division; 
DePauw University Library, David J. Olson, Archivist, and an as-
sistant, Virginia Brann; New York Public Library, Robert W. Hill, 
Chief of the Manuscript Division, and an assistant, John Stinson; 
Swarthmore Peace Collection, Bernice Nichols, Curator, assisted 
by Nina Wolls and Sylvia Haviland; National Headquarters of the 
American Red Cross, Lillian C. Kidwell, Head Librarian, Irma 
Lucas, Archivist; National Archives, Milton Gustafson, Curator of 
Diplomatic Records Group, Jerry N. Hess of the Industrial and So-
cial Branch, and William F. Sherman of the Legislative, Judicial, 
and Fiscal Branch; The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, J. C. James, 
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Director, John S. Highbarger and Frances M. Seeber, Reference 
Archivists; Library of Congress, Roy P. Basler, Chief of the Manu-
script Division, assisted by Carolyn Sung; and special appreciation 
to Mrs. William E. Gossett for permission to use the papers of her 
father, Charles Evans Hughes. 
INTRODUCTION 
A WEEK AFTER Czar Nicholas II abdicated in 1917, the Winter 
Palace received a visit from the American ambassador. Prince 
George Lvov, premier of the new Provisional government, wel-
comed his guest and received the official news that the United 
States would be the first major power to recognize the new gov-
ernment. In the hectic March days the sixty-seven-year-old ambas-
sador, David R. Francis, had frequent conversations with Michael 
Rodzyanko, former president of the State Duma and an important 
figure in the committee of Duma representatives who secured the 
czar's abdication and selected members of the Provisional govern-
ment. When that government emerged from the committee's ef-
forts, Francis had an extended interview with the recently named 
minister of foreign affairs, Paul Milyukov. The meeting between 
the minister and ambassador on March 18 convinced Francis that 
Romanov rule had forever ended. While he recognized the final 
collapse of autocracy, he based his evaluation of the ultimate suc-
cess of the new government on two fallacies. Francis cabled Secre-
tary of State Robert Lansing shortly after his audience with 
Milyukov that the successor regime would be able to prosecute the 
war more vigorously than ever before and that the new govern-
ment embodied that principle of government most cherished by 
the American people-rule by consent of the governed. 1 
Who could fault the forthright ambassador for accepting ap-
pearances and for making a false analogy between Russia and his 
own country? Francis had served as ambassador for nearly a year 
2 Alexander Gumberg 
prior to the outbreak of revolution. He had been in Petrograd long 
enough to note the gross inefficiency of the czarist regime in wag-
ing war. He noted, too, the street rumors blaming Russian reverses 
on the czar's wife, who, according to popular tales, worked as an 
agent for Germany. Francis, however, was unaware that the Rus-
sian army was a peasant army, one which by 1917 fought, when it 
fought at all, to protect hearth and home. The ambassador failed to 
comprehend that Russia's army needed a reason to fight a ghastly 
war. A more efficient, Western-style administration to replace the 
moribund autocracy did not automatically give the Russian soldier 
a reason to die. 
A former grain dealer, mayor of Saint Louis, governor of Mis-
souri, and secretary of the interior in the second administration of 
President Grover Cleveland, Francis knew much about wheat, 
border-state politics, and the Democratic party. He did not know 
Russian history. Staying close to the plush ambassadorial resi-
dence on Furshtatskaya Street, Francis accepted the Provisional 
government as essentially representative of the Russian people. 
Had he been a better student of Russian affairs he might have rec-
ognized the Provisional government as a minority authority re-
moved from the people and their popularly elected institutions, the 
Soviets. 
Many scholars have commented on the qualifications of Fran-
cis as ambassador, but few have praised him. The uniformly nega-
tive evaluation distorts the historical record. Of all the political 
misfits which the United States willed upon the Russian people as 
American ambassador, Francis stood higher than most as a man 
eminently qualified for the post in 1916.2 He had been sent in April 
of that year for one purpose: to secure a trade treaty. His experi-
ence in commercial ventures and political ties with the Democratic 
party and Wilson administration provided him the expertise and 
connections to fulfill his task. 
Francis did not complete the mandate of his office, but this 
failure had little to do with his qualifications to renew commercial 
ties between the United States and Imperial Russia. The war, 
Nicholas's bitterness over American complaints against his rule, 
and the changes of personnel in the ministry of foreign affairs due 
to the less-than-statesmanlike influence of Rasputin on the em-
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press led to delay after delay until the Romanov dynasty ruled no 
more. By the spring of 1917 the requirements of American-Russian 
relations had altered just as dramatically as the overthrow of the 
monarchy had altered the Russian government. Not commerce but 
the prospect of American entry into the First World War became 
the pervasive influence in the American view of Russia. 
On April2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress 
to declare war with Germany. 3 Because the United States was un-
willing to become a full-fledged ally and was unable to make an 
immediate contribution of armed men, the government did what 
American private financiers had been doing for a considerable 
period-it lent the Entente Powers the funds to do its fighting. 
Immediately after Wilson requested war, Francis informed the Pro-
visional government that the United States would extend $100 mil-
lion in credits to assist Russia. By October 1917 the commitment of 
America reached a total of $325 million in credits, of which over 
$187 million had been used by the Russian government. 4 
It required so little sagacity on the part of the United States 
government to note the tenuous existence of the Lvov and, later, 
Kerensky regimes that these financial arrangements appear most 
unusual, even foolhardy, except in the context of war. The United 
States provided assistance to an unconstitutional government, re-
sponsible to neither the people nor to a national assembly and one 
which, as indicated by its very name, Provisional, would be re-
placed in the near future by a different government whose policy 
toward war could not safely be predicted. Indeed it may be stated 
that the real support for the Lvov-Kerensky regimes existed out-
side of Russia. For the next several months the Provisional gov-
ernment survived only because it could walk a tightrope between 
pleasing its allies with a strong prowar stance and appearing to be 
striving toward peace, the overwhelming desire of the people as 
expressed in the Soviets. 
Besides credits, the Wilson administration tried to bolster the 
lagging spirit of the Provisional government through words and 
deeds. On May 22, 1917, Wilson sent the Lvov regime a note 
reiterating his earlier thoughts to Congress that war and liberty had 
become synonymous. 5 A month later, an advisory commission of 
railway experts arrived in Russia under the direction of John F. 
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Stevens, world-renowned American engineer who had supervised 
the completion of the Panama Canal. Events overtook the experts 
before they could produce effective results for the Provisional gov-
ernment. 6 Concurrent with the arrival of the Stevens group, Russia 
received the so-called Root Mission. 
It is not entirely clear whether the Root Mission accomplished 
anything. At seventy-three years of age, Elihu Root led a high-
powered group of Americans to register the sympathies and sup-
port of the United States for Russia in revolution, but especially for 
Russia in war. 7 The American guests stayed at the Winter Palace to 
be wined and dined and awed by the splendors of czarist Russia 
without achieving any idea of what direction the revolution had 
taken. Except for Minister of War Alexander Kerensky, who was 
at the Eastern Front exhorting the troops to engage in a final and 
disastrous offensive against the Central Powers, the responsible 
members of the Provisional government succeeded in convincing 
their American guests of their incompetence but not necessarily 
their impotence in carrying out the impossible task of governing a 
country bordering on anarchy. Only one member of this Special 
Diplomatic Mission, Charles Edward Russell, made a determined 
effort to break away from established protocols to locate the 
genuine sources of democracy and power in Russia. 8 
After the Root Mission left Petrograd on July 9 it recom-
mended that the United States fund a large propaganda organiza-
tion in Russia to influence public opinion toward the efficacy of 
war. Scholars critical of the Root Mission have grudgingly admitted 
the political acumen of the Special Diplomatic Mission for reaching 
such a conclusion. However, a ready-made case study of the effect 
of propaganda on the war spirit of Russian soldiers existed in the 
abortive July offensive begun a week before the mission's depar-
ture. For a considerable period of time prior to the commencement 
of the offensive, the Provisional government, and particularly its 
minister of war, made a strenuous effort to plead, argue, cajole, 
exhort, and otherwise shame the Russian army into activity by at-
tempting to resurrect its patriotic spirit. That this great exertion 
ended in dismal failure should have indicated to the Root Mission 
and the Wilson administration the futility of attempting to 
influence Russian behavior by persuasion. The disorganization of 
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the Russian army and society had reached a stage beyond which 
words could alter the situation. 
Although the Root Mission's specific proposals concerning 
propaganda did not receive the full support of the Wilson adminis-
tration, measures had already been taken in April1917 that would 
lead to the establishment of an American public information pro-
gram in Russia. On April14 President Wilson issued an executive 
order creating a Committee on Public Information composed of 
representatives of the secretaries of state, war, and navy and 
chaired by journalist George Creel. The committee's purview in-
cluded domestic propaganda and censorship, but it would also 
administer a program of information in neutral and Allied coun-
tries. Less than a month after Wilson established the committee, 
Creel asked the president to send Arthur Bullard to Petrograd as 
the committee's representative. A graduate of Hamilton College, 
Bullard had spent five years in Russia as a journalist and had wit-
nessed the 1905 Revolution. Creel thought Bullard could be at-
tached to the Special Diplomatic Mission; however, another corre-
spondent had already been assigned. Apparently Root disliked 
Bullard's political views, and Creel's suggestion proved abortive. 
Bullard subsequently went to Russia as a private citizen but became 
part of the committee after the Bolshevik insurrection. Not until 
late October did Wilson approve the assignment of Edgar Sisson as 
Petrograd agent for the committee. The choice of Sisson for the 
post reflected the concern and importance Russia's situation, and 
the deterioration of the Eastern Front, held for the United States 
government. Sisson formerly had been an editor of the Chicago 
Tribune and since May 1917, associate chairman of the committee. 
Between the time Wilson appointed Sisson and the time he arrived 
at his post, the Provisional government ceased to exist. The Root 
Mission envisioned an expenditure of over $5 million to bolster 
through propaganda the Provisional government and the morale of 
the Russian people. Ultimately the Committee on Public Informa-
tion spent less than $2 million in sixteen countries. Thus the prop-
aganda campaign in Russia received thousands, not millions, of 
dollars and then only after the downfall of the prowar govern-
ment.9 
The Provisional government sent its own mission to the 
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United States, led by the assistant minister of commerce, Boris 
Bakhmetev. Early in July, Bakhmetev acquired the post of Russia's 
ambassador to the United States, a position that he would hold 
long after the government which sent him had ceased to exist. 10 
The new ambassador gave substantial support to the fallacy that 
his government could rule Russia and carry on the war. Thus the 
governments of the United States and Russia assured each other of 
the viability of the Provisional government in a setting of mutual 
admiration which bore little resemblance to actual conditions. 
Partnership in war had prompted America to recognize the Provi-
sional government, to assist that government financially, to send 
various missions providing support, and to establish belatedly a 
Petrograd office for propaganda. Finally, the Wilson administration 
enlisted the services of private institutions, including the American 
Red Cross, to bolster Russia's morale and flagging war effort. 
The very day, July 5, 1917, Bakhmetev assumed his duties as 
Russian ambassador to the United States, the Empress of Asia, carry-
ing among other passengers an American Red Cross Commission, 
sailed from Seattle for Vladivostok. The War Council of the Red 
Cross had conceived this operation at its third meeting held at the 
end of MayY In less than a month over twenty men had been 
selected for the commission. Led by Frank Billings, a Chicago 
physician, the commission gave every appearance of having estab-
lished broad humanitarian goals: the distribution of food and 
medicine plus assistance with sanitation and transportation. Once 
inside Russia, however, the commission moved into politics-
specifically support for Kerensky who had become premier. Sev-
eral of the commission's scientific personnel, including Billings, 
departed from Russia in disgust over the turn of events. 
Three circumstances prevented Billings from limiting the polit-
ical involvement of the commission. First, William Boyce 
Thompson, a mining magnate and Wall Street parvenu, paid for 
the expenses of the entire operation. Although technically only the 
business agent for the group, Thompson provided the actual lead-
ership of the commission and set the tone for the members' partici-
pation in Russian politics. Second, Red Cross officials during the 
war became part of the United States military. They received mili-
tary ranks and were subject to military orders. Not surprisingly, a 
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close relationship developed between the Red Cross and the 
American Military Mission in Petrograd, commanded by Brigadier 
General William V. Judson. Accompanying the Root Mission, Jud-
son remained in Petrograd as military attache. The Military Mis-
sion, extremely interested in gathering intelligence, laid the 
groundwork for the political direction of the Red Cross. Third, un-
like Billings, Thompson received what appeared to be direct in-
structions from the Wilson administration through the offices of 
Edward N. Hurley, a member of the War Council, to do everything 
possible to help the Kerensky regime bring order to Russia so that 
once again the Eastern Front might challenge the Central Powers. 12 
Thompson's commanding position did not overshadow the 
most interesting personality in the Red Cross group, Raymond 
Robins. A powerhouse orator and Bull Moose Republican, Robins 
had been the personal selection of Theodore Roosevelt, whose ad-
vice the War Council had solicited in determining the composition 
of the commission to Russia. 13 At first, Robins did not get along 
with Thompson. His dark hair, penetrating eyes, swarthy com-
plexion, vigor, and intensity sharply contrasted with the quiet, in-
articulate, balding, and rotund Thompson who resembled an over-
ly serious and somewhat lethargic cherub. As a politician, informal 
preacher, and social worker, Robins and his progressive associates, 
Robert La Follette, Jane Addams, Hiram Johnson, and others had 
attacked the financiers Thompson epitomized. In addition, Robins 
had married Margaret Dreier, leader of the women's labor move-
ment and president of the National Women's Trade Union League. 
Despite these obvious differences, Robins and Thompson 
were remarkably alike. Both had humble beginnings, an irregular 
education, made fortunes from mining, and turned to philan-
thropy before joining the Red Cross Commission. It was these 
similarities which wedded unlike personalities into a team on the 
journey from America to Russia. In fact, their mutual regard would 
grow and endure. 14 
After a stop in Yokohama, the Empress of Asia berthed at Vla-
divostok. A representative of the Russian Red Cross, George 
Landau, welcomed the group and acted in the capacity of guide 
and interpreter for the long train ride to Petrograd. Russian Red 
Cross officials had done everything to assure the comfort of their 
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American counterparts. The Russian Red Cross provisioned nine 
special cars which had formerly belonged to Czar Nicholas II. For 
twelve days and nights the commission experienced at firsthand 
the extent of the Russian land mass which spread over eight mil-
lion square miles of territory. 
On August 7 Ambassador Francis and other members of the 
American colony in Petrograd met the commissioners and intro-
duced them to their Russian home. At first the commission resided 
at the Hotel de France, a dilapidated and lice-ridden institution. 
After a week Thompson, acting as business agent, secured with his 
own funds a suite of rooms at the Hotel d'Europe, one of Petro-
grad' s finest. The luxurious hotel became the permanent head-
quarters for the American Red Cross and an oasis containing food 
and drink for Americans who suffered from the general scarcity of 
goods in the revolutionary-torn capital. 15 
Within three days of the commission's arrival important meet-
ings were held in Petrograd and Washington, D.C., concerning aid 
to Russia. In the American capital President Wilson and his secre-
tary of state welcomed home the Root Mission. Its members under-
scored the need for an expensive and extensive propaganda cam-
paign to lift the spirit of Russian soldiers and the sagging will of the 
Provisional government. The president, urged to move in this di-
rection by his ambassador to Russia and also by his dose adviser, 
Colonel Edward M. House, as well as Creel, did not act with the 
dispatch required by the fast-moving pace of events. In contrast to 
the dilatory approach of the president, Thompson and the Red 
Cross Commission jumped at the first opportunity to demonstrate 
political interest and material support for the Kerensky regime. On 
August 10 Thompson, Robins, and Francis met with Premier 
Kerensky and his foreign minister, Michael Tereshchenko. At a 
dinner presided over by Francis within the American embassy, 
Thompson established a close rapport with the Russian premier. 
The magnate produced a telegram he proposed to send to J. P. 
Morgan & Company. Not only did Thompson request an im-
mediate sum of 425,000 rubles of his own funds to purchase Rus-
sian war bonds but offered to form a syndicate to buy 10 million 
rubles' worth of bonds, to act as an unpaid agent, and to under-
write 10 percent of the syndicate's purchase. 16 Thompson assumed 
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that Russia had been saved by her revolution and the revolutionary 
spirit could be turned into a crusade to expel the Central Powers 
from Russian soil to the benefit of America's war policy. 
Almost as an afterthought, President Wilson approved the 
dispatch of a Committee on Public Information agent to Russia 
some two and a half months after his talks with members of the 
Root Mission. Thompson, in a matter of weeks, helped form a 
propaganda machine by working through the Provisional govern-
ment and the moderate socialists associated with Kerensky. A 
Committee on Civic Education in Free Russia was created as a Pro-
visional government propaganda agency financed by a million dol-
lars from Thompson. Catherine Breshkovskaya, a longtime anti-
czarist revolutionary, became the titular head of the committee 
which also included Kerensky's private secretary David Soskice 
and General Constantine Neslukovsky, a member of the Russian 
General Staff who took charge of army propaganda. The initial 
sum put forward by Thompson permitted the Committee on Civic 
Education in Free Russia to purchase a printing plant, create sol-
diers' clubs that would exhibit propaganda and sponsor prowar 
speakers, establish news bureaus, and form a chain of a hundred 
newspapers. This impressive information project had one goal: to 
stamp upon the Russian mind the idea that the revolution could be 
saved only by fighting the Central Powers. Until the arrival of 
Thompson, most Allied propaganda had been designed to boast of 
the invincibility and material resources possessed by the democra-
cies. Such propaganda succeeded in convincing Russians that vic-
tory could be achieved without any assistance from war-weary 
Russians. 17 
The committee's work proved tardy in changing existing opin-
ion. When Charles Edward Russell returned with the Root Mission 
he told President Wilson: "The trouble is that at present the aver-
age Russian sees nothing in the war that appeals to the soul in him. 
The war was made by the Czar; that mere fact prejudices the aver-
age Russian against it." Even those Americans directly involved in 
the committee's campaign could see that it was too late. After ad-
dressing a Russian machine-gun unit, Robins confided to his diary 
that the "war is dead in the heart [sic] of men." 18 
The elaborate propaganda machine fashioned by the Commit-
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tee on Civic Education in Free Russia required large amounts of 
money. Thompson's million-dollar grant proved insufficient and 
the magnate began to bombard the Wilson administration with re-
quests for additional money. Thompson pleaded with the State 
Department for an allocation of $3 million a month. He even en-
couraged Breshkovskaya to send a direct communication to Presi-
dent Wilson begging for additional assistance. Finally, Thompson 
enlisted his Wall Street associates in the campaign. Creel arranged 
an appointment with President Wilson for H. Grosvenor Hutchins, 
first vice president of the National Bank of Commerce, who inter-
ceded on behalf of the Thompson group. The meeting between 
Wilson and Hutchins resulted in Wilson's sending a letter to 
Thompson commending him for his patriotism. The previous day 
Wilson talked with Edgar Sisson who then prepared for his jour-
ney to Russia. The initial allocation for Russian propaganda was a 
paltry quarter of a million dollars instead of the millions sought by 
Thompson. Furthermore, Wilson's instructions to Sisson, written 
the day Hutchins had his audience with the president, implied that 
Sisson must avoid the "meddling" in politics evidenced by the al-
liance of Red Cross Commission and Provisional government. 19 
While Thompson engaged in political activity the Red Cross 
Commission ministered to the very real needs and sufferings of the 
Russian people. The members of the Red Cross assisted in war re-
lief, in work with refugees, and in care for the wives and families of 
soldiers in the vain hope of stimulating the army to fight. Robins 
received the most difficult and demanding task. A member of a 
four-man committee appointed to deal with civilian needs in Rus-
sia's two great metropolitan areas, he made frequent trips to the 
countryside to organize and transport food supplies for Moscow 
and Petrograd. In the provinces and districts Robins visited, he 
discovered that grain and transportation could be secured only by 
working through the local Soviets rather than the officials of the 
Provisional government. After one of these food-searching trips to 
the Ekaterinoslav Province early in September, Robins entered Pet-
rograd in the midst of a counterrevolution. A rift had occurred, due 
to confused communications between Premier Kerensky and his 
commander-in-chief, General Lavr Kornilov. After the general re-
fused Kerensky's demand for a resignation, Kornilov mobilized his 
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forces in a desperate and futile attempt to crush the Petrograd 
Soviet and reorganize the Provisional government. His movement 
faltered in the unsteady allegiance of his own troops and the swift 
and vigorous resistance organized by the Petrograd Soviet. The 
whole episode revealed to Thompson and Robins the Provisional 
government's weakness and propelled the Bolshevik party to new 
heights of prestige and power. 20 
Frustrated by the lack of support rendered by the Wilson ad-
ministration, discouraged by the evident weakness of the Provi-
sional government following the Kornilov putsch, and convinced 
of the efficacy of the Soviets, Thompson and Robins took a drastic 
step early in November 1917. Thompson gathered together the mil-
itary attaches for Britain, France, and the United States. Generals 
Alfred Knox, Henri Niessel, and Judson joined Kerensky's secre-
tary, Soskice, and attache General Neslukovsky in a conference 
designed to save the Provisional government by an alliance with 
the Soviets. The talks degenerated into a name-calling session. 
With the exception of the Americans, the Allied generals expressed 
in overly blunt terms their disappointment in the Kerensky regime. 
These attaches, along with their civilian diplomatic counterparts, 
had actively supported the Kornilov revolt, and the only positive 
program they could suggest was a military dictatorship. Like the 
United States, Britain and France focused their attention on Russia 
only as a wartime ally in the struggle with Germany. Humiliated 
by the derogatory comments of Knox and Niessel, General Nes-
lukovsky abruptly left the Hotel d'Europe. 21 Three days later Leon 
Trotsky secured the Peter and Paul Fortress for the Soviets and two 
days after that the Second All-Russian Soviet pronounced the end 
of the Provisional government. 
Out of the maelstrom of revolution the figure of a New York 
businessman, Alexander Gumberg, emerged to play a key role in 
the unofficial relations that existed between Soviet Russia and the 
United States from November 1917 to November 1933. A Rus-
sian-American, Gumberg returned to his homeland in late spring 
1917 as a sales representative for several American firms. His abil-
ity as a translator, however, quickly led him into a different direc-
tion. The Root Mission employed his services, as did numerous 
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American correspondents, so that by October he quit his business 
connections to devote his full time to translating Russian periodi-
cals for journalists. 22 Because he had many Bolshevik acquaint-
ances and had easy access to the Bolshevik headquarters in the 
Smolny Institute, Gumberg's importance to Petrograd's American 
colony grew in proportion to the radicalization of Russia's Revolu-
tion. 
During September and October, Robins employed several 
translators, principally Sarah Kropotkin, daughter of the philo-
sophical anarchist Prince Peter Kropotkin, to gather Russian opin-
ion from periodicals. 23 He kept himself and Thompson abreast 
of the Russian view of the United States. From time to time Robins 
also informally employed members of the American community, 
such as journalists Bessie Beatty, Albert Rhys Williams, John Reed, 
and Louise Bryant, who had inside information on political affairs. 
Robins held long conversations with these members of the Ameri-
can colony as well as with Bullard and the Associated Press repre-
sentative, Charles Smith. Gumberg did occasional assignments for 
all these individuals and frequently joined his companions in their 
talks with Robins at the Hotel d'Europe. Out of these discussions 
grew Robins's appreciation of and close friendship with Gumberg. 
Robins would later recall that Gumberg consistently had the most 
prescient information about Russian affairs. 24 
The impact of the November 7 Bolshevik insurrection would 
directly affect not only the diplomatic ties of the United States with 
Russia but the personal lives of Gumberg, Robins, and Thompson. 
Unlike the situation in March, Francis, closely aligned with the de-
funct government, recommended nonrecognition of the new 
Soviet government because of its avowed intention to withdraw 
Russia from the war. In the immediate context of the chaos prevail-
ing in Russia, the United States had little choice but to wait and see 
what effect the events in Petrograd would have on the remainder of 
Russia. As time wore on, however, the formula of nonrecognition 
became a program and then a hardened policy, curiously, in direct 
proportion to the increasing ability of the Soviet government to as-
sert control over Russia's political life. Guided by humanitarian 
and patriotic motives, Thompson and Robins always worked with 
whatever institutions they could use in Russia to further the war 
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effort and ameliorate the distress war and revolution brought to the 
Russian people. Their goals did not change because of the new 
political life in Petrograd, but their personal role in Soviet Russia 
changed dramatically. 
Thompson had given much of his own energy and financial 
resources to helping the revolution through the Provisional gov-
ernment. His close ties with the ousted leadership of that gov-
ernment proved an insurmountable handicap. The taint of 
Thompson's million-dollar contribution to Kerensky was a liability 
recognized by both Thompson and Robins. A few weeks later, 
Thompson departed, leaving Robins in command of the Red Cross 
Commission. Robins himself needed to restructure his outlook and 
his staff. In his effort to seek influence with the Soviet government 
to continue the beneficial endeavors of the Red Cross, Robins dis-
missed Sarah Kropotkin, who openly opposed the Bolshevik lead-
ership. Robins replaced his principal secretary with Gumberg, a 
man whose intelligence and access to the Smolny Institute he had 
already come to appreciate. In the aftermath of Bolshevik victory, 
Gumberg was to become the most important bridge linking 
America and Russia. 
1 
THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN 
IN THE DARK of night on that historic day of November 7, 1917, 
three men and two women departed from Smolny Institute leaving 
behind them the smoke-filled, stale but excited air of the Second 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets. As headquarters of the Bolshevik 
party and the Military Revolutionary Committee, this former 
school for young ladies became the command center for what has 
been labeled the Bolshevik Revolution. 1 The cool bracing air of Pet-
rograd's night enveloped the five comrades. They left behind the 
noise of couriers, soldiers, delegates, and the contemptuous voice 
of Leon Trotsky describing as so much garbage those who would 
waver at the supreme moment. New sounds greeted the five, less 
intense but more ominous-the occasional crack of a rifle and the 
distant thud of a firing cannon-sounds associated with death and 
violence. Sights and sounds of life, however, drew their attention. 
In front of Smolny vehicles moved, occasionally coughing in seem-
ing protest to the cold and to the cargoes they carried. Several 
armed men stacked bundles of paper in a lorry. One of the five 
made inquiries and discovered that the truck would soon be driven 
through the city. An armed man extended an invitation to them 
and shortly the truck roared through the streets carrying its load of 
people and paper. The riders tore open the bundles and began to 
throw into the night air a proclamation written by Vladimir I. 
Ulyanov, known to all as Lenin. The proclamation began "To the 
Citizens of Russia! The Provisional Government is deposed." 2 
It was not unusual in the Petrograd of November 1917 to see a 
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truck careening through the streets spewing out pieces of white 
paper. The novelty of the situation was that of the five acquaint-
ances only one, Alexander Gumberg, had been born in Russia. The 
other members of this remarkable group, John Reed, Louise 
Bryant, Bessie Beatty, and Albert Rhys Williams, were in Russia as 
American newspaper correspondents. Significant and symbolic of 
the life of Gumberg was his performance as an interpreter, figura-
tively and literally, for this group of Americans traveling through 
the Russian Revolution. 
Born in the Ukraine in 1887, the son of an Elizavetgrad rabbi, 
Alexander Semenovich Gumberg emigrated alone to the United 
States at the age of fifteen. He shared, along with millions of perse-
cuted Russian Jews, the vision of America's promise. While knowl-
edge of his formative years will probably remain unknown, he ob-
viously had been instilled with a self-sufficient spirit enabling him 
to make the arduous journey from Odessa to New York City. 3 De-
spite the independence of mind revealed to all who touched his 
life, Gumberg provided comfort and financial aid to his family re-
maining in Russia. These apparently contradictory parts to his 
character, independence and family ties to Russia, made unique 
his view of the events in his homeland. He sympathized with the 
aspirations and progress of the Russian people but lacked an at-
tachment to the ideology which sought to drag Russia into the 
twentieth century. 
Of Gumberg's brothers and sister-Sergei, Veniamin, and 
Zhenya-only Sergei, who assumed the revolutionary pseudonym 
Zorin, briefly visited the United States. Zorin, the ardent Bolshevik 
in the family, did not find life in America appealing. He worked as 
an unskilled laborer and left the United States in 1917 with Trotsky 
and other Russian-American emigres. Although never a public 
figure, Zorin's name and form loom up again and again as a 
troubleshooter within the inner circles of the Bolshevik party. This 
brotherly relationship would later facilitate Gum berg's movement 
among the Bolshevik elite even though he never joined the party. 
The difference between brothers may be summarized by noting 
that on November 7, when Gumberg observed the Revolution as a 
sympathetic outsider, Zorin carried a weapon and actively partici-
pated in the overthrow of the Provisional government. 
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Receiving a university education, Veniamin developed a taste 
for life and culture more in tune with that of his younger brother, 
Alexander. Veniamin became Gumberg's counterpart in Russia, 
something of a Soviet businessman. His bourgeois background 
would eventually overtake him in the era of Soviet Five Year Plans. 
His fall from position followed that of Zorin, who had the misfor-
tune of siding with the ousted lieutenants of Trotsky when Stalin 
obtained supreme power. In the 1930s much of Gumberg's life cen-
tered on his efforts to aid his family in its time of stress. 4 
Understandably, some commentators on the life of Gumberg 
have never been able to comprehend satisfactorily the conflict in-
herent within his character. In Russia Leaves the War, George F. 
Kennan suggested that Gumberg confused his national allegiances 
when he returned to Russia in 1917. The record indicates quite the 
opposite. Unlike many Russian-Americans in the prewar era, 
Gumberg enjoyed a relatively successful life in the United States. 
He entered the pharmaceutical industry and, after numerous years 
of employment and apprenticeship with the Manhattan Drug Im-
porting Company, became a registered pharmacist in 1908. For the 
next few years, he was employed as a pharmacist or as a phar-
maceutical salesman, pursuing his profession from New York and 
New Jersey to California and later returning to New York. All his 
employers remarked on his honesty, integrity, and reliability. Pre-
sumably he left one employer for another in the grand, if some-
what romanticized, American tradition of independence and a 
search for a better life. In contrast to other Russian emigres who 
remained closely attached to their own communities in New York, 
Cleveland, or Chicago, Gumberg had the opportunity of seeing 
and enjoying the United States and developing wide contacts 
among Americans in the business community. He gained such an 
astute knowledge of American commercial procedures that he be-
came business manager of the Russian socialist paper Navy Mir 
(The New World), published in New York City. 5 
Gumberg resigned his position with Navy Mir late in 1915 but 
not before forming many friendships among American and Rus-
sian-American socialists. These associations enabled him to meet 
many of those Russian-Americans who would later play such a 
vital role in the Bolshevik Revolution. Not the least of these indi-
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viduals, Leon Trotsky sought asylum in the United States from a 
French government displeased over his antiwar attitude. Trotsky 
briefly joined the world of Russian-America to write for Navy Mir. 6 
Unlike Trotsky, who immersed himself only in the America of 
emigres, Gumberg pursued an American, not Russian, experience. 
He left pharmaceuticals to obtain a position with Perelstrous & 
Storms, industrial purchasing agents, in New York. There he 
supervised the filling of orders for gauges, jigs, and special tools. 
He went to Russia in 1917, not as a disenchanted Russian emigre 
but as an American businessman in charge of the Russian interests 
for Perelstrous & Storms. His firm also authorized him to sell trac-
tors produced by Dauch Manufacturing Company, moving pic-
tures handled by the Inter-Ocean Film Corporation, gauges fur-
nished by the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, and 
lungmotors manufactured by the Life Saving Devices Company. 7 
Gumberg, a naturalized American, a purchaser of Liberty Bonds, a 
heavy investor in American railroad securities, and one who al-
ways directed his financial compensation from his various activities 
in Russia to his New York bank, never intended to renew his Rus-
sian citizenship. s 
Gumberg's American experience differed significantly from 
that of many of his Russian-American acquaintances. Most had 
come from a far more humble Russian background. Michael 
Yanishev, Boris Reinstein, Bill Shatov, Moisei Goldstein, Samuel 
Voskov, Alexander Krasnoshchekov, and Arnold Neibut entered 
life as the progeny of peasants and workers. They left the political 
oppression of czarist Russia to enter what appeared to them to be 
the economic oppression of the United States. Whether they be-
came, as Yanishev, a Boston worker or, as Neibut, a leader of the 
Chicago section of the American Socialist party, they maintained 
two characteristics: hope for the eventual overthrow of the de-
spised Russian monarchy and a belief in the historic mission of 
the worker. 9 
These and other Russian-Americans typified those individuals 
George Kennan could understand with alacrity. Their American 
sojourn enhanced, rather than altered, any fundamental values 
and prejudices which they possessed. They saw what they wanted 
to see; they lived among themselves in Russian-American enclaves 
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where they met only like-minded members of America's radical 
community. Of the many Russian-Americans who reentered Rus-
sia in 1917, some found their way to the Bolshevik party and a few, 
such as Krasnoshchekov, president of the Far Eastern Republic, 
achieved positions of leadership. Gumberg, however, became the 
interpreter of two societies, sympathetic to both, yet accepting 
their basic differences. Many of his Russian-American friends 
could not exist in two dimensions. They interpreted, for good or 
evil, their American life from the Russian vantage point and subtly 
strengthened, as translators and members of the Bolshevik party, 
the antagonism of two ideologies. 10 
Despite the duality of Gumberg's sympathies, he had a re-
markable facility and took some pride in his ability to move among 
diverse social circles. His short, stocky build and receding brown 
hair imperfectly covering a wry visage became a familiar sight 
among Russian-Americans, the personnel of the American em-
bassy in Petrograd, and the Bolshevik leadership at Smolny. He 
could even count numerous Russian monarchists and businessmen 
as his friends. Shortly before the November insurrection Gumberg 
took Williams and Reed to the home of a Russian merchant for a 
social gathering of conservative Russian businessmen. Reveling in 
the obvious contrast between Russian monarchists and two Ameri-
can socialists, Gumberg quieted the correspondents' misgivings by 
suggesting that the event would be an excellent opportunity to 
view the opposition-besides there would be plenty of food, 
drink, and caviar, luxuries rarely enjoyed by American socialists or 
anyone in Petrograd in the third year of World War I. Gumberg 
could not have been more pleased at the meeting. When the con-
versation turned to politics, however, sparks began to fly as the 
merchants showed a preference for a German occupation of Pet-
rograd to a Bolshevik assumption of power. Gumberg's cynical 
humor saved the social encounter when he called for a vote be-
tween Kaiser Wilhelm and Lenin. Lenin lost by a landslide and the 
Americans quickly cut short their visit. 11 
Those who knew Gumberg have noted his intelligence, his 
courage, and especially his wit. His reluctant smile and utterances, 
though, sometimes passed from wit to sarcasm and at least one 
person, the volatile and thin-skinned John Reed, disliked Gum-
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berg because of his indiscriminate barbs directed at both friend and 
foe. Eventually the two men shared a reciprocal animosity. Fun-
damentally unemotional, Gumberg became unnerved only by four 
occurrences: the unexpected death of Dwight Morrow in 1931, the 
arrest of his brother Veniamin in 1930, the trial and execution of 
Leonid P. Serebriakov in the Stalinist purge, and any time some-
one mentioned the name John Reed. The premature death of Reed 
in 1920 did not alter Gumberg's antagonism, as Granville Hicks 
discovered in the 1930s when he communicated at length with 
Gumberg for his biography of Reed. Reed will always have the last 
word in their feud. In his work, Ten Days That Shook the World, Reed 
immortalized his opinion of Gumberg by assigning him the 
pseudonym "Trusishka," which means "coward" in Russian. 
Gumberg, however, accompanied the commissars for war and 
marine when they journeyed to the battle between pro- and anti-
Provisional government forces shortly after the November insur-
rection; these could hardly have been the activities of a 
"Trusishka." 12 
Although Gumberg and Reed became bitter foes, they shared 
the mutual friendship of Albert Rhys Williams. The son of a Con-
gregational minister, Williams followed the calling of his father, 
graduating from Hartford Theological Seminary in 1907. After 
further studies at Cambridge and Marburg universities he returned 
to America as pastor of the Maverick Congregational Church in 
East Boston's working-class district. Williams interested himself in 
radical movements and later spurned his religious vocation for 
journalism. Sent to Russia as a correspondent for the New York 
Evening Post in June 1917, Williams met Gumberg and other Ameri-
cans residing in Petrograd. Gumberg helped Williams learn Rus-
sian and smoothed his transition into the Russian milieu. 
Later that summer Williams, accompanied by his new guide, 
visited the Ukraine and Gumberg's birthplace, Elizavetgrad. Wil-
liams's various trips to the countryside became a revelation. He 
would later spend considerable time studying the "dark" villages 
of rural Russia gleaning material for his book on the peasants, The 
Russian Land, published in 1927. Imbued with a Christian 
humanitarian background and an instinctive compassion for the 
workingman, Williams quickly saw the crux of the Russian situa-
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tion. From the beginnings of recorded Russian history, the peasant 
believed the land belonged only to those who worked it. In the 
summer of 1917 the conflict between the landlords and tillers of the 
soil had already erupted. The weak Provisional government could 
not stem the tide of increasing disorders, and Williams and Gum-
berg witnessed more than one burned-out manor house and the 
forcible eviction of its occupants. When the Bolsheviks assumed 
power and issued a decree nationalizing the land, the party did not 
start a revolution in the countryside but merely accepted its out-
come. The majority of the people freely and democratically, if not 
distastefully, decided against property. Neither the liberals of the 
Wilson administration nor the conservative members of the Repub-
lican regimes in the 1920s and early 1930s could accept this type of 
democracy. The casual regard for property which developed in 
town and country in Russia became a serious impediment to dip-
lomatic relations between America and Russia. 13 
After Williams and Gumberg returned to Petrograd, Williams 
found himself increasingly isolated from other American corre-
spondents, except for Bessie Beatty, who represented the San Fran-
cisco Bulletin. Most of the American journalists refused to accept the 
realities of Russian life and Williams sought comfort in the com-
pany of sympathetic British reporters, Arthur Ransome and 
M. Philips PriceY Williams's feeling of isolation ended upon the 
arrival in September of John Reed and his wife, Louise Bryant. By 
1917 Reed, a Harvard graduate, had become famous as a partisan 
of the International Workers of the World in the Paterson strike 
and as a war correspondent, first in the battles of revolutionary 
Mexico and then in the war in Europe where he had covered the 
Western Front from both sides. While in Germany, Reed commit-
ted the faux pas of taking, on a lark, a few shots at the French from 
the German lines. Like many American socialists, he found the war 
basically disgusting and hated British imperialism as much, if not 
more, than German imperialism. Not surprisingly his activities and 
beliefs made him persona non grata to the Entente Powers. When 
he attempted to see the Eastern Front from the Russian side, his 
past caught up with him and czarist officials placed him in jail. In 
spite of this experience, he became something of a Russophile. 
Reed entered Petrograd sharing with Williams a love for Rus-
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sia, sympathy for the working classes, and a similar opinion of the 
war. They quickly formed a close association and enjoyed the as-
sistance of Gumberg, who helped Reed with his Russian and pro-
vided him with the contacts and information necessary to bring 
him up to date on the Russian situation. 15 Reed appreciated Gum-
berg's abilities, but he and Williams developed into Bolshevik par-
tisans and Reed could not accept Gumberg' s skepticism. The sharp 
but still friendly banter exchanged by Reed and Gumberg ended on 
the day of the Bolshevik insurrection. Although both men held a 
profound admiration for Lenin, Gum berg's apparent objectivity 
drove a wedge between him and the pro-Bolshevik Reed. The 
events of November 7 acted as a watershed in their relationship. 
Thereafter a few American radicals such as Reed and many Rus-
sian-Americans, who in spirit had never left Russia, lost their iden-
tity in their total acceptance of the Russian Revolution as seen 
through the eyes of the Bolshevik party. 
The day had begun auspiciously enough for the insurrection. 
In the early hours of November 7, the Kexholm and Pavlov regi-
ments seized the Petrograd Telephone Exchange, the State Bank, 
and the Treasury in the name of the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee of the Petrograd Soviet. Earlier elections among Petrograd 
workers and soldiers had returned a Bolshevik majority to the local 
Soviet, which selected Leon Trotsky as its presiding officer. Most 
individuals, including members of Alexander Kerensky's Provi-
sional government, realized that the Second All-Russian Congress 
of Soviets could easily assume power once the vestiges of Keren-
sky's authority had been removed. By noon the Provisional gov-
ernment's rule extended only to the outer limits of the Winter 
Palace. Two questions restrained the elation of the Bolsheviks over 
the near bloodless "revolution." Would the Kerensky regime be 
able to muster sufficient military force to effect a counterstroke? 
When would the Winter Palace be occupied by pro-Soviet forces? 16 
Beatty had made a luncheon engagement with Premier Keren-
sky. Needless to say, the insurrection ended their plans. Beatty 
missed her lunch and a provocative interview with the besieged 
premier. Gumberg soothed Beatty's disappointment by introduc-
ing her to Trotsky, who told them of his fear that troops loyal to 
the Provisional government might be brought from the Eastern 
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Front to Petrograd to unseat the Soviets. This did not occur until 
five days later, when pro- and anti-Soviet forces confronted each 
other at Pulkovo. Only future events confirmed that the diffident 
"battle" of Pulkovo sealed the doom of the Provisional govern-
ment. On November 7, however, the potential existence of coun-
terrevolutionary forces contributed to the anxious moments of 
Soviet partisans. 17 
Afternoon passed into evening and the Winter Palace con-
tinued to hold out against the Soviet forces surrounding it. The 
opening of the Second Congress at Smolny could no longer be de-
layed. Dan, a Menshevik and the outgoing chairman of the Central 
Executive Committee of the First Congress, opened the new ses-
sion. The first order of business was the election of a presidium. 
Allied with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks made 
an impressive showing. The presidium included fourteen Bol-
sheviks, seven Socialist Revolutionaries, and only four Men-
sheviks. As a result, the Bolshevik leader Leo Kamenev became the 
new chairman. Under the direction of Martov, the Mensheviks vil-
ified the Bolsheviks for spearheading the attack on the Provisional 
government. Adhering more closely to Marxist orthodoxy, Men-
sheviks believed that a blow against the Provisional, or any 
capitalist, government should be struck only when Russia had be-
come a fully developed capitalist society. For the most part they did 
not differ with the Bolsheviks as to the ultimate goal of history. To 
them, the Bolsheviks committed the error of bad timing; therefore, 
the Mensheviks would walk out of the Congress and hence out of 
the revolution. 
Around midnight, while the Congress still debated the fate of 
the Provisional government, Gumberg, Williams, Reed, Bryant, 
and Beatty left Smolny to try to determine what was happening at 
the Winter Palace. The distance was nearly two miles, too far for 
the anxious group to walk, so Gumberg negotiated a ride in a truck 
which carried Lenin's proclamation. They hoped they could get off 
the lorry somewhere near the palace. The truck raced over the 
cobblestone streets, its occupants throwing copies of the proclama-
tion in the hands of passers-by. At one pause Gumberg read the 
proclamation to his friends under the dim light of a nearby street 
lamp. The document not only informed Petrograd that the Provi-
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sional government had been deposed but promised peace, the 
elimination of landlord property rights, labor control over indus-
try, and the creation of a Soviet government. 18 
The five left the lorry near the Kazan Cathedral and walked the 
remainder of the way to the Winter Palace. After some difficulty in 
penetrating the approaches patrolled by Red Guards, their Military 
Revolutionary Committee passes gained them entrance to the area 
of the palace which had just been captured by the variety of forces 
assembled for that purpose. The attackers suffered six fatalities, 
one soldier and five sailors. None of the defenders perished. The 
Americans saw the various ministers being led from the palace to 
the Peter and Paul Fortress, which had become the temporary 
headquarters for the committee's operation. For want of cars the 
ministers endured a trek to the fortress under threatening harass-
ment from onlookers. The real prize, Kerensky, could not be 
found. He had escaped, with the partial assistance of the American 
embassy, earlier in the day. At the moment the ministers threaded 
their way through lines of ugly-tempered soldiers and sailors, he 
sat safely in Pskov, 180 miles away, attempting to gather troops for 
a counterblow. 19 
The Americans journeyed back to Smolny and to the Second 
Congress, just in time to hear Kamenev announce the fall of the 
palace and the arrest of the various ministers. A walkout staged by 
the Mensheviks enabled the slightly truncated Congress to proceed 
with the business at hand. A resolution passed, officially deposing 
the Provisional government and replacing it with the Congress. 
The decree also transferred all power of local government to the 
existing countrywide system of Soviets. By five o'clock on the 
morning of November 8, the Congress concluded its first session 
by approving another resolution, pleading with the railway work-
ers and soldiers to stop any rail traffic proceeding to Petrograd 
under the direction of Kerensky. Later the same day the over-
worked Congress held a second session creating the first Soviet 
government, a Council of People's Commissars chaired by Lenin, 
and it issued the famous decrees on peace and land. 20 
Years later Williams recalled that after he, Reed, Bryant, Beat-
ty, and Gumberg had witnessed the fall of the Winter Palace and 
the creation of the new Soviet government, it was the Russian-
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American Gumberg who shrugged his shoulders and told his radi-
cal friends that it was their revolution to do with as they please, not 
his. 21 Ideologically and ironically, the revolution would belong to 
the American journalists and not to the Russian-American. Yet, 
during the days that followed, the need for communications be-
tween Petrograd' s American colony and Smolny Institute would 
push Gumberg from the periphery to the center of events as an 
unofficial ambassador. Gumberg may have shrugged his shoulders 
over the drama played out on November 7, but the Bolshevik vic-
tory would have a lasting impact on his life and on the nature of 
Russian-American relations. 
2 
AMBASSADOR WITHOUT PORTFOLIO 
ALEXANDER GOMBERG'S POCKETS literally bulged with passes 
and letters of introduction in the aftermath of the November insur-
rection. While the new Soviet regime supported peace in direct 
contrast to the aims and desires of Russia's recent allies, Bolshevik 
leaders never desired to terminate all contact with the Western 
democracies, who uniformly declined to recognize the new state of 
political affairs. Forced by diplomatic ostracism to seek unofficial 
means of communication, the Soviet government made Gumberg 
its principal contact with the United States from the fall of 1917 to 
the spring of 1918. Among his contemporaries in Petrograd, he ac-
quired the nickname "International Ambassador," a distinction 
acknowledging his role in arranging discussions between the 
Soviet government and the Allied countries, particularly the 
United States, about problems that would ordinarily have been 
handled through regular diplomatic channels. 1 
Gumberg's credentials included writs issued by Felix Dzer-
zhinsky, commandant of Smolny Institute, Vyacheslav Molotov, 
secretary of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and Leon 
Trotsky, commissar of foreign affairs. These passes permitted 
Gumberg to gain entry into any commissariat or institution of the 
new government. The freedom of movement he acquired equaled 
that of the most prominent members of the Bolshevik party. His 
low, mocking, staccatolike speech became as familiar in the pas-
sageways of Smolny as the flowing verbosity of Trotsky. Although 
he refused to join the Bolshevik, later Communist, party, his inti-
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mate relations with the hierarchy of the party emerged through his 
friendship with many Russian-American Bolsheviks, his consider-
able skill as a professional translator, his brother Zorin's active 
party work-Zorin would shortly leave for Rumania as a party 
agitator-and his close ties with many American journalists. Bol-
shevik leaders, including Lenin, carefully groomed numerous 
journalists from several countries in the expectation of receiving 
sympathetic press coverage on the aspirations and events sur-
rounding the Soviet experiment. Gumberg, by acting as inter-
mediary between Smolny and the American correspondents, had 
assisted the Bolsheviks before the November insurrection. He con-
tinued this function after November 7, 1917. Gumberg arranged for 
Reed and Williams to cover the battle of Pulkovo from the very au-
tomobile carrying the commanders of the Bolshevik forces. 2 
Gumberg's most important role, however, was not played in 
the frequently romantic world of journalism. The American Red 
Cross Commission required his talents and contacts. Dwindling 
members of the commission had to distribute thousands of cans of 
condensed milk and several hundred thousand dollars worth of 
medical supplies, while they continued overseeing the appropriate 
use of ambulances and other vehicles donated by the Red Cross 
and the American Jewish Friends of Free Russia. The lapse in 
American diplomatic relations with Russia did not in any way di-
minish the important services provided by the commission. Red 
Cross officials found their ranks depleted as a result of earlier con-
troversy between the politically and scientifically oriented mem-
bers. Realistically Thompson and Robins knew they had to reach a 
modus vivendi with the Soviet regime or lose all ability to aid the 
destitute masses and prevent the death by malnutrition of an esti-
mated 25,000 Russian children dependent on American milk. Ig-
noring for the moment the lively and controversial issues raised by 
the Bolshevik assumption of power, Thompson authorized Robins 
to make contact with Smolny to secure the commission's position 
with the new regime. Although Robins had worked frequently 
with local Soviets on Red Cross matters, he and Thompson unwit-
tingly had placed themselves in an awkward stance by their strong 
support of the Provisional government. Under those circumstances 
Robins turned for help to Gumberg, the one man he knew to have 
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the intelligence and discretion required to establish unofficial con-
tacts with a government not recognized by the United States. Thus 
sixteen years before America acknowledged the existence of Soviet 
Russia, Gumberg entered Smolny Institute to make an appoint-
ment with Trotsky for Robins. 3 
In the first week after its formation, the Soviet government's 
attention, by necessity, focused on anti-Soviet movements. 
Trotsky did not even bother to vacate his office in Smolny or at-
tempt to take physical charge of the premises housing the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs until after the government's position had been 
safeguarded in the conflict at Pulkovo Heights outside Petrograd. 
Trotsky's attitude toward his new post was impudent at best. He 
claimed that all he would have to do would be to preach world rev-
olution, publish the secret treaties between czarist Russia and her 
Allies, and close down the ministry, then under the charge of a 
czarist bureaucrat Count Tatishchev.4 
Within two weeks Trotsky made good his promise to publish 
the treaties. Under different circumstances the release of these 
documents, laying bare the Entente Powers' expansionist aims, 
could have been considered the first step in a new public diplo-
macy. President Wilson later spoke of open covenants in his Four-
teen Points speech. But in the midst of war, such braggadocio 
exhibited a breach of faith and disdain for the traditional forms of 
diplomacy. By December 2, 1917, Russian delegates reached Brest-
Litovsk, command post for the German Eastern Front. A combina-
tion of Bolshevik insolence, publication of the secret wartime 
treaties, and establishment of unilateral armistice talks with the 
enemy prevented Russia's former Allies from recognizing the new 
regime. The Bolshevik espousal of godless, economic democracy 
achieved by force perplexed particularly and challenged directly 
President Wilson's precepts: political democracy, Christian ethics, 
and America's mission to extend by example her unique moral, 
economic, and political values to the world at large. But the im-
mediate cause for American nonrecognition lay in Wilson's view of 
the Soviet regime as a minority government which had seized 
power illegally. A concrete expression of American displeasure 
emerged on November 24, 1917, when Secretary of State Lansing 
informed Ambassador Bakhmetev that the Wilson administration 
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would continue to acknowledge the ambassador as Russia's, but 
not the Soviet government's, representative. Bakhmetev became a 
creature of the United States-a point of considerable importance 
since the ambassador controlled the remaining credits and monies 
extended by America to the Provisional government. 5 
When Gumberg arranged the interview for Robins, Trotsky 
revealed a different, more realistic understanding of his govern-
ment's weak position. The war had ended for Russia. No army or 
martial will existed to reconstitute the Eastern Front. In those con-
ditions the Soviet government had two alternatives: first, to work 
for a German revolution which would create a government sym-
pathetic to Russia; second, in the absence of a German revolution, 
to reach an armistice and peace agreement with the Central Powers 
before European Russia came under military occupation. Under 
these desperate conditions Trotsky did attempt to open diplomatic 
relations with the Allies. He had frequent conversations with Cap-
tain Jacques Sadoul of the French Military Mission, interviewed the 
Belgian ambassador, and two days after the insurrection agreed to 
Gumberg's request to see Robins. 6 
Unfortunately, when Gumberg and Robins entered Trotsky's 
office, an aide recognized Robins and remembered a speech in 
which Robins had praised the Provisional government. Gumberg 
quickly intervened to explain to the commissar that Robins had 
come to Russia to aid the Russian people and had worked with 
Kerensky only because the premier presumably led the revolution-
ary government. Robins's translator informed Trotsky that Robins 
now considered the Provisional government defunct and would 
acknowledge Soviet authority. By drawing on Gumberg's skill and 
acquaintance with Trotsky, Robins concluded an understanding 
with Trotsky that allowed the Red Cross to continue its work in 
Russia. Robins then and in subsequent interviews learned that the 
Red Cross Commission not only could fulfill its humanitarian goals 
but also could play a political role which would have a direct and 
beneficial result for the war policies of the United States. 7 
Trotsky assured the two Americans that the commission's 
presence would be welcome. He also laid the groundwork for posi-
tive action which would convince Robins that the Soviet govern-
ment could be trusted and was willing to work against the Central 
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Powers in the limited manner possible consistent with the situation 
confronting the Soviet leadership in November 1917. The commis-
sar of foreign affairs promised the protection and safe transport to 
Petrograd of over 400,000 cans of condensed milk and medical 
supplies then stored in the northern White Sea ports. Under stress 
of reduced personnel and because of Gumberg' s ability to work 
with Soviet institutions, Robins eventually assigned him to or-
ganize and administer the distribution of these Red Cross 
supplies. 8 
Surprisingly, Trotsky also permitted the transfer of thirty-
two boxcars of Red Cross supplies to Rumania. The American Red 
Cross Commission in Rumania, led by Colonel H. W. Anderson, 
needed those supplies. Rumania, like the United States, joined the 
Allied cause late in the war. Russia's withdrawal from active par-
ticipation left the beleaguered country isolated. By allowing the 
Rumanians to receive Red Cross materials, Soviet Russia indirectly 
supported the anti-German coalition. Only later, when an anti-
Soviet force established a base of operations in southern Russia 
under General Alexis Kaledin, opening the initial round of the 
Russian Civil War, did the Soviet authorities reevaluate their 
Rumanian policy. 
Finally, Robins and Gumberg asked Trotsky to place in Mur-
mansk some fifty boxcars of copper, nickel, and platinum, goods 
Robins and the Allied military attaches feared might slip into Ger-
man hands. Trotsky promptly ordered the cars sent to Murmansk 
and placed in the care of the British fleet stationed at the northern 
port. The granting of Robins's requests exploded the myth that 
Bolsheviks were intransigent revolutionists or agents in Germany's 
employ. Recalling some of these protracted and difficult discus-
sions, Robins later told a British envoy that Trotsky was "a four 
kind son of a bitch, but the greatest Jew since Christ. If the German 
General Staff bought Trotsky, they bought a lemon." 9 
Although Gumberg succeeded in convincing Trotsky of Rob-
ins's good faith, no amount of oratory on Gumberg' s part could 
alter the displeasure the name William Boyce Thompson evoked in 
Soviet circles. The magnate's million-dollar contribution to the 
Provisional government could not be forgiven as easily as the few 
speeches made on its behalf by Robins. Regrettably, Thompson 
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would later be vilified by American public opinion which confused 
this grant to the Provisional government as a gift for Russian 
Communists. In view of the apparent flexibility of the Bolsheviks, 
Thompson agreed with Robins that the United States should be in-
formed of the Russian situation. Contrary to reports then being cir-
culated in Allied capitals, it seemed to Thompson and Robins that 
the Allies could prevent the Central Powers from gaining access to 
Russian raw materials and might possibly delay or stop altogether 
the conclusion of a separate peace. 10 
Toward the end of November, Thompson prepared to leave 
Russia. He realized that his alliance with Kerensky had eliminated 
his usefulness in dealing with Soviet Russia. The best purpose he 
could serve was to consolidate his considerable influence and try to 
persuade the Allies and America to deal with the existing Russian 
political situation. Thompson learned that his Exeter classmate 
Thomas P. Lamont had arrived in London along with President 
Wilson's close adviser, Colonel Edward M. House. He left Russia, 
appointing Robins as director of the commission seconded by 
Major Thomas Thacher. Thacher wired London requesting that 
Lamont wait for Thompson's arrival, which occurred on December 
10. In London, Thompson set out with Lamont to talk over the 
Russian problem with high British officials, capped off by a lun-
cheon interview with Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Every-
where Thompson went he bluntly told British statesmen of the 
stupidity of the Allied refusal to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. 11 
He warned that if the Allies consistently spurned the Bolsheviks, 
the Soviet government would have no recourse but to seek a rap-
prochement with the Central Powers. 
Thompson apparently impressed Lloyd George, for the prime 
minister promptly appointed Bruce Lockhart as an unofficial en-
voy to Petrograd. Lockhart, a romantic, colorful, and highly emo-
tional individual, had been a British consul in Russia. His in-
structions, however, were of the vaguest sort-to put a monkey 
wrench in the separate peace negotiations between Russia and the 
Central Powers. Lockhart possessed all diplomatic privileges in-
cluding the use of ciphers and a courier. These courtesies were ob-
tained by permitting Maxim Litvinov, a Russian Bolshevik then re-
siding in London, similar privileges. 12 
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While Thompson thought he had influenced British policy, 
events demonstrated quite the opposite. At the same time Lockhart 
received his instructions, Britain and France signed a convention 
dividing Russia into spheres of interests as a prelude to military in-
tervention. Thompson and Lamont left England aboard a trans-
port, the converted luxury liner Olympia, as the guests of the 
British. Once back in Washington, Thompson spent a week trying 
to see the president. Wilson, displeased with Thompson's political 
activity in Russia, refused to grant him an interview. Little hope 
remained except to convince other administration members of his 
views. His talks with Bernard Baruch and Herbert Hoover ac-
complished little. Baruch could do nothing, and Hoover refused to 
see any value in negotiating or trying to influence Bolshevik 
anarchists. 13 
While the Wilson administration remained steadfast in its pol-
icy of procrastination, the success of the Robins and Gumberg in-
itiatives opened other avenues of contact for the American Military 
Mission and the Committee on Public Information. Like Robins 
and Gumberg, General William V. Judson accepted the new situa-
tion in Petrograd for completely realistic reasons. In the aftermath 
of revolution, Judson first concerned himself with the embassy's 
safety. After a series of exchanges between attache and ambas-
sador on November 19 and 20, 1917, Francis reluctantly accepted 
the general's view that the Soviet government should provide the 
traditional security forces necessary to protect the embassy. More 
significant, Judson met Trotsky on December 1, a day prior to the 
opening of negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. The general's motives 
cannot be impugned. Vitally concerned with the fate of American 
and Allied soldiers on the Western Front, Judson desired to 
influence the Soviet government's armistice terms. He wanted 
Soviet representatives at Brest-Litovsk to insist that all soldiers re-
main in place, avoiding a massive transfer of German troops be-
tween Eastern and Western fronts. Judson's talks with Trotsky had 
been sanctioned initially by Ambassador Francis. The Wilson ad-
ministration, appalled by Judson's breach of policy, recalled the at-
tache. When Francis caught wind of his government's displeasure, 
the ambassador disavowed his own approval of the Judson-
Trotsky conversations. 14 
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The furor raised by the attache's attempts to limit German 
forces on the Western Front also placed an official restraint on rela-
tions between the Red Cross Commission and the Soviet govern-
ment. In elaborating a policy of nonrecognition, Secretary Lansing 
informed Francis that the Red Cross should discontinue its 
dialogue with the Bolsheviks. If the attache could not engage in 
agreements with Smolny, neither should pseudomilitary members 
of the American Red Cross. Robins, with Francis's tacit approval, 
refused to abide by the State Department's directive and im-
mediately put pressure, through the Red Cross War Council in 
Washington, on the United States government to make an excep-
tion to the nonintercourse rule. The Wilson administration eventu-
ally agreed that the Red Cross could not arrange transportation and 
distribution of supplies without communicating with the Soviets. 
However, the policy of permitting other informal relations with the 
ostracized regime did not receive definitive approval by the State 
Department until February 1918. 15 
In the meantime two events forced both Robins and Francis to 
violate the explicit instructions of their government. Gumberg's 
part in these incidents accurately reflected the subtle and unpub-
licized influence he used to improve contacts between America and 
Russia. 
On December 21 Gumberg delivered to Robins his morning in-
telligence report on the Soviet government. Part of his information 
confirmed news of Andrei Kalpashnikov' s arrest. Originally a Rus-
sian Red Cross representative, Kalpashnikov had been attached to 
Colonel Anderson's group in Rumania and had attempted to divert 
American Red Cross supplies from Petrograd warehouses to 
Rostov-on-Don rather than Jassy, seat of the Rumanian govern-
ment. Hemmed in by the Central Powers, Rumania's government 
feared it might have to flee to Rostov. The fact that Rostov also 
served as headquarters for General Kale din's anti-Soviet forces 
was an understandably suspicious coincidence in the mind of the 
Soviet authorities. That evening Trotsky invited Gumberg to the 
Alexander Theater where Trotsky delivered a scathing public 
speech exposing the incident. Relieved to hear Trotsky exonerate 
Robins, Gumberg nevertheless heard the commissar of foreign af-
fairs vilify Ambassador Francis and the American government for 
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attempting to supply anti-Soviet troops. In the aftermath of Trot-
sky's speech the American embassy existed in a state of emotional 
siege, facing the possibility that Trotsky's verbal attack might 
evolve into more physical action. Fortunately, the only violence to 
erupt occurred two days later with the "arrest" of Kalpashnikov's 
train. 16 
Against the expressed will of the United States government, 
Robins and Gumberg continued their close relationship with the 
Soviets to secure the unhampered movement of supplies to Col-
onel Anderson in Rumania and to spare the American embassy an 
ugly incident. They talked with Trotsky about the Kalpashnikov af-
fair and all its ramifications. These conversations eased Soviet-
American tensions in Petrograd and resulted in the release of the 
arrested train and supplies upon Robins's promise that they would 
go to Jassy and not RostovY The situation in Rumania, however, 
would continue to cause trouble and would force, despite the of-
ficial policy of nonrecognition, a direct confrontation between 
Francis and Lenin. 
By December 1917 the southern flanks of the Eastern Front had 
become a blur of Rumanian and Russian soldiers, enmeshed within 
the Moldavian territory of Rumania. These Russian troops formed 
an allegiance to the Soviet government, assisted in that direction 
by Bolshevik agitators such as Gumberg's brother Zorin. A jus-
tified fear grew in Rumanian circles that the territory not already 
occupied by the Central Powers might be conquered by Russian 
troops. Incidents broke out as the Rumanian government tried to 
isolate and disarm Russian soldiers. The activity angered Soviet 
Russia which responded by arresting Count Constantine Dia-
mandi, Rumania's ambassador in Petrograd. This violation of dip-
lomatic immunity had few precedents and proved to be a horror 
story for all foreign representatives then in Petrograd. By sheer 
longevity of service, Francis had become dean of the diplomatic 
corps. On January 14, 1918, the day following Diamandi's incarcer-
ation in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Francis summoned all mem-
bers of the diplomatic community to the American embassy. The 
assembled body decided to compose a note of protest and to make 
a personal presentation of their views to Lenin. 
Before the diplomats of nineteen countries could descend 
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upon Smolny for their collective protest in the afternoon, Gumberg 
spent part of the morning in conference with Lenin. He warned the 
Soviet leader that "if he wished to make Russia helpless before 
Germany and destroy his own party all he would have to do would 
be to keep the Rumanian in jail." 18 He went on to suggest that as a 
matter of realistic politics, something Lenin appreciated, he should 
release Diamandi. 
Now aware of the impact of the Diamandi arrest upon the 
capital's diplomatic corps, Lenin assured Gumberg that he would 
receive the delegation. In the audience with the diplomats, the 
founder of bolshevism appeared receptive and after accepting the 
petition and hearing their comments, he shook hands with each of 
them. 19 The following day Diamandi became a free man, though 
still persona non grata with the Soviet government. The successful 
resolution of the Kalpashnikov and Diamandi affairs impressed the 
Wilson administration with the value of permitting its ambassador 
and the Red Cross Commission to continue unofficial relations 
with the umecognized government of Russia. 
While Gumberg played an important and at times crucial part 
in fostering communications between the Soviet government and 
the Red Cross Commission, he also enlisted in the propaganda 
work of Edgar Sisson's Committee on Public Information. Gum-
berg always seemed to commit himself to several different areas of 
employment at one time, frequently in a multiple effort to bring 
Americans and Russians closer together. The strange paradox in 
his relationship with Sisson is that Sisson is remembered as a Bol-
shevik baiter, a leading proponent of the theory that members of 
the Bolshevik elite received monies and instructions from Imperial 
Germany as paid agents of the Central Powers. Sisson's most in-
famous act occurred in October 1918, when he published under 
government auspices a collection of spurious documents purport-
ing to prove his thesis. The appearance of The German-Bolshevik 
Conspiracy, sanctioned by the Committee on Public Information, 
made a significant contribution toward those hysterical attitudes 
on communism which loomed in the peculiar phenomena of 
events historians describe as the "Red Scare" in America. 20 
Sisson's endeavor to prove a German-Bolshevik connection 
belied his earlier and successful attempt to work with the Soviet 
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government. Creel's lieutenant arrived in Petrograd in time to at-
tend the farewell Thanksgiving dinner held in honor of Thompson. 
Occupying a room adjacent to the headquarters suite of the Red 
Cross Commission in the Hotel d'Europe, Sisson developed a close 
working relationship with Robins, who generously shared the 
services and talents of Gumberg. Initially Sisson concurred in the 
views on Soviet Russia taken by Robins, Gumberg, Judson, and his 
own assistant Arthur Bullard whom he brought from Moscow to 
head a news bureau. The urgency attached to their work to gain 
some influence with the Soviet government and prevent a sellout 
of Russia to the German militarists hit home in the presence of 
Count Wilhelm von Mirbach. German representative in Petrograd 
for talks on the commercial and financial aspects to the peace 
negotiations, Count Mirbach took up residence down the corridor 
from the rooms of Sisson and the Red Cross. 21 
Shortly after his arrival, Sisson wrote home about the Bol-
shevik method of reducing Germany's bargaining position without 
an army. "The Russians are sending leaflets into the German lines 
telling the soldiers to seize the German Government as they have 
seized theirs." Sisson concluded: "This does not look as if the Rus-
sian peace movement were German controlled." At first, Sisson 
did not consider the Bolsheviks to be German agents, but did avoid 
direct contact with the personnel of the Soviet government to pre-
vent any taint of political meddling, a charge he knew President 
Wilson had held against Thompson and the Red Cross Commis-
sion. Thus Sisson relied on Gumberg as his intermediary with 
Soviet officials. Gumberg, for example, secured a printing plant for 
the use of the Committee on Public Information early in December 
1917. By January 1918 Gumberg's usefulness in working with 
Soviet institutions prompted Sisson to place him in charge of or-
ganizing the distribution of the publications and motion pictures 
sponsored by the committee. The explicit cooperation of Smolny 
extended even to the point where American propaganda material 
ended up in Die Fackel (The Spark), a Bolshevik publication de-
signed to propagandize German soldiers on the Eastern Front. Sis-
son had to admit to his family in America that "the Bolsheviks are 
decently human. I have been able to do the things I set out to 
do."22 
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The Soviet government's cooperation with Sisson reached a 
pinnacle in January 1918. President Wilson's Fourteen Points 
speech started to arrive over the wire in Petrograd on January 10. 
The Bolshevik insurrection, call for peace, and withdrawal from 
war spurred on an effort to define war aims that President Wilson 
had begun as early as September 1917. When Wilson delivered his 
address before Congress on January 8, he mentioned specifically 
the Russo-German peace talks in his prefatory remarks. German 
demands at Brest-Litovsk provided Wilson an excellent contrast for 
his Fourteen Points. Undoubtedly, the president hoped to entice 
the Bolsheviks to the Allied cause or at least to disrupt the peace 
efforts in East Europe. Sisson had the document translated im-
mediately into Russian and, together with Gumberg, set out for 
Smolny. Although Lenin was temporarily out of the city and 
Trotsky had joined the delegates at Brest-Litovsk, Gumberg con-
vinced Trotsky's secretary, Shalyapina, to send a courier to Brest-
Litovsk with those portions of Wilson's speech already translated. 
The following day Gumberg arranged a meeting with Lenin for 
Robins and Sisson, the first interview either man had with the Bol-
shevik leader. Lenin, seemingly impressed by Wilson's speech, 
personally took the copy, had it telegraphed to Trotsky, and gave 
the Americans his permission to broadcast the document in a vari-
ety of media including Soviet publications. 23 
The Fourteen Points speech raised Lenin's hope for American 
recognition. Article six called for the evacuation from Russian terri-
tory of all foreign troops and implied an acceptance of the Soviet 
government when Wilson spoke of receiving Russia into the family 
of nations under "institutions of her own choosing." 24 Wilson's 
plea for no annexations or indemnities resembled the six-point 
peace proposal Soviet delegates presented at Brest-Litovsk. But ac-
tion spoke louder than Wilson's words. The United States neither 
accepted the Soviet call for expanding the talks at Brest-Litovsk 
into a European-wide peace conference nor recognized the Soviet 
government. 
January 11, 1918, marked the height of Soviet-American col-
laboration, and within a month Sisson would break with Robins 
and Gumberg. Ironically Gumberg provided Sisson with the first 
documents which led the former Chicago Tribune editor to believe 
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the Bolsheviks had been rece1vmg money from the Germans. 
Gumberg collected the readily accessible forged papers as 
curiosities from his anti-Soviet friends in Petrograd. They were so 
patently false that British intelligence would have nothing to do 
with them, but they became the basis for Sisson's theory of a 
German-Bolshevik conspiracy. 25 By early February, Sisson no 
longer sought out the company of Gumberg and Robins. He virtu-
ally vacated to Arthur Bullard his post as director of the Russian 
Section of the Committee on Public Information in order to pursue 
his quest for more documents which might link bolshevism with 
the German enemy. 
The shift of opinion evidenced by Sisson is perplexing. Un-
doubtedly events in mid-January, the arrest of Diamandi, the ac-
quisition of Gumberg's documents, and especially the demise of 
the Constituent Assembly, contributed to Sisson's change of at-
titude toward the Bolsheviks. Sisson attended the proceedings of 
the assembly, convened on January 18, 1918, in the Tauride Palace, 
in the company of Gumberg. 26 Delayed by war, revolution, and 
the Provisional government's procrastination, the Constituent As-
sembly's original purpose had been eclipsed by events. Before Bol-
sheviks assumed power, the people had already taken the question 
of property into their own hands and had spontaneously estab-
lished institutions of government, the Soviets. The basic problems 
thrown up by the revolution no longer existed, and members of the 
assembly could only stamp their approval to the fait accompli or 
attempt to make a political move to reduce the power of the one 
party, the Bolsheviks, which had accepted the revolution as found. 
Under the circumstances, the Soviet government permitted the 
opening of the assembly but then arbitrarily dissolved it by threats 
of violence after a one-day session. 27 While Gum berg could under-
stand the Soviet government's blunt actions, Sisson became disil-
lusioned. The Bolsheviks obstructed the one and only attempt to 
fashion a constitution by representatives of all sectors of Russia's 
society. Thereafter the Allied powers considered, as did Sisson, the 
Soviet government to be led by usurpers and this view seriously 
impeded the normalization of diplomatic channels between Russia 
and the rest of the world. The demise of the assembly took place at 
a crucial moment in the talks then recessed at Brest-Litovsk. It 
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guaranteed that Russia would face the grasping demands of the 
Central Powers alone. 
Before Gumberg and Sisson broke off their friendship, their al-
liance cemented the fate of one of the great tragicomedies played 
out between the Soviet government and members of the American 
colony in Petrograd. In mid-January, John Reed talked the Soviet 
regime into appointing him Russian consul general to New York. 
This action had a selfish and logical explanation in that as an official 
representative of Russia, Reed would be able to transport safely 
back to America materials he had collected for his book, Ten Days 
That Shook the World. Reed's biographer admitted, however, that 
what Reed saw "in the appointment was a recognition that pleased 
him and an opportunity for a dramatic gesture of the kind that he 
enjoyed." 28 
Sisson complained bitterly to Gumberg, Robins, and Francis 
about Reed's appointment, particularly after Reed delivered a 
speech before the Third Congress of Soviets, meeting a few days 
after the aborted Constituent Assembly in the same Tauride Palace. 
Gumberg required little prodding from Sisson and the other 
Americans to take the matter into his own hands. He told Reed's 
close friend Albert Rhys Williams that he considered the appoint-
ment detrimental to Russian-American relations. 29 
But the deterioration of the Gumberg-Reed friendship from 
the time of the November insurrection undoubtedly spurred Gum-
berg to go directly to Lenin. Gumberg scored his point by two ar-
guments. First, he stressed that Reed was an irresponsible roman-
tic whose explosive temperament would not likely improve 
Soviet-American relations. Second, he showed Lenin a prospectus 
Reed had prepared for Robins and Sisson on the use of American 
capital in Soviet Russia. 30 Max Eastman, who became Trotsky's 
literary agent, later remarked that to Lenin and the Soviet leaders 
the prospectus "looked either like a disrespectful joke, or a scheme 
for selling out their revolution." 31 Lenin canceled the appoint-
ment. Reed never forgave Gumberg for this behind-the-scenes talk 
with Lenin. Reed departed Russia early in February and suffered 
delays and harassment in his travels. Thereafter he could not men-
tion Gumberg's name without adding a string of four-letter 
epithets. 
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Curiously, Williams held Sisson responsible for Reed's 
difficulties. Nevertheless, the picture of Gumberg running to Lenin 
on a mission of spite is not very pretty. Certainly in his own mind, 
Reed had justification for considering Gumberg's act despicable. 
The episode revealed one of the few times when Gumberg used his 
influence to satisfy a personal grudge. Yet Gumberg's American 
contemporaries unanimously agreed that Reed's appointment 
would have been received by the American government as an act 
of supreme insolence on the part of Soviet Russia on par with the 
publication of the secret treaties, removal of Russia from the war, 
and destruction of the Constituent Assembly. In the absence of an 
agreement to exchange unofficial envoys with diplomatic privi-
leges as in the British-Russian arrangement for Lockhart and Lit-
vinov, it would be difficult to imagine the United States accepting 
an American national as Russian consul general with anything but 
studied contempt. Reed could not realistically expect the Wilson 
administration to accord him diplomatic immunity or acknowledge 
his consul status. So, while Gumberg's motives were undoubtedly 
linked to his pique with Reed, he performed an important service, 
eliminating an unnecessary conflict and possible irritant to Soviet-
American relations. Had America and Russia exchanged diplomat-
ic representatives, an American ambassador would have vigorous-
ly protested Reed's appointment. The difference between such an 
ambassador and Gumberg would have been the personal com-
mitment Gum berg brought to Lenin to get Reed's appointment 
reversed. 
Thus far had the deterioration of Soviet-American relations 
progressed. The interests of the United States government were 
being maintained by an obscure secretary to the American Red 
Cross, a man who worked as an informal liaison to reduce friction 
between governments in the Kalpashnikov, Diamandi, and Reed 
affairs so that the lines of communication between Russia and 
America would not be completely severed. 
3 
RED LITMUS PAPER 
TWO DECADES LATER a scholar could refer to the talks at Brest-
Litovsk as "the forgotten peace." 1 But in the winter of 1917-1918 
the negotiations between Russia and Central Powers were any-
thing but forgotten in the minds of Allied officials. Maintenance of 
an Eastern Front concerned America's policymakers. They under-
stood little of Russia's revolution except that Bolsheviks broke 
every traditional code of national behavior and sought peace from 
America's enemy. The Bolsheviks, however, did not conspire to 
take Russia out of war. Lenin's party accepted the obvious. After 
the disastrous July offensive, a Russian army no longer existed in 
any recognizable form. Lenin, never a pacifist, wanted peace only 
to preserve his and his party's power. 
Between January and March 1918, Soviet Russia and America 
shared the same enemy, for Imperial Germany threatened Lenin's 
position just as much as it imperiled Woodrow Wilson's leadership 
in making the world "safe for democracy." President Wilson, mov-
ing tortuously between the conflicting recommendations received 
from personal and official advisers, seemed too paralyzed to face 
forthrightly the challenge and reality of revolutionary Russia. His 
policy drifted uneasily upon the assumption that Bolsheviks were 
radical usurpers whose tenuous hold on power would be broken in 
the near future by legitimate or at least moderate, sane, and disci-
plined Russians. Swift events, distance, and simple ignorance also 
contributed to America's failure to take advantage of Russo-
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German friction. By contrast, proximity to these events gave Alex-
ander Gumberg an entirely different perspective. He noted the 
possibilities for Soviet-American collaboration and made, with 
Raymond Robins, every effort to maintain a dialogue between gov-
ernments. From Gumberg' s vantage point, intractability toward 
Bolsheviks caused the Wilson administration seemingly to aban-
don Russia to Germany, brought the end of the Red Cross Com-
mission's role, and prompted him to start back to America to 
reeducate the public about Russia's revolution. 
On February 10, 1918, Leon Trotsky, who had earlier assumed 
personal command over Soviet representatives, took his Russian 
delegates out of the peace negotiations. The Central Powers had 
countered Russia's demand for peace without annexations or in-
demnities by treating independently with the Ukrainian separatist 
movement and by occupying key Russian islands off the Baltic 
coast. Frustrated in negotiations, unable to place an army in the 
field, and without hope of Allied backing, Trotsky outlined his 
no-war, no-peace formula before the astonished eyes of the Cen-
tral Powers. By refusing to sign a peace, he avoided compromising 
the principles of the Soviet government. He hoped unrealistically 
that his audacious move, declaring Russia's refusal to continue 
fighting, might prevent a new offensive. 2 Involved in a titanic 
struggle, however, Germany's field commanders gave little atten-
tion to world opinion, the only remaining hope for Russia's salva-
tion. 
Gumberg and Robins held no illusions as to the probable re-
sponse of the German militarists to Trotsky's flamboyant strategy. 
While Lenin desired peace to consolidate the gains of revolution, 
he had no love for Imperial Germany. Many party members, the 
so-called Left Communists, wanted to resume the war against the 
Central Powers, a "holy war" designed to liberate Germany from 
the kaiser. The United States, for a brief period, had the opportu-
nity to move toward de facto recognition of the existing Russian 
government and to aid and support that government in the effort 
to make Russia enough of a nuisance to Germany to prevent 
large-scale shifts of military personnel to the Western Front. As 
Gumberg told Albert Rhys Williams: "If we turn aside from them 
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now, it will mean a long period of reaction for us-because once 
my government starts out on a new path, all its spokesmen defend 
it, and it rolls along, and it's awfully hard to reverse it. This now is 
the crossroads for America-as well as Russia." 3 
Three days after Trotsky stalked out of the peace negotiations, 
Gumberg learned directly from Karl Radek about the talks at 
Brest-Litovsk. Journalist and delegate to the conference, Radek had 
responsibility for Soviet propaganda, and Gumberg's association 
with him eased the job of distributing American propaganda. 
Radek revealed to Gumberg that at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky had 
tried to use the threat of American recognition and assistance as a 
bargaining weapon with the Central Powers. Trotsky apparently 
had American cigars shipped from Petrograd in order to emphasize 
this ruse of American-Russian collaboration. 4 
The day after Gumberg discussed the peace negotiations with 
Radek, Secretary of State Robert Lansing authorized Ambassador 
Francis to continue informal talks with the Soviet government in 
seeming acknowledgment that events at Brest-Litovsk might per-
mit closer relations with Soviet Russia. Over the next few days, 
Robins and Gumberg convinced Francis that mutual antagonism 
toward Germany could form the basis for Russian-American de-
tente. According to a contemporary who knew both Americans, 
"Gumberg's arguments in Robins' mouth made a most convincing 
case for recognition." 5 
Developments, though, proceeded too quickly to change of-
ficial American policy. Within eight days of Trotsky's denouement, 
the German Command recovered from the temporary shock of 
Trotsky's no-war, no-peace tactic and began on February 18, 1918, 
a general offensive along the Eastern Front. The Imperial German 
Army met little or no resistance. While the Soviet government at-
tempted to stop the offensive by agreeing to the original peace 
terms, the German Command delayed its response for several 
agonizing days. 
Recognizing its precarious position, the Soviet government 
prepared to transfer its capital to Moscow. Under those conditions 
the American embassy staff had to leave to avoid falling into Ger-
man hands. Robins and Gumberg arranged and accompanied the 
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flight of Francis and the embassy personnel to Vologda, a city 250 
miles northeast of Moscow and fortuitously situated at the junction 
of railroad lines leading eastward to Vladivostok and northward to 
Archangel. 
In Vologda, Gumberg kept touch with the one-sided 
German-Russian military confrontation through Trotsky's secre-
tary, Shalyapina, and Robins communicated with Lenin. 6 From the 
American viewpoint the news they received held little encourage-
ment. The Germans finally replied to Soviet peace overtures with 
an ultimatum. Negotiations had to resume in two days and a set-
tlement had to be reached within three days thereafter. Trotsky 
quietly resigned to George Chicherin his post as commissar of 
foreign affairs and he left to lesser lights the onerous task of signing 
on March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
The Draconian peace removed from Russian control mam-
moth chunks of territory, including the Ukraine and what would 
later become the countries of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Poland. Other adjustments concerned the Turkish-Russian 
border. Signatures on the treaty confirmed the loss to Russia of one-
third of her population. 7 Though Lenin desired peace at any cost, 
considerable opposition appeared against ratifying a treaty which 
would reverse the results of three centuries of Russian history. 
Aware that the Bolshevik party and the specially called Fourth 
Congress of Soviets would ratify the treaty only with great reluc-
tance and dissension, both Lenin and Trotsky began sounding out 
the Allies on the possibility of military aid. The initiative in this di-
rection had been taken already by Jacques Sadoul of the French 
Military Mission. In a series of conversations with the Soviet re-
gime, Sadoul pledged military support to the government. The 
Sadoul talks with Trotsky, shortly appointed commissar of war, ul-
timately found fruition in the highly unorthodox creation of a mili-
tary advisory board composed of members of the Italian, French, 
British, and American missions. During the uncertain and chaotic 
days between the resumption of the German offensive and the 
final ratification of the treaty, Trotsky also approved a British land-
ing of troops at Murmansk on March 1, 1918. Both the Allies and 
Russia felt Germany might capture Murmansk and use it as a sub-
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marine base. Finally, Trotsky and Lenin demonstrated their keen 
concern in securing Allied and American relief in a series of confer-
ences held on March 5, 1918, with Robins and Gumberg. 8 
On the night of March 4-5 Robins, accompanied by Gumberg, 
returned by train to Petrograd from Vologda. 9 In the morning they 
made their way to Smolny Institute where the Bolsheviks were in 
the process of gathering their papers for the move to Moscow. 
Trotsky advised Robins and Gumberg that Lenin possessed some 
flexibility on the treaty. He surprised the Americans by stating that 
if the United States and the Allies would guarantee economic and 
military assistance to Russia, Lenin would join the Left Communist 
faction of the party and refuse to sanction the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 
Trotsky also told his visitors that the Soviet government was con-
sidering moving the capital beyond the Ural Mountains to 
Ekaterinburg and reestablishing a military front against Germany 
at the Urals. 
Robins may have been a romantic, an overly emotional though 
effective speaker and a religious visionary, but he possessed more 
than a grain of common sense. He insisted Trotsky place his state-
ments in writing. The Americans left Smolny to give the govern-
ment time to prepare a written statement. They returned in the af-
ternoon to join Trotsky and Lenin in a frugal dinner. Lenin handed 
Robins a manuscript which he passed on to Gumberg who quickly 
translated it. Robins read Gumberg's rough translation. Should the 
peace between Germany and Russia fail, Lenin and Trotsky asked: 
1) Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United 
States of North America, Great Britain, and France in its struggle 
against Germany? 
2) What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future 
and on what conditions-military equipment, transportation, sup-
plies, living necessities? 
3) What kind of support would be furnished particularly and spe-
cially by the United States? 
Should Japan-in consequence of an open or tacit understanding 
with Germany or without such an understanding-attempt to seize 
Vladivostok and the Eastern Siberian Railway, which would 
threaten to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean and would greatly 
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impede the concentration of Soviet troops toward the East about the 
Urals-in such case what steps would be taken by the United States, 
to prevent a Japanese landing on our Far East? 10 
Gumberg and Robins recognized this to be the most serious 
gesture yet made by the Soviet government to gain recognition and 
help in the common cause against Germany. Scholars have tried to 
make light of or minimize the Soviet proposal because of its inter-
rogatory format, but quid pro quos are the stuff of diplomacy, and 
it would be folly to dismiss the Soviet paper as only an attempt to 
retain the allegiances of Robins and Gumberg. In their considerable 
excitement, they left Smolny to seek the company of Bruce Lock-
hart, Britain's special representative to Russia. They showed the 
document to Lockhart who had held similar conferences with 
Trotsky earlier in the day. Lockhart gave Robins a copy of a tele-
gram he had sent to the British Foreign Office, a portion of which 
read: "The Congress meets on March 12. Empower me to inform 
Lenin that the question of Japanese intervention had been shelved 
... that we are prepared to support the bolsheviks in so far as they 
will oppose Germany .... In return for this, there is every chance 
that war will be declared." 11 
That evening Gumberg feverishly improved his translation 
and Robins, aided by a member of the American Military Mission, 
coded the Soviet paper into cipher. After transmitting it to Vologda 
at 2:30 A.M. on March 6, 1918, for retransmission to the United 
States, Robins and Gumberg discovered that the American em-
bassy staff at Vologda could do nothing with the document. The 
military code had been returned to Petrograd by a member of the 
mission and the paper had to be hand-carried by Robins and Gum-
berg to Francis before any thought could be given to cabling its con-
tents to the State Department. 12 By the time the Soviet paper had 
been sent to the State Department, Robins and Gumberg had left 
Vologda to attend the Fourth Congress of Soviets meeting in the 
Hall of Nobles to accept or reject the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
The arrival of Robins and Gumberg in Moscow coincided with 
the establishment of the government in the new capital and the 
convening of delegates for the Congress. Seeking accommodations 
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became the first order of business. Gumberg acquired several 
rooms at the Hotel Elite through Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, secre-
tary to the Council of People's Commissars. 13 The Red Cross 
Commission shared its rooms with the British envoy Lockhart. 
Finding a place to stay proved far easier than coping with the 
difficult events which followed. According to Robins, Lenin in an-
ticipation of a positive American response to the Soviet inquiries 
delayed the opening of the Congress. 14 After the Congress con-
vened on March 14, 1918, the only word received from the United 
States came in the form of a message from President Wilson who 
spoke in generalities expressing his sympathies for the Russian 
people. Without any hope of American and Allied assistance, Rob-
ins and Gumberg felt the disappointment of watching Lenin per-
suade the delegates to vote in favor of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. 
It would have been logical at this point for relations to termi-
nate between the Soviet government and the Red Cross and other 
members of the American colony in Russia, but in fact cooperation 
continued unabated. One of the thorny problems facing the Soviet 
regime had been the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Siberia. 
By the arguments of Robins and Sadoul, Francis concluded that the 
United States should not support such an intervention, since a 
Japanese invasion would throw Russia and Germany closer to-
gether. Robins and Francis did not singly influence the Wilson ad-
ministration which faced heavy Allied pressure for American ap-
proval of Japanese intervention. President Wilson, with the back-
ing of advisers Colonel House, Root, and William C. Bullitt, re-
fused temporarily to sanction the use of Japan in the Far East as an 
Allied agent to reestablish an Eastern Front and prevent the arming 
of German prisoners of war then held in Siberia. Quite unaware of 
the contradictory pressures exerted on the president, the Soviet 
government may well have believed their relations with Robins 
and Gumberg had been decisive. Lenin indicated as much to 
Robins. 15 
Since the Soviet government felt it could use the Americans as 
an indirect instrument to check Japanese imperialism, the new 
commissar of war, Trotsky, actively sought Allied assistance in 
another area, building the new Red Army. Trotsky sought the ad-
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vice of the Allied military missions, and for a brief time Robins, 
Lockhart, and the military attaches of Italy, France, Great Britain, 
and the United States constituted an informal committee to guide 
the organization of the Soviet force. They hoped that once the Red 
Army had been fashioned, the government might tear up the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty and again engage the Central Powers in 
war.16 
Further cooperation persisted between Red Cross and Soviet 
officials. In a letter from Lenin and Chicherin, the Soviet govern-
ment expressed to Robins its appreciation for the aid rendered by 
the Red Cross. Although Russia formally stopped hostilities with 
the Central Powers, Lenin and Chicherin hoped the "useful and 
valuable work of the American Red Cross" would not be "consid-
ered as ended." Thus Gumberg continued his participation in the 
distribution of dwindling Red Cross supplies. In his frequent ab-
sences from Moscow, Robins left to Gumberg's care not only the 
management of Red Cross affairs but all matters pertaining to the 
informal relations with the Soviet government. 17 
Robins and Gumberg may also have indirectly triggered the 
Soviet government's raids against the capital's anarchists. The 
Moscow Federation of Anarchists had been an ally of the Bol-
sheviks during the early days of the government, but by the spring 
of 1918 their lawless activities had become an embarrassment, a 
reminder to the Allies that the Soviet regime lacked firm control 
over the country. On that morning of April 9, 1918, Robins and 
Gumberg stopped their Rolls-Royce outside the Central Telegraph 
Office in Moscow. Robins entered the office and sent a message to 
Francis at Vologda. When he returned he discovered that the car 
was surrounded by ten anarchists who had decided to requisition 
it. Gumberg had jumped to the fender of the automobile, evidently 
prepared to defend the colonel's vehicle to the last. (A year later 
Robins reported the events to the Overman committee of the Sen-
ate investigating Bolshevik propaganda. Robins's recounting of 
Gumberg's heroics brought spontaneous applause from committee 
members and witnesses present at the hearings.) One of the 
anarchists placed the muzzle of his cocked rifle deep in Gumberg' s 
midsection, threatening to blast him in half. Gumberg "grinned 
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and said to the anarchist thieves: 'You are not afraid, are you?' " 
The nonplussed attitude of Gumberg and the raw courage of Rob-
ins temporarily confused the anarchists. Both Americans rushed 
into the Rolls-Royce and ordered the driver to proceed. The 
anarchists climbed all over the car. Exhibiting more discretion than 
valor, their driver accepted directions from the anarchists. The car 
sped to the anarchists' headquarters where they placed it in a ga-
rage and bodily evicted the Americans from their vehicle. Finding 
argument useless, Robins and Gumberg helplessly watched the 
anarchists remove the American flag and Red Cross insignia from 
the car. 18 
Neither man enjoyed the adventure and each set about in his 
own way to regain the stolen vehicle. Robins reported the incident 
to Chicherin concluding with a left-handed threat: "I must make 
some report before too long to my government upon this incident 
and am desirous to be able to say that the matter has been entirely 
liquidated in harmony with the dignity and effective power of the 
Russian government." As Robins prepared his protest for Chicher-
in, Gumberg, aware of the sources of Soviet power, took a different 
tack. Using his considerable knowledge and influence, Gumberg 
brought the matter to the attention of Felix Dzerzhinsky, chairman 
of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counter-
Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation, an organization more fa-
miliarly known by its initials as the CHEKA. Dzerzhinsky gave Gum-
berg his written assurance that the automobile would be returned. 
Indeed three days after the Rolls-Royce had been taken, it was 
returned to its owners in slightly altered but driveable condition. 
The Soviet government had acquired the vehicle after a massive 
night-time raid on all the nests of anarchists then belonging to the 
Moscow Federation. 19 
The raid symbolized Robins's influence with the government 
and that government's ability to preserve order. Robins later as-
serted that anarchists, not Communists, had received German help 
and claimed to have seen German machine guns of the newest 
type at the anarchists' headquarters. While sufficient evidence is 
not available to prove this allegation it would seem that Robins 
through Gumberg did possess enough weight with Soviet au-
thorities to be a catalyst in the decision to obliterate the anarchists. 
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Their removal eliminated a politically offensive group on the 
periphery of Communist circles. The Soviet government's action 
certainly appeared to have been prompted, at least partially, by its 
sincere desire to improve relations with the United States govern-
ment. Although the regime did not specifically seek recognition, 
after the April incident the Soviet press speculated that Robins 
might become the new and official ambassador to Russia. 20 
Despite this groundwork for closer relations established by 
Robins and Gumberg, it had to be abandoned. For the Wilson ad-
ministration, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty sealed the policy of non-
recognition. Already perceived as anti-democrats and revolution-
ary socialists, the Bolsheviks now became full-fledged traitors to 
the war. The United States government did not concur with Robins 
that Russia might yet contribute to America's war strategy. Robins 
began to sense that his pleas for cooperation fell on deaf ears in 
Washington. He warned Red Cross leader Henry P. Davison, then 
in Paris, that if tangible support for his work and a more conciliatory 
policy by the Allies were not forthcoming, he would have to termi-
nate the Red Cross Commission in Russia. 
A series of events conspired to end the commission. America's 
consul general in Moscow, Madden Summers, married to an anti-
Bolshevik Russian, possessed no enthusiasm for the Soviet gov-
ernment. Shortly before his death, Summers cabled Washington 
calling for Robins's dismissal and threatening resignation if his re-
quest was not met. Summers suspected Robins and Gumberg of 
being Bolsheviks. The consul general learned that Gumberg had 
asked Louis E. Brown, a friend and correspondent for the Chicago 
Daily News, to make inquiries to his American office about the dis-
position of the Sisson papers. 21 It seemed to Summers that Robins 
and his translator had been engaged to do intelligence work for the 
Soviet government. 
At the same time, Edgar Sisson, still on his way home to 
America, wired from London, begging the Wilson administration 
to recall from Russia American personnel, particularly those as-
sociated with the American Red Cross and the Committee on Pub-
lic Information. He predicted that the Bolsheviks would use the 
Americans as hostages and make a "public show of their helpless-
ness, thus exploiting before the Russian masses their ability to in-
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sult with impunity the representatives of powerful peoples." Upset 
with Robins's all too sympathetic ties with Soviet Russia and fear-
ful that American lives might be endangered by their continued 
presence in Soviet-held territory, the State Department directed 
Cornelius Bliss, acting chairman of the American Red Cross War 
Council, to order the Red Cross Commission home. By the time 
Bliss sent his telegram on April 24, 1918, Robins had already de-
cided to leave. Few Red Cross medical supplies remained in Mos-
cow. On April20, 1918, Major Allen Wardwell, who stayed in Pet-
rograd, reported the existence of only 23,000 cans of milk, enough 
for one week's distribution. The total supply situation of both Pet-
rograd and Moscow had deteriorated so badly over the winter that 
the remaining members of the Red Cross Commission had been 
forced to break open and consume some of the relief supplies. 22 
The Russian experiences shared by Robins and Gumberg left 
an indelible mark upon their later careers. To the end of his stay 
Robins maintained a close working relationship with the Soviet 
leaders, who expressed to him their "gratitude for those great ser-
vices" rendered by the Red Cross. Shortly before his departure 
Lenin gave him a nine-page memorandum on "Russian American 
Commercial Relations," in hope of restoring trade between the 
countries. Lenin through Robins offered American business raw 
materials in return for assistance in rebuilding the war-torn coun-
try. For his part Robins promised both Lenin and Trotsky that he 
would continue to interpret Russia's new democracy to Americans. 
Robins, sporadically though at times with great intensity, kept his 
promise and for the next fifteen years he used his political and 
oratorical talents to keep alive the recognition issue and to plead for 
a more balanced appraisal of Russia's revolution. 23 
To Gumberg's intimacy with the leaders of Russia was added a 
new dimension: political influence in America, which sprang from 
the bonds of friendship developed between him and Robins. By 
the spring of 1918 they had become inseparable and Gumberg did 
not consider returning to America at any other time or with any-
one else except Robins. On the other hand, Zorin, after a series of 
adventures in Rumania, continued to work for the party as a judge 
in a revolutionary tribunal. Gumberg's other brother, Veniamin, a 
Menshevik and anti-Communist, required Gumberg's connections 
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to prevent incarceration by the Soviet regime. The struggles and 
political values held by Zorin and Veniamin could not be experi-
enced by their brother whose personality inclined him to lampoon 
ideology rather than fight for it. 24 
Nevertheless, Gumberg wanted to bring Americans and Rus-
sians together. His ties with Navy Mir, with the Committee on Pub-
lic Information, and with journalists Charles Russell, Albert Rhys 
Williams, Bessie Beatty, and Charles Smith, as well as Soviet corre-
spondents Karl Radek and Boris Reinstein, led him into a public 
relations effort to keep open the lines of communication between 
the two peoples. Late in April, after the Red Cross Commission 
had been ordered out of Russia, Gumberg and Lenin agreed that 
the New Yorker could make a genuine contribution to better rela-
tions by establishing a public information program in the United 
States. Out of their talks came a written directive from Lenin which 
assured Gumberg complete access to all printed materials held by 
the Soviet government on its recent history. Like John Reed and 
Edgar Sisson before him, Gumberg began collecting newspapers 
and other printed matter, not to write a memorable volume on the 
revolution or to prove a German-Bolshevik conspiracy, but to 
present a more balanced and as far as possible accurate picture of 
Soviet life to the American press. To this end Gumberg received an 
appointment from the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, precursor of 
TASS, as American representative. In order to gain a foothold with 
the American news media, Gumberg asked the Associated Press 
correspondent Charles Smith to write a letter of introduction to 
Melville E. Stone, general manager of the Associated Press in New 
York City. Smith spoke of Gumberg as "the medium through 
which the American Embassy kept in touch with the new govern-
ment" and as a "man with fuller knowledge than anyone I know 
concerning Russia's history for the last year." Finally, on the day 
before he left Moscow, May 14, 1918, Gumberg bid farewell to 
Trotsky. The war commissar asked Gumberg to be his literary 
agent, safeguarding the rights to his book The International and the 
War. Gumberg also carried with him Trotsky's manuscript Our 
Revolution, which Gumberg later had published in New York. 25 
After a relatively uneventful trip, Gumberg, Robins, and their 
traveling companion Louis E. Brown arrived in Vladivostok on 
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May 30, 1918. The journey by train across Siberia had taken sixteen 
days, slightly longer than usual due to a delay when one of the en-
gines jumped the track. All across the Eurasian land mass the three 
companions witnessed Soviet power in complete authority. Their 
pass, written by Lenin, smoothed all obstacles Gumberg could not 
overcome. On the way to and in Vladivostok the three met old 
friends and acquaintances. In Khabarovsk, they paused briefly to 
attend a session of the Far Eastern Council of People's Commis-
sars, presided over by the Chicago lawyer Alexander Kras-
noshchekov, known to both Robins and Gumberg. The former 
mayor of Vladivostok, Agarev, greeted the three men on their arri-
val. He had been an editor of Navy Mir. 26 Then too, Gumberg, 
Brown, and Robins visited with Williams. Williams's friend Bessie 
Beatty had left in January, carrying with her a report on the Red 
Cross to Henry P. Davison. John Reed was already in New York 
after a series of adventures, but Williams remained in Russia until 
the summer of 1918, writing articles for the Vladivostok news-
paper, Peasant and Worker. 
Williams saw the Americans off as they embarked on the Kama 
Maru for the long voyage to Seattle on June 6, 1918. He later re-
called the bon voyages to be rather sad and the mood of the Ameri-
cans to be quite glum. Robins, too late to change his plans, learned 
that his recall had been reconsidered and that he could have stayed 
three more weeks in Russia. Bending under the weight of heavy 
Allied pressure, the Wilson administration was reevaluating its 
policy on intervention and seemed to hope that Robins could se-
cure Bolshevik approval for the landing of Allied troops in Si-
beria. 27 The news west of Vladivostok further dispirited the Ameri-
cans. Czechoslovakian troops, prisoners of czarist Russia, had been 
organized by Thomas Masaryk into a fighting force for the Allies. 
They rejected their former subject status to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. The Soviet government agreed with the Allied request to 
let these troops leave Russia by way of Vladivostok on their way by 
sea to France and the Western Front. At the last minute insufficient 
transport at Vladivostok forced a reconsideration of the Czecho-
slovakian route in favor of the northern ports at Murmansk and 
Archangel. By the time the Allies could decide on a policy the former 
prisoners were armed and strung out all along the Siberian rail-
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road. Until the Allies developed a unified policy in regard to these 
soldiers, Trotsky decided on what appeared to be a prudent course 
-to have the Czech army disarmed. Local Soviet officials along 
the railroad tried to carry out the policy, but the Czech army, in 
a foreign country, being shunted about without adequate infor-
mation, refused to surrender its weapons. Incidents occurred and 
multiplied between Soviet and Czech troops. Highly organized, 
the Czech army proceeded to take matters into its own hands. 
By the time Gumberg, Robins, and Brown boarded the Kama 
Maru most of the railroad from Vladivostok to the Urals had come 
under the jurisdiction of the Czechs. Within weeks President Wil-
son approved Allied and American intervention, ostensibly to aid 
the peaceful departure of the Czech army. In reality Washington 
concluded that Japan would land troops with or without American 
approval and an American presence would hopefully brake 
Japanese imperialism. From the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 
American officials expressed concern for German prisoners of war 
whom, it was thought, were being armed by the Bolsheviks. De-
spite evidence to the contrary gathered by the American Red 
Cross, American and British Military missions, and American con-
sular officials, the United States joined Japan and the other Allies in 
a massive intervention program to "save" Czechs from "armed" 
German troops. The litmus paper turned red in President Wilson's 
acid test for American goodwill toward Russia. The revolt of the 
Czechs and the subsequent destruction of Soviet authority paved 
the way for the temporary elevation to power of counterrevolu-
tionary forces all along the Siberian railroad. Assisted by the 
Czechs and then American and Allied forces, these so-called 
Whites began and perpetuated a brutal civil war. The Czechs pro-
vided the Wilson administration with a means to intervene in Rus-
sia without violating publicly the president's own call for the self-
determination of peoples and for the territorial integrity of Russia. 
This new force solved temporarily Wilson's dilemma of how to bal-
ance his opposition to revolutionary socialism with his moral pre-
cepts. The almost subtle anti-Bolshevik nature of American inter-
vention was revealed in the actions of Ambassador Boris 
Bakhmetev. The United States permitted the intrepid representa-
tive to disburse millions of dollars of funds, intended originally for 
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the defunct Provisional government, for arms and ammunition. 
Through Bakhmetev, the American government bolstered and 
subsidized the anti-Bolshevik forces with over 200,000 weapons. 
The goodwill President Wilson wished upon the Russian people 
choked and perished in Russian blood. Gumberg and his friends 
experienced the last unobstructed train ride across Russia until 
1922. 28 
Between Gumberg and Williams, the good-byes were not 
without some humor. Reflecting upon Williams's unorthodox Rus-
sian career, including his participation in an international socialist 
brigade, Gumberg could not resist throwing out one more parting 
shot to his companion of the night ride to the Winter Palace on the 
day of the Bolshevik insurrection. "The trouble with you writing 
fellows is that it's not enough for you to record history; you insist 
on making it, too." Williams retorted with affection, "Not everyone 
can be so modest as you, Alex, or have your talent for making 
history-but always in the background." 29 For the next fifteen 
years Gumberg did make history, in his quiet unobtrusive way 
seeking to neutralize the acid poured on American-Russian rela-
tions by war, revolution, and intervention. 
4 
THE UNOBTRUSIVE PUBLICIST 
WHEN ALEXANDER GUMBERG returned to the United States, 
he expected to operate a part-time information bureau which 
would provide detached truth about Soviet Russia. Enjoying the 
spring breezes on board ship, he could not have fathomed the 
coming storm he would face after landing in America. Within 
weeks Gumberg saw his plans destroyed. The issue of helping 
Soviet Russia against the German enemy no longer existed in the 
American matrix. Intervention and the amalgamation of Bolsheviks 
with Huns ended all prospects for promoting Russian recognition 
or even operating a news agency. Gumberg's lack of ideological 
commitment further complicated his life. Possessing strong ties 
withboth Soviet Russia and the United States only made him sus-
pect to American radicals and red-baiters alike. Gradually, Gum-
berg overcame his handicap to support and assist quietly important 
publicists and publications which appraised Russia in positive or at 
least rational terms. For the next three years Gumberg worked to 
correct the erroneous image Russia evoked in the American mind 
in order to achieve reconciliation between his adopted and native 
lands. 
The Kama Maru docked at Seattle on June 20, 1918. Gumberg, 
Raymond Robins, and Louis Brown overcame mixed feelings about 
Russian events to share a common joy at being home again. Their 
exuberance faded quickly, however. Instead of hailing Robins for 
his generous and humane services to the Russian people, federal 
agents searched his companions as if they carried a new disease, 
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bolshevism, which might prove fatally infectious on American soil. 
Robins was "quarantined": the Wilson administration enjoined 
him from making any public statements on Russia. Perplexed at 
this ill treatment, the men proceeded to Chicago where they re-
ceived a warmer welcome from William Boyce Thompson and 
Thomas Thacher. The reunited leaders of the Red Cross Commis-
sion then traveled by train to Washington, D.C., to begin a fruitless 
lobbying campaign to prevent American intervention in Russia. 1 
For a while Gumberg continued to work for the Red Cross, but 
he left Robins to reestablish himself in New York. In different times 
and circumstances his new life in Greenwich Village might have 
been idyllic. He was independent. From his various Russian activi-
ties, he had saved a modest amount of money which gave him 
financial security. 2 
Gumberg's employment as the North American representative 
for the Petrograd Telegraph Agency (PTA), though, proved illu-
sory. Since the Allied embargo of Soviet Russia prohibited use of 
the cables, Gumberg could perform no service for the PTA. It would 
not be until1923 that the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), suc-
cessor to the PTA, could sponsor an American correspondent, Ken-
neth Durant, in New York. Nevertheless, Gumberg worked cas-
ually for Thacher's law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett while 
also acting as a paid consultant on Russian affairs for Allen 
Wardwell's law firm of Stetson, Jennings & Russell. He delivered 
expert testimony on Soviet Russia's confiscation policies in civil 
litigation concerned with American property in Russia. 3 
Logically, Gumberg should have found an outlet for his talents 
with the Russian Soviet Government Bureau. Established early in 
1919 in the World Tower Building by Ludwig C. A. K. Martens and 
his assistant Santeri Nuerteva, the bureau became the leading dis-
seminator of information on the new Russian government through 
its journal, Soviet Russia. Martens had been appointed by Soviet 
Russia as the official representative for America in January 1919. 
The bureau, partially financed by czarist jewels, received addi-
tional support from American business through the American 
Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia. Martens 
failed to open trade or diplomatic relations. The State Department 
refused to acknowledge Martens's credentials in March 1919. Al-
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though Martens made tentative contracts with numerous business 
firms for $30 million, they went unfulfilled. The Federal Reserve 
Board prohibited the import or export of Russian rubles in Feb-
ruary 1919 and the State Department, through its control of the 
War Trade Board's Russian licensing policy, would not allow ex-
port licenses for American manufactures going to Soviet Russia. 4 
Whatever optimism Gumberg held for spearheading the in-
formation program through the Martens Mission diminished in the 
Red Scare. The amalgam Edgar Sisson initiated, linking hatred for 
Germans with communism, combined with labor unrest to culmi-
nate in January 1920 when officials arrested 4,000 alleged radicals 
in thirty-three cities. Like Robins, Gumberg suffered continual ha-
rassment and surveillance by federal secret service agents. Possess-
ing through Robins contacts with high-ranking public officials, 
Gumberg avoided some of the worst moments of the Red Scare. 
From the instant he entered the United States, though, federal au-
thorities treated him as one suspected of spying for an unfriendly 
power. Only his sense of humor prevented him from becoming bit-
ter toward the government which suspected him of treason. Floyd 
Odlum, then a junior clerk for Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, re-
called that Gumberg leased a first-floor apartment for the conven-
ience of the federal agents and placed outside his window a bench 
permitting the agents a measure of relaxation while watching his 
activities. "When he went out he would say hello to them and tell 
them where he was going so they could follow him easily." 5 
At first Gumberg found his influence to be quite limited in 
both American and Soviet journalistic circles. The letter of intro-
duction correspondent Charles S. Smith generously wrote to Mel-
ville Stone, general manager of the Associated Press, failed to im-
press the AP director. Stone's close friend, Ambassador David R. 
Francis, had warned that Robins was a pseudo-Bolshevik and 
should be ignored. 6 Hence Stone would have nothing to do with 
Robins's companion, Gumberg. He experienced greater disap-
pointment in the frequent snubs and suspicions encountered 
among American and Russian-American friends who held views 
sympathetic to Soviet Russia. When John Reed returned to New 
York he had broadcast to all who would listen that Gumberg clung 
to pernicious counterrevolutionary ideas and could not be trusted. 
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While federal authorities had Gumberg under surveillance, he en-
dured slander and whispers behind his back from those most likely 
to appreciate his thoughts about the Russian revolution. Reed's as-
sertions kept Gumberg outside the radicals supporting Martens 
and the Russian Soviet Government Bureau. For a year he tried to 
ward off or minimize Reed's verbal assault. 
Finally, in 1919 Gumberg asked Max Eastman to act as a 
mediator. Eastman later became an opponent of Soviet Russia, but 
in 1919 the editor of the pro-Bolshevik magazine, Liberator, was the 
most celebrated radical writer in the United States. Gumberg 
hoped Eastman could either change Reed's attitude or submit 
findings on Reed's accusations to Martens, the unrecognized rep-
resentative for George Chicherin and the Soviet Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs. Gumberg invited Eastman to dine at the Brevoort 
Hotel, a Bohemian-style establishment in Greenwich Village with 
bankers' prices. Robins accompanied him and together they spent 
an evening outlining to Eastman Gomberg's work in Russia. As a 
result, Eastman agreed to attempt conciliation. He arranged an ap-
pointment in his office where the antagonists could confront each 
other. Gumberg arrived first. When Reed entered Eastman's office, 
his uncontrollable rage burst forth on sighting Gomberg. He 
shouted to Eastman that he would not "talk to that counter-
revolutionary son of a bitch." Since Reed's outburst ended any 
hope of terminating the feud, Gumberg prevailed on Eastman to 
write an account of his mediation attempt to Martens. Eastman 
admitted his inability to bring the pair together, but also pointed 
out that Gumberg possessed papers documenting his aid for the 
peoples of Soviet Russia. As to Gomberg's alleged counter-
revolutionary activities, Eastman stated that Reed provided no 
witnesses or documents and "Jack never convinced me of his asser-
tion." Martens's reaction to the Eastman memorandum is un-
known. Subsequently Reed left for Russia where he died of 
typhus. Martens, under investigation by the New York State legis-
lature and the United States Senate, had been ordered deported by 
the Labor Department following disclosures that the Soviet repre-
sentative gave aid to the American Communist movement. Gum-
berg seemed not to have effectively bridged the suspicions caused 
by Reed until he formed a lengthy association with Boris E. 
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Skvirsky, later director of the semiofficial Soviet Union Information 
Bureau in Washington. 7 
Despite engendering the suspicions of Soviet sympathizers 
and his own government, Gumberg tried to help correct the popu-
lar press's frequently negative account of Russia's revolution. Al-
bert Rhys Williams first helped Gumberg gain access to those 
periodicals most likely to value his knowledge. In November 1918 
Williams recommended Gumberg to Harold Stearns, associate 
editor of the liberal journal Dial. At the time Stearns planned a spe-
cial issue on Russia to be published in January 1919 and asked 
Gum berg to advise and assist him in its preparation. Gum berg's 
modest contribution consisted of translating one of Lenin's 
speeches and reviewing for accuracy several articles considered for 
publication. These rather inauspicious beginnings enhanced Gum-
berg's reputation. Before long specialty publications, such as Asia, 
sought and used his expertise to criticize manuscripts and answer 
questions concerning Russian affairs. 8 
Gumberg established a more fruitful relation with William 
Hard, a friend of Robins and a free-lance correspondent. Robins 
advised Hard to talk with Gumberg in May 1919 when the jour-
nalist researched a series of six articles for the New Republic on 
anti-bolshevism in America. Gumberg counseled Hard for these 
articles and for his biography of Robins. The New Republic series fo-
cused on the role of Bakhmetev and the clique supporting the Rus-
sian embassy's anti-Bolshevik propaganda machine in America. 9 
Nearly two years after the Kerensky regime ceased to exist, the 
United States government continued to accept its representative as 
ambassador. Since the Wilson administration refused to recognize 
Soviet Russia or the several counterrevolutionary regimes in Russia 
then carrying on a civil war against the Red Army, the Russian em-
bassy in Washington had the peculiar distinction of being both the 
official embassy and capital of Russia. 
Hard castigated Bakhmetev' s ties to the Russian Information 
Bureau in New York. The bureau's organ, Struggling Russia, not 
only called for America's recognition of the anti-Bolshevik Omsk 
regime in Siberia led by Admiral Alexander Kolchak but also fed 
anti-Soviet materials to American publicists. John Spargo, some-
time socialist, President Wilson's ardent supporter, and author of 
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Bolshevism: The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy, relied on 
translations of Soviet documents by the Russian Information 
Bureau. Since Spargo used Soviet sources, his book seemed par-
ticularly damning. 10 
Gumberg enabled Hard to discredit both Spargo and the Rus-
sian Information Bureau. Spargo had cited an article in Izvestia (July 
28, 1918) which purportedly showed that Soviet Russia imposed 
severe punishments, such as floggings and lynchings, for petty lar-
ceny. Gumberg retranslated the same article, demonstrating that 
the Russian Information Bureau had neglected to give Spargo the 
headline and introductory sentence which described lynchings and 
floggings in the town of Loupia as a nightmare. Nor did the bureau 
give Spargo Izvestia's terse, single-word editorial comment, "horri-
ble," at the conclusion of the story. 11 In short, the article had been 
published to condemn, not to condone, floggings. 
Collaboration with Hard in the New Republic articles opened 
other avenues for Gum berg's campaign to rectify the one-sided 
view of Russia projected in America in the era of the Red Scare. In 
August 1919 Hard brought Gumberg to the attention of James G. 
McDonald, chairman of the Executive Committee of the League of 
Free Nations Association. Formed in 1918 out of the old League to 
Enforce Peace, the League of Free Nations Association contained 
among its members the elite of American progressive thinkers, in-
cluding the New Republic's Herbert Croly, historians Charles and 
Mary Beard, editor William Allen White, educational philosopher 
John Dewey, and labor economist John R. Commons. The associa-
tion advocated a League of Nations in 1918 but only on condition 
that such a league uphold liberal concepts of free trade, free seas, 
and a bill of rights for all countries. 12 
By late summer 1919 many liberal journals such as the Dial and 
the New Republic as well as the League of Free Nations turned 
against President Wilson and the Versailles Peace Treaty. Liberal 
disaffection mounted with each critical article penned by the New 
Republic's Walter Lippmann and Walter Weyl who covered the Paris 
conference. The two correspondents exposed European hypocrisy 
and concluded that Europe planned to maintain peace through 
old-fashioned force and power politics. In addition, President Wil-
son's Russian policy sparked liberal outrage and widened the 
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breach separating Wilson from his former supporters. The League 
of Free Nations hoped for free trade; yet the Allied powers clamped 
an embargo on goods going to Soviet Russia. While the United 
States did not officially join the embargo, the government did noth-
ing to open trade. By February 1918 a State Department-controlled 
licensing system restricted Russian-American trade. Furthermore, 
America's Russian intervention enflamed criticism, including con-
gressional complaints from Robins's political friends, Senators 
Robert La Follette, Hiram Johnson, and William E. Borah. Finally, 
William C. Bullitt punctuated liberal disillusionment when he de-
livered his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee chaired by President Wilson's steadfast foe Henry Cabot Lodge 
in September 1919. 13 
Bullitt, sent that spring from Paris to Moscow as an Allied 
emissary, reported his views on Wilson's Russian policy. Bullitt re-
vealed that Wilson and the Allies had ignored Soviet Russia's 
seemingly reasonable seven-point program to end the embargo, in-
tervention, and civil war. The emissary had returned to Paris in the 
midst of a colossal row between Wilson and the French over the 
fate of the Saar at the peace conference. Also, White forces ap-
peared to be winning the Russian Civil War and there seemed to be 
no compelling reason to placate the Soviet government. Finally, 
Communists assumed power briefly in Hungary adding credence 
to the prevalent fear that Bolsheviks might be able to fulfill their 
promise of staging an international class revolution. 14 
When the League of Free Nations Association decided to un-
derwrite the publication of a documentary source book on Rus-
sian-American relations from 1917, they chose as one of the two 
editors Walter W. Pettit who had accompanied Bullitt on his quest 
for peace in March 1919. Gumberg received Hard's endorsement to 
be employed as an adviser on the volume being prepared by Pettit 
and Caroline K. Cumming. Robins also urged that McDonald use 
Gumberg on the project. 15 
Over the winter of 1919-1920, Gumberg worked closely with 
Pettit and Cumming, providing translations and suggesting mate-
rials for the book. Although a paid consultant, Gumberg received 
the grateful appreciation of the League of Free Nations' Executive 
Committee which praised his "invaluable assistance in getting the 
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Russian volume ready for press" and his "painstaking and con-
scientious effort to make this volume an impartial and invaluable 
source for those who wish to study Russian-American relations." 
The 1920 publication of American-Russian Relations, March 1917-
March 1920, marked the advent of a pioneer effort to provide a fac-
tual documentary account of Soviet-American relations before ar-
chival records of the era would be available to the general public. 
For Gumberg's subsequent career the project had great personal 
significance as it broadened his contacts with important opinion-
makers.16 
The acquaintances and friends Gumberg made over the years, 
political and literary figures on all points of the ideological spec-
trum, bear witness to his astounding ability to ingratiate himself 
with widely divergent groups and individuals. In the 1930s Gum-
berg capitalized on his connections with various writers and 
periodicals as a well-paid Wall Street public relations expert. Yet 
Joseph Freeman, an editor of the Communist-supported New Mas-
ses, treasured the advice of the ideologically skeptical GumbergY 
In 1919 a less incongruous relationship formed between Gum-
berg and a fellow maverick, Upton Beall Sinclair. Gumberg appar-
ently met Sinclair for the first time in August 1919 shortly before he 
undertook the assignment with the League of Free Nations Associ-
ation. Their meeting resulted from Gum berg's marriage to the for-
mer Emma Frances Adams, known to all her friends simply as 
Frankie. Robins witnessed their New York wedding on May 27, 
1919, and had been indirectly involved in their courtship. Gum-
berg had met Frankie through Robins's wife, Margaret. Adams 
directed one of the New York affiliates of the National Women's 
Trade Union League. Member of the famed and historic Adams 
family, she was not only attractive, talented in music and horse-
manship, but also, long before the term became current, liberated. 
Their marriage, barren of children, seems to have been cemented 
by the peculiar mixture of immigrant and patrician. They thrived 
on their differences. While the marriage could never be considered 
one of the great love affairs of history, the constancy and concern 
each brought to the other's life was admirable if not touching. 
Gumberg "had a way with her, as with others, but her conscious-
ness of being an ADAMS asserted itself once her Russian-Jew hus-
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band was dead." After 1939 Frankie infuriated Robins by reverting 
to her maiden name, but for twenty years she supported Alexander 
and polished some of the jagged edges of her immigrant husband. 
In the summer of 1919 the newlyweds traveled to Monrovia, 
California, where Frankie introduced her new husband to family 
and friends, including Upton Sinclair. 18 
The oddity of a founder of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society 
and the author of the famed muckraking work, The Jungle, hob-
nobbing among old and prestigious families was more apparent 
than real. Sinclair came from a long line of Baltimore aristocrats 
who served with distinction as officers in the United States Navy. 
By Sinclair's own admission he thrived in high society and his 
novels proved effective in contrasting social classes, drawing 
characterizations of the worlds of the rich and the poor, and dwell-
ing on the conflict between the two. Although remembered for his 
activities on behalf of economic and social reform, Sinclair shared 
Gumberg' s detachment from firm ideological commitments. When 
the United States entered the war in April 1917, Sinclair made a 
moral judgment in favor of America's participation. He became an 
important supporter of the Wilson administration while most of his 
socialist colleagues took an antiwar position, and published a small 
prowar socialist magazine, Upton Sinclair's. 19 
The issues of Russia and American civil liberties, however, 
brought him to loggerheads with the government within a year. In 
the spring of 1918 the federal government brought to trial the radi-
cal periodical Masses for its antiwar and pro-Bolshevik content. 
When John Reed and Max Eastman became involved as defen-
dants, Sinclair was incensed. He had spent a year and his own 
money to organize and publish a socialist magazine extolling the 
war for democracy in Europe only to discover democracy sub-
verted in America. Sinclair lashed out at this effort to suppress 
domestic dissent, but his final break with the Wilson administra- . 
tion occurred over Russia. Before merging his small journal with 
Emmanuel Haldeman-Julius's socialist weekly, Appeal to Reason, 
Sinclair began a serialized novel, later published as a book, Jimmie 
Higgins: A Story. Sinclair's volume, reflecting the changing moods 
of the author toward the war, concluded with an attack on Ameri-
ca's Russian intervention. 20 
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During Gumberg's month-long sojourn in California in 1919, 
he and Sinclair spent a great deal of time together discussing Rus-
sia and the anti-Soviet campaign in the American press. Shortly 
before Gum berg's arrival, Appeal to Reason ran a front-page story 
on "How America Refused Lenin's Call for Aid." The story out-
lined the Soviet government's March 1918 initiatives to garner 
American aid in the face of German aggression. In the earlier 
merger agreement between Upton Sinclair's and Appeal to Reason, 
Sinclair received a full page of his own for editorial comments. Dur-
ing and shortly after Gumberg's visit, Sinclair's page, with such 
headings as "War on Russia" and "Russia-Pro and Con," 
reflected a high degree of concern with intervention and the press 
attacks against Soviet Russia. In preparing these editorials Sinclair 
had relied upon Gumberg' s knowledge for background material. 21 
Although still on his honeymoon, Gumberg agreed to read 
Sinclair's manuscript The Brass Check, a work of nonfiction which 
laid bare the distortion of news surrounding social justice battles 
which had engaged Sinclair's attention over the years. As the title 
suggested, Sinclair believed the American press had prostituted it-
self to the shrine of capitalism. Gumberg contributed his thoughts 
on Melville Stone and read Sinclair's chapter entitled "The Case of 
Russia." Specifically, Sinclair queried Gumberg about Soviet au-
thor Maxim Gorky, translating the names of Soviet newspapers 
and the transition of monarchist to revolutionary newspapers, 
czarist spy Eugene Azev, and Melville Stone's reception of a deco-
ration from Czar Nicholas II. Gumberg advised Sinclair on the 
Russian chapter which reviled the capitalist press for lies and dis-
tortions concerning such topics as Bolshevik atrocities in the civil 
war and the ridiculous stories on the Soviet nationalization of 
women. 22 
Early in September 1919 the Gumbergs left California by train 
for their new apartment off Union Square in New York. Gumberg 
then devoted considerable time to the Cumming and Pettit volume 
on Soviet-American relations. That particular book, though, did 
not satisfy his desire to place before the American public those 
sources he had collected in Russia on the revolution and on the 
new Soviet government. G. G. Wyant of Yale University Press had 
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written earlier to Gumberg and expressed interest in publishing a 
"Source Book on the Russian Revolution" based upon the Gum-
berg archives. Wyant learned of the Gumberg collection from the 
New Republic's Herbert Croly. 23 
The unsolicited inquiry from Yale elevated Gumberg's spirit 
and offered the prospect of fulfilling a year-long dream. As soon as 
his California honeymoon ended, he began a series of negotiations 
with George Parmly Day, editor of Yale University Press, concern-
ing the projected publication of a two-volume source book. Their 
discussions proceeded to the selection of an editor, either Edward 
A. Ross or Archibald Coolidge. Coolidge, earlier appointed as one 
of three historians by the National Board for Historical Research to 
investigate the Sisson documents, had refused to attest to their au-
thenticity. His colleagues, J. Franklin Jameson, editor of the Ameri-
can Historical Review, and Samuel N. Harper of the University of 
Chicago, after undergoing heavy pressure from the Wilson admin-
istration and much to their later embarrassment, sanctioned the 
collection of forgeries. Obviously Coolidge possessed integrity, but 
Gumberg' s repeated pleas with Day to place him in contact with 
the historian went unheeded. After protracted talks and corre-
spondence, Day finally informed Gumberg in November that 
members of the Committee on Publications of Yale University had 
individually and quietly informed Day that they would not ap-
prove the publication of the proposed book should the subject be 
formally raised at one of the committee's meetings. 24 
Very suddenly Gumberg discovered he had neither an editor 
nor a publisher and yet boxes of documents cluttered his new 
apartment. Immediately he and the former members of the Red 
Cross Commission took action to preserve and publish the mate-
rial. In July 1919 Avrahm Yarmolinsky, representative for the New 
York Public Library had asked Gumberg to deposit his archives 
with that institution. The hope of publishing the materials pre-
vented Gumberg from turning his documents over to the library at 
that time. However, after termination of the negotiations with Yale 
University Press, he had his lawyer and former associate on the 
Red Cross Commission, Thomas Thacher, arrange for the deposit 
of his books, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and other 
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documents with the New York Public Library. The agreement, 
completed between December 2 and 4, 1919, kept the archives 
closed until Gumberg finished his examination of the contents. In 
return for the accession of these valuable sources on Russia, the li-
brary made available to Gumberg and his assistants a special study 
room which became his office for the next year. 25 
During these 1919 negotiations Gumberg and Thacher kept 
Robins abreast of developments. After Robins had been asked that 
spring to testify on Bolshevik propaganda before a committee of 
the United States Senate, he no longer felt enjoined to remain si-
lent about Russia. Robins began a flurry of speaking engagements 
and political maneuvers seeking to alter American foreign policy 
but resulting in his complete physical and mental collapse in the 
spring of 1921. 
In December 1919, though, Robins was hale, hearty, and ex-
hibiting his forensic talents before the student body of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin. When he learned from Gumberg and Thacher 
that Yale University Press decided not to publish the source book, 
Robins agreed that former members of the Red Cross Commission 
should underwrite the publication of a historical summary of those 
documents in the hands of Gumberg and other members of the 
commission. At Wisconsin, Robins made an appointment to see 
Edward A. Ross. When Robins and Ross completed their talks, the 
famed pioneer in sociology agreed to become the project's editor-
in-chief. Ross also agreed to contact his publisher, Century Com-
pany, about printing the proposed two-volume study of Soviet 
Russia. The sociologist made appropriate arrangements with the 
University of Wisconsin to take an early sabbatical in the fall of 1920 
to begin preparing the volumes. 26 
Although known primarily as an author and scholar in the 
fields of economics and sociology, Ross held a special interest in 
Russian social processes. In 1917 the American Institute of Social 
Service sponsored his research trip to study Russia's revolution. 
His findings appeared the following year in a book entitled Russia 
in Upheaval. Associated with many of the same Progressive per-
sonalities known to Robins, Ross also had met Gumberg. Two 
years earlier, in December 1917, Gumberg had accompanied Ross 
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on a visit to a government-owned worker-managed munitions 
plant at Sestroretsk, ten miles outside Petrograd. Through corre-
spondence Robins arranged a New York meeting between himself, 
Gumberg, Ross, Thacher, and Wardwell at the Bankers Club on 
February 2, 1920. The two-hour conference produced an elaborate 
agreement in which the former members of the Red Cross Com-
mission decided to publish a "factual," "objective," and noncontro-
versial account of Soviet Russia but which undoubtedly was de-
signed to uphold the commission's sympathetic regard for the 
Soviet experiment and neutralize the voluminous material then 
being published against Russia. The Red Cross group subsequently 
asked Ross to avoid all acknowledgment as to the source of funds 
and documents for the books. Nevertheless, Robins, Thacher, and 
Wardwell each subscribed $2,000 to pay the salaries of Ross and 
Gumberg. Gumberg indexed and translated the Russian material 
for Ross and collaborated closely with him in collating the sources for 
The Russian Bolshevik Revolution and The Russian Soviet Republic. 27 
The volumes produced no dramatic change in the predomi-
nately anti-Soviet views held by the majority of the American peo-
ple. However, Ross and his associates presented, in 1921 and 1923, 
a reasonably factual, critically sympathetic account of Bolshevik 
Russia; it was solidly documented and written by a reputable 
scholar widely acclaimed for his insight into social behavior. In the 
words of Ross, he offered the study "on the theory that intelligent 
people are tired of being the victims of propaganda about Russia." 
He found the "key to the Russian Revolution" to be a "reaction 
against the unbearable," and he stressed the heavy responsibility 
czarist Russia bore for the radical turn of events of the twentieth 
century. 28 The first volume chronicled Russia's revolutionary year, 
1917. In the second, Ross carried his narrative to 1921 and em-
phasized such themes as the beneficial American Red Cross role 
and the harmful effect intervention had on Russia. The concluding 
chapters offered a series of vignettes on Soviet life, extremely crit-
ical of Communist ideology, yet designed to dispel the hysterical 
view of Bolsheviks as oversexed, bomb-throwing anarchists who 
enjoyed the sight of blood. In short, the books presented to the in-
telligent reading public an alternative view of Soviet Russia-
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understanding, even accepting, Russian events without the wild 
moral condemnation so frequently expressed in the popular press. 
The year Gumberg devoted to this grand project produced 
other dividends. In his work at the New York Public Library, he 
employed the services of a stenographer, but he also had assistance 
in refining his translations from a young writer, William Henry 
Chamberlin. Chamberlin impressed Gumberg during the course of 
their endeavors, so much so, that Gumberg later loaned him six 
hundred dollars to finance a trip to Europe and Russia. Their rela-
tionship redounded to their mutual advantage. Chamberlin wrote 
lengthy letters to Gumberg providing up-to-date information on 
Russia and Gumberg helped place Chamberlin's articles on Russia 
in American periodicals; he even checked galley proofs until 
Chamberlin became a correspondent for the Christian Science 
Monitor. Chamberlin's lengthy stay in Russia eventually led to the 
publication of a classic two-volume study, The Russian Revolution. 
In one of those recurrent twists of fate Chamberlin in the 1930s be-
came progressively disenchanted with the Soviet Union. In 1923, 
though, he wrote Gumberg: "My greatest grief is the thought that 
some day, after I have spent every cent I can earn or borrow, I will 
have to go back [to the United States]. For a man like yourself, who 
could certainly land a good job, Russia should be an infinitely pref-
erable place to live." Chamberlin suggested not only that Gumberg 
leave America but that he should join the Communist party. To 
this Gumberg replied: "I ... went through the revolution in 1917 
unscathed, there is not much chance of my becoming a convert at 
this late hour. And frankly I have seen so many of the post 1917 
bolsheviks [sic], that I have no desire to look like them. I prefer to 
remain a free lance, a sympathetic bystander and well wisher." 29 
In the two years following his return from Russia, Gumberg 
retained his independence. Undergoing the enormous strain of 
being a Russian-American during the period of the Red Scare, he 
managed to maintain his sense of humor, to preserve his 
nonideological stance, and to resist the temptation to return to 
Russia where his talents would undoubtedly have received greater 
appreciation. Gumberg overcame harassment from American gov-
ernmental agencies, separation from his employment with the Pet-
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rograd Telegraph Agency and from semiofficial Soviet groups by 
the slanders of John Reed, to work diligently with important publi-
cists and institutions to improve the climate of opinion in America 
toward Soviet Russia. The measure of his success would be impos-
sible to gauge except in the end product of important articles and 
books published with Gumberg's aid. In the early 1920s Gumberg 
combined this role, as an unobtrusive publicist, with a political role 
in order to try to gain the recognition of Soviet Russia by the 
United States. 
5 
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ALEXANDER GOMBERG NEVER gained fame as a literary figure. 
Through the years his English improved considerably and he died 
in the midst of a public relations career with an investment firm, 
Atlas Corporation. By 1939 he wrote refined prose in the best Wall 
Street tradition. He always possessed, however, a genuine talent 
for relaying information through personal contact. At a glance 
Gumberg seemed poorly suited for the path he cut for himself-a 
mediator between two societies. A childhood disease impaired the 
normal function of a leg, and when combined with overly long 
arms, the slight limp made him ungainly. More than one person 
who knew him reflected on his primeval appearance, formidable, if 
not frightening. 1 Those who met and chatted with him, though, 
soon forgot his physical impairment. His pleasant, handsome face, 
his quiet but quick cadence of speech, eliciting thoughts terse and 
prescient with a touch of cynical humor, pleased most of his con-
temporaries. Gumberg rarely demonstrated anger or vindictive-
ness, save toward John Reed. His even-tempered personality and 
ability made him a natural reconciler between the worlds of 
capitalism and communism. 
From June 1918 to March 1921 Gumberg devoted most of his 
energy to correcting the lopsided Russian picture painted by the 
American press. Meanwhile his friend Raymond Robins worked 
indefatigably to gain Republican support for their views on Russia. 
During these three years Robins coordinated the Russian cause al-
most singlehandedly. Then suddenly in the spring and summer of 
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1921 two events conspired to vault Gumberg into the political 
arena. Robins left the scene temporarily, passing the torch of his 
campaign to his former secretary, and second, Russia suffered fam-
ine. Gumberg, through his associations with liberal journalists, 
spearheaded a relief agency and as Robins's heir tried to soften the 
stridently anti-Bolshevik views of the Harding administration. 
After Robins, William Boyce Thompson, and Thomas Thacher 
failed in the summer of 1918 to talk Woodrow Wilson out of an in-
terventionist policy, Robins convinced himself that any fundamen-
tal change in America's Russian policy required a Republican Con-
gress and president. In September, two months after President 
Wilson decided to join the Allies in sending troops to Russia, Rob-
ins asked Thompson to meet Will Hays, chairman of the Republi-
can congressional campaign of 1918, and Fred Upham, treasurer of 
the Republican party. Thompson agreed to contribute several hun-
dred thousand dollars in the successful venture to gain a Republi-
can victory in the fall elections. The magnate later became chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee of the Republican party 
with the special task of raising money for the 1920 presidential 
campaign. While he exercised political clout through his millionaire 
associate, Robins carefully cultivated the dissident Republican 
Senators Robert La Follette, William E. Borah, and Hiram Johnson. 
The latter introduced a resolution on December 2, 1918, calling on 
the secretary of state to clarify the purpose of America's interven-
tion in Russia. 2 Within six months American troops left north Rus-
sia, and a little over a year after Johnson and his colleagues began 
to question the intervention policy, the United States troops with-
drew from Siberia. Intervention had been a debacle. Weakly de-
fended by the Wilson administration, the policy had been widely 
criticized by those who, in the general atmosphere of retrenchment 
following the conclusion of the First World War, desired to have 
American soldiers returned home. As early as February 1919, a 
measure calling for the withdrawal of American forces found the 
Senate evenly divided and failed by the tie-breaking vote of Vice 
President Thomas Marshall. 3 
Robins made his contribution to the pressure against Presi-
dent Wilson. His stratagems, though, were dwarfed by the force of 
events which actually dictated the reversal of American foreign pol-
72 Alexander Gumberg 
icy. The avowed mission of United States troops in Russia had 
been to protect Czechoslovakian forces and the residue of Allied 
supplies from the Germans. The end of war only too quickly de-
stroyed rationalizations supporting use of Allied armies in Russia. 
The unpublicized reasons for American military participation in 
Siberia and north Russia, i.e., limitation of Japanese expansion 
and circumspect assistance to anti-Bolshevik governments, also 
evaporated. At the outset, Japanese forces entered Siberia in 
sufficient strength to make America's 12,000 troops insignificant in 
comparison. Furthermore, the brilliant and frequently brutal 
Commissar of War Leon Trotsky led the Red Army to victory after 
victory against several White Russian armies. By March 1919 Red 
forces began probing into north Russia where there existed neither 
Czechs, supplies, nor Germans. After part of the 339th United 
States Infantry mutinied, American troops departed from Arch-
angel in May 1919 but not before suffering over 500 casualties. 
United States forces in Siberia were spared a direct confrontation 
with the Red Army by the presence of 100,000 Japanese soldiers 
and Soviet Russia's recognition of a makeshift country, the Far 
Eastern Republic. Originally part of Soviet Russia as the Far East-
ern Council of Commissars headed by Alexander Krasnoshchekov, 
the Soviet command on January 18, 1920, decided to recognize the 
council as a buffer government which might provide the Red Army 
a means of avoiding engaging Japan, Britain, Italy, France, and the 
United States in a major war to regain Russian territory east of Lake 
Baikal. Thus America's Siberian troops could withdraw relatively 
peacefully between February and April1920. 4 
While Robins found strong public sympathy against the use of 
American troops in far-flung corners of the earth, he discovered lit-
tle support for any of his positive statements about the Soviet gov-
ernment. The Red Scare revealed that, although Americans would 
not uphold an adventurist policy in Soviet Russia, fighting Com-
munists at horne was an entirely different matter. Few Americans 
advocated any change in the nonrecognition policy. This policy 
was outlined on August 10, 1920, when Secretary of State Bain-
bridge Colby issued a note to the Italian ambassador, Baron Avez-
zano. Entering into informal discussions with Soviet Russia, Italy 
had requested a statement of America's position. Colby's response, 
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based on the thoughts of anti-Bolshevik publicist John Spargo, be-
came a keystone in America's foreign policy toward Russia until 
1933. Reflecting the contemporary American opinion of Bolsheviks 
as anarchists, Colby denied Russia recognition, not because of 
ideology, but because the Communist regime lacked "every prin-
ciple of honor and good faith and every usage and convention un-
derlying the whole structure of international law." 5 
Robins made a fundamental error in his political thinking. He 
blamed Democrats for nonrecognition and assumed a Republican-
controlled presidency and Congress would reopen the Russian 
question, if only to repudiate Woodrow Wilson. While Gumberg 
worked assiduously with Edward A. Ross on the Russian books 
throughout 1920, Robins pursued this political chimera. At theRe-
publican National Convention of 1920, Robins hoped to secure the 
selection of Hiram Johnson as the party's nominee. When Senator 
Warren G. Harding emerged the victor, both Johnson and Robins 
pledged their support to the Ohioan in return for Harding's prom-
ise to reconsider President Wilson's Russian policy. 6 
Robins campaigned strenuously for the Republican ticket. 
After Harding's victory there was talk he would receive an ap-
pointment as secretary of labor. Robins, however, refused to con-
sider any cabinet post unless paired with Thompson. Thompson 
did become a member of a mission sent to Peru to help celebrate 
that country's century of independence. 7 The appointment typified 
the political crumbs tossed to the Robins-Johnson-Borah wing of 
the Republican party. The pro-Russian Robins group lost the battle 
for control of Harding and the Republican party. 
By the time Harding's cabinet appointees indicated the anti-
Soviet nature of the new administration, Robins had been forced to 
vacate the political scene entirely. For a year after he appeared be-
fore a committee of the United States Senate, Robins had delivered 
speeches on Russia almost daily across the country. Then came the 
Republican convention and further tours and speeches for the Re-
publican presidential nominee. In the year and a half of strenuous 
travel, speeches, and politics, Robins had exhausted himself men-
tally and physically. He had already suffered a partial stroke during 
the presidential campaign. His bitterness and frustration over 
Harding's cabinet selections, particularly Secretary of State Charles 
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Evans Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, little 
improved his spirit. 8 Finally, in February 1921 he had a severe 
breakdown which incapacitated him for much of the remainder of 
the year and confined him to his beloved home at Chinsegut Hill, 
Florida. 
As February passed to March 1921, it had become obvious to 
Robins that his health would require months of recuperation. He 
could write or think only with great difficulty and enjoined Gum-
berg to carry on the struggle. "In your hands," Robins told his 
former secretary, "my poor attempts are safe." 9 Gumberg filled 
the void left by Robins's illness. 
At the outset Gumberg aspired to collect some of the people 
favorable to Russia, particularly Thacher, Allen Wardwell, and 
Walter Pettit, into an unofficial group to induce the new Republi-
can secretary of state to trade with Russia. As Robins told Gum-
berg, surely Hughes could be made to "realize the folly of follow-
ing a me-to [sic] policy after Woodrow Wilson." Although wartime 
trade impediments had been removed at the time of Harding's in-
auguration, the State, Treasury and Commerce departments re-
stricted Soviet mail, gold, securities, and long-term loans. 10 
Before Gumberg organized his pressure group, two events 
shattered his goal. Harding had promised the pro-Russian wing of 
the Republican party that his inaugural message would advocate 
lifting all restrictions on Soviet-American trade. With Robins safely 
out of the way in Florida, however, the new president surrendered 
to Hoover and Hughes. His Inaugural Address dashed Gumberg' s 
hopes. In the main Harding elicited foreign policy statements filled 
with generalities and platitudes. "We recognize the new order in 
the world," stated Harding, "with the closer contacts which prog-
ress has wrought. We sense the call of the human heart for fellow-
ship, fraternity, and cooperation." 11 
Within three weeks Hoover and Hughes revealed that the new 
administration excluded Russia from Harding's "call of the human 
heart." The Soviet government made a plea for the normalization 
of Russian-American trade on March 22, 1921. It assumed that the 
end of the Wilson presidency marked the termination of hostility 
toward Russia. Parroting a statement issued by Hoover three days 
earlier, Hughes replied on March 25. Hughes found no proper 
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basis for considering trade relations until the Russian government 
protected life, property, and labor. The new administration 
adhered to the stereotype of a Russia governed by bomb-throwing 
anarchists, although Lenin, seventeen days earlier, had reinstated 
capitalism through his New Economic Policy and nine days earlier 
Great Britain had signed an Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. The 
new Republican regime's single concession restored postal service 
between America and Russia in May 1921. 12 
Undoubtedly Gumberg concluded in March and April that the 
best method of keeping the Russian issue alive was to gather sym-
pathetic support for Russian trade among Republicans in Con-
gress. He established an alliance with Senator Joseph I. France of 
Maryland. Together they discussed the possibility of a trip toRus-
sia to investigate the situation there and report their findings to 
Congress and the American people. Gumberg's excitement 
mounted as he looked forward to returning to Russia in the sum-
mer of 1921 as France's secretary and interpreter. On May 24 the 
senator embarked for Russia aboard the Aquitania-without Gum-
berg. Despite the personal pleas of France, the State Department 
refused to assure Gum berg's readmittance to America. 13 
Until the State Department regularized visa procedures in May 
1925, Gumberg dared not leave the country. For several years he 
battled with the State Department over its regulations. The Rus-
sian-American did not have to suffer from paranoia to realize that 
high administration officials considered his continued residence in 
America undesirable. After one of these confrontations with the 
State Department, Robins confided to Gumberg, "You are the one 
man that the Counter-Revolution wants out of America." Robins 
advised his friend never to leave the country unless he went on an 
official government mission, recognition had been achieved, or, ul-
timately, Gumberg determined that a prolonged stay in Russia 
would benefit Soviet-American relations. 14 
Although he had suffered a personal setback, Gumberg could 
take some consolation from Century Company's announcement in 
June 1921 of the publication of Ross's book The Russian Bolshevik 
Revolution. Gumberg had diligently translated and made available 
to Ross so much material that the Wisconsin sociologist had been 
able to complete several chapters of the succeeding volume before 
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the first one arrived at the bookstores. In celebration of the event 
the Gumbergs accepted Kenneth Durant's invitation to spend a 
brief vacation at his camp in the Adirondacks. 15 On their return to 
New York, however, Russia's famine tragically emphasized dismal 
Soviet-American relations. 
Anna J. Haines, representative of the American Friends' Ser-
vice Committee in the Volga River region, reported to the Philadel-
phia office that from October 1920 to June 1921, when fourteen 
inches of rain was the norm, only two and one-half inches of rain 
fell in Russia's grain basket. The worst of the disaster occurred in 
the grain-growing months of April, May, and June 1921, when the 
Volga basin received only three-tenths of an inch of rain. 16 Before 
the famed Soviet author Maxim Gorky made his plea for American 
assistance, Gumberg had been following the grain condition in the 
Soviet press and reporting the drought conditions to his slowly re-
covering friend Raymond Robins. 
The American press speculated that this new disaster would or 
should cause the collapse of the Soviet government. Keeping Rob-
ins abreast of the new situation in July, Gumberg argued against 
such conjecture. Concerned only with saving Russian lives, not 
Marxist ideology, Gumberg wrote Robins that if the present regime 
collapsed it "would mean hell and anarchy for a generation." The 
starving people of Russia would be the ultimate losers. He 
suggested the establishment of a relief agency independent of the 
American government. So suspicious had he become of the 
Hoover-Hughes axis within the Harding administration, that he 
dismissed entirely, and erroneously, the idea that Hoover, as direc-
tor general of the American Relief Administration, would provide 
timely or sufficient help. His fears of Hoover's intent were entirely 
justified, for in 1919 Hoover had suggested that President Wilson 
use relief agencies to undermine and destroy communism in Rus-
sia and Hungary. Gumberg proposed the establishment of a sepa-
rate organization to seek funds from Russian immigrants, labor un-
ions, benevolent businessmen, church leaders, women's clubs, 
"liberals and their press," and "from the plain people who will not 
turn down a starving man." While Gumberg knew that Robins 
would not be well enough to lead the new cause, he sought and 
secured Robins's endorsement for a relief program. 17 
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Robins wished he could do more-he had recovered partially 
from his breakdown but continued to suffer from internal hemor-
rhaging and insomnia. The Russian sympathizers turned to the lib-
eral press for assistance. The pleas and reports of Anna Haines and 
the Quakers already had had an effect, and through Robert Morss 
Lovett of the New Republic, Gumberg and Robins spurred on the 
formation of a committee for Russian relief. Lovett urged Robins to 
assume the chairmanship but he was prevented by his health from 
accepting the responsibility. Robins thought several individuals, 
especially Norman Hapgood and Gifford Pinchot, would make an 
excellent coordinator for the relief campaign. Gumberg, though, 
stuck to his original choices of either Thacher or Wardwell. 18 
When the Russian Famine Fund finally began its operation on 
October 13, 1921, Gumberg's ideas prevailed; Wardwell led the 
executive committee. In his discussions and correspondence with 
Lovett, Gumberg commended the use of Wardwell not only be-
cause the former Red Cross Commission major had special knowl-
edge of Russia but because he had "largely escaped personal attack 
and abuse, while maintaining with unswerving fidelity his support 
of a rational policy for the solution of Russian problems." To Gum-
berg the recent Red Scare made it necessary for the committee to 
have a relatively untainted but sympathetic chairman. Wardwell 
proved an excellent choice. Within a few months the fund was 
organized nationwide and collected subscriptions in twenty-nine 
states. It raised $214,681.66, an amazing sum considering the eco-
nomic straits experienced by the United States and the subsequent 
congressional appropriation for Russian aid. 19 
The diverse membership of the executive and national com-
mittees of the Russian Famine Fund reflected Gumberg' s original 
concept as to who should be reached by such a national group. 
United for humanitarian purposes were leaders from religion, bus-
iness, labor, journalism, and women's groups, many of whom 
Gumberg had met or had worked with over the previous several 
years: Wardwell, Lovett, Thacher, Robins, France, Thompson, Pet-
tit, James G. McDonald, and Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of 
the Nation. The fund also welcomed those critics of Soviet Russia 
who, nonetheless, maintained sympathies for the Russian people 
in their hour of need: Samuel Gompers, David R. Francis, and 
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Cyrus McCormick, among others. Monies collected by the fund 
purchased food for distribution in Russia through the American 
Friends' Service Committee. By March 1922 the Quakers were feed-
ing nearly 100,000 Russians in the worst drought-stricken area near 
the city of Buzuluk, 150 miles east of the Volga River. The fund 
gave the largest single donation to this special Quaker project, 
whose contributors included the Joint Distribution Committee 
Oewish), American Red Cross, and the American Relief Adminis-
tration.20 
Although the fund followed closely Gum berg's conception of 
a relief organization, the New Yorker miscalculated the official re-
sponse of the United States government to the Russian disaster. 
The Hoover-Hughes statements and Gumberg's visa problems 
caused him and Robins to doubt that the Harding administration 
might render assistance. When it became obvious the American 
government would pursue a charitable policy, the Russian sym-
pathizers retained a high degree of suspicion of the real motives of 
Hoover throughout the entire relief episode to its conclusion in July 
1923. 21 
Herbert Hoover, director general of the American Relief Ad-
ministration, replied to Maxim Gorky's July plea by promising aid 
on condition that all Americans then incarcerated in Soviet jails be 
released. Five days later, on July 30, 1921, Senator France arrived in 
Riga after a month-long sojourn in Russia, bringing with him 
Soviet Russia's positive response to Hoover's condition for aid. As 
an act of good faith the Bolsheviks released to France's care one of 
the American prisoners, Margaret C. Harrison, a journalist for the 
Baltimore Sun. Harrison, a chain-smoker, listed only one complaint 
against her Soviet captors-the lack of cigarettes. 22 
Hoover fulfilled his part of the bargain quickly. In August the 
European director of the American Relief Administration, Walter 
L. Brown, met Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov at Riga and 
negotiated a relief agreement. Later in London, Brown signed 
another document permitting the Soviet government to transfer 
$12.2 million worth of gold to the United States. 23 For budgetary 
purposes, this Russian gold was absorbed as part of the American 
relief effort. Paradoxically, Russia contributed 20 percent of Ameri-
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can aid and in a manner contrary to the official United States policy 
toward Russian gold. 
Gumberg recognized the charitable impulse of the American 
people, although he had doubted that of the leaders. Congress ver-
ified his insight when it passed "An Act for the Relief of the Dis-
tressed and Starving People of Russia." President Harding signed 
it into law on December 24, 1921. The bill authorized the United 
States Grain Corporation to act as the fiscal agency to expend up to 
$20 million on foodstuffs for Russian relief. Colonel William N. 
Haskell, designated American Relief Administration director for 
the drought-ridden country, had already left with the first two 
hundred Americans when Harding issued an executive order pro-
posed by Hoover implementing the congressional legislation. His 
order fashioned a five-member Purchasing Commission for Rus-
sian Relief and included not only Hoover but also Edgar Richard, 
Edward Flesh, Don Livingston, and James P. Goodrich, who had 
just completed a term as governor of Indiana. 24 
Ever wary of Hoover, Gumberg overcame his misgivings 
about the American Relief Administration (ARA) only after meet-
ing Goodrich, who became a lifelong associate. Circumspectly, 
Goodrich reintegrated the efforts of Gumberg, Robins, and other 
Russian sympathizers with those of the Harding administration. 
Gumberg, whose endeavors to aid Russia between July and De-
cember had been directed toward keeping all relief programs out of 
the hands of Hoover, made his about-face on December 19, 1921. 
That afternoon he met Goodrich in the Washington hotel suite of 
Will Hays. It was well known that Goodrich, who had already 
acted as Hoover's personal representative in the Russian ARA proj-
ect, would be appointed to a position of influence once Congress 
approved funds for Russian relief. After a long talk with the for-
mer governor, Gumberg immediately communicated with Robins. 
The ailing protege of Theodore Roosevelt, then in New York, had 
recovered sufficiently to resume public life by speaking out in 
favor of a pet project, peace and disarmament, in connection with 
the Washington Conference already convened in the nation's capi-
tal. Contrary to their earlier discussions, Gumberg told Robins to 
"use all your influence to back that bill for 20 million for Russian 
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relief." Gumberg found Goodrich possessed "more intelligence of 
real human sympathy or understanding about Russia" than any-
one he had met, except for Robins. Gumberg's favorable reaction 
to Goodrich continued the next day when the two met for a second 
round of talks. As soon as Gum berg departed from Hays's suite he 
wired Robins and arranged a New York meeting between his new 
and old friends. 25 
Subsequent events justified Gumberg's initial confidence in 
Goodrich. As vice chairman of the Purchasing Commission, he 
took charge during the frequent absences of its chairman, Herbert 
Hoover. In the summer of 1922 Goodrich traveled to Russia as the 
commission's representative, and his reports back to the Harding 
administration showed not a conversion to bolshevism but a con-
viction that Communist Russia would evolve into Capitalist Russia. 
As Goodrich informed Harding: "Economic forces as old as civili-
zation and as enduring as the human race are now at work, and 
will continue to work until Russian laws and Russian policies cor-
respond to the needs and fulfill the aspirations of the people." 
Goodrich apparently accepted the New Economic Policy of Soviet 
Russia as an indication of change away from revolutionary Marx-
ism. He reminded the Harding administration that the restoration 
of law and order never occurred during, but after, a revolution. Al-
though Goodrich did not expect the United States to write off gov-
ernment and private debts incurred by czarist Russia, he believed 
the confiscatory policy of Soviet Russia could be negotiated. Once 
the two governments reached an accord on debts, Goodrich wrote, 
"then it is my opinion that the surest and safest way to help the 
Russian people is frankly to recognize the revolution as an ac-
complished fact, deal with this government as the only possible 
government in Russia and . . . open up trade relations with them 
[sic] and let American capital flow into Russia and assist in her res-
toration." 26 
On the surface, Gumberg's new associate seemed an unlikely 
supporter of the Russian cause. Goodrich had defeated a Progres-
sive party candidate to be elected Indiana's twenty-ninth governor 
in 1916. A classmate of Albert J. Beveridge at DePauw University, 
he became a lawyer in 1887 but devoted little time to law practice. 
Instead he followed a financially rewarding career developing 
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holdings in farms, mines, utilities, grain elevators, and banks. The 
capstone to his entrepreneurial enterprise was achieved the year 
after his return from Russia when he became president of the 
National City Bank of Indianapolis. Goodrich, though, was very 
much a part of the era of Progressivism in which he matured politi-
cally. He belonged to the Knights of Labor and as Indiana's gover-
nor he reorganized the state government and established a new tax 
system, highway system, Public Service Commission, and a De-
partment of Conservation. In 1919 he declared war on the coal in-
dustry's excessive profits. During the 1920s, when many of his 
Hoosier Republican cohorts wooed the Ku Klux Klan, Goodrich 
supported the NAAcP's anti-lynching campaign and contributed 
heavily to Roman Catholic Notre Dame University, although he 
was an elder of the Presbyterian Church. 27 His agricultural hold-
ings influenced his Russian views. As did several politicians of 
rural states, he concluded that trade with Russia might ameliorate 
the agricultural depression experienced in America throughout the 
1920s. 
Gumberg's association with Goodrich immeasurably in-
creased his connections with the· Harding administration. It did 
not, however, lessen his wariness of Hoover or the State Depart-
ment's suspicion of Gumberg's Bolshevik connections. Gumberg 
was justified in his jaundiced view of Hoover. The secretary of 
commerce and administration spokesmen in private and public ut-
terances minimized the need for relief and frequently attacked the 
relief efforts of agencies not directly connected with Hoover's ARA 
and the Purchasing Commission. Using as his source of informa-
tion the memoranda of William J. Burns, director of the Justice 
Department's Bureau of Investigation, Hoover stigmatized non-
governmental relief as part of the Communist plot to gain a foot-
hold in America. While numerous groups, such as the Russian Red 
Cross and the Friends of Soviet Russia, included Communists, 
Hoover's indiscriminate statements adversely affected the entire 
private donation effort. The government never raised or answered 
the fundamental question of whether Communist-inspired agen-
cies used relief funds for purposes other than to feed starving Rus-
sians.28 
From the very first moment Gumberg met Goodrich, the two 
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men discussed the possibility of Gumberg' s becoming the 
Hoosier's secretary when the latter went to Russia in the spring. 
Even though employed by the Special Trade Delegation of the Far 
Eastern Republic before he knew Goodrich, Gumberg seemed ini-
tially to be most eager to quit his post and accompany his new 
friend to his homeland. However, as his work for the Special Trade 
Delegation progressed, Gumberg believed he could better promote 
the improvement of Soviet-American relations by assisting the del-
egation during the Washington Conference. Gumberg contented 
himself with briefing Goodrich on the latest available information 
about Russia. 29 
By early spring 1922 Gumberg began to have second thoughts 
about Goodrich's next projected journey. First, his work for the 
Special Trade Delegation appeared less important once the dele-
gates to the Washington Conference concluded their negotiations 
in February. Second, Robins through his Republican associates as-
certained in April that there was a "real change planned at 
Washington" in regard to Russia. Robins did not see any dramatic 
breakthrough for either trade or recognition but a change in at-
titude, a new flexibility brought about by international events. At 
the time Robins wrote these observations to Gumberg an economic 
conference to reconstruct Europe met in Genoa. Soviet Russia's in-
vitation to the conference not only increased the prestige of her 
revolutionary government but also threatened to leave America out 
of future Russian trade as Moscow appeared to be reintegrated 
with the other capitals of Europe. The Genoa Conference achieved 
little except for the German-Soviet Treaty of Rapallo which nor-
malized trade and diplomatic relations between Europe's two 
major outcasts. 3° 
Both Gumberg and Robins believed Goodrich might inspire a 
reappraisal of America's Russian policy. The former governor had 
easy access to President Harding and might either circumvent the 
Hoover-Hughes influence by direct talks with the president or 
change the entire administration view because Goodrich worked 
so closely with Hoover. After the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo 
on April 16, 1922, the Goodrich trip to Russia had potential to be 
more than a journey to determine the effectiveness of the ARA in 
distributing wheat acquired by the Purchasing Commission. To 
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Robins, Gumberg wrote that he now wished he could accompany 
Goodrich, "not so much [for] myself, but because I could have 
been very useful in healing the breach between America and Rus-
sia." Nevertheless, Gumberg concluded, "things never looked as 
well for the Russian people as they do now, both in Washington 
and Europe." Recalling his difficulties with the State Department 
the previous year, Gumberg resigned himself to reading about the 
Goodrich mission in the American press. 31 
On May 18, 1922, he accompanied Goodrich to New York har-
bor and the North River waiting room on Pier 56 of the Cunard 
Steamship Company. At the very last moment before embarking, 
Goodrich decided he had to have Gumberg with him not only as a 
secretary and translator but also as an adviser and expediter. Be-
cause it was too late for Gumberg to depart at once, the two de-
cided that they would meet later in Moscow. Gumberg reminded 
the former governor of his problem in securing a visa the previous 
spring. Thus Goodrich called Hoover and explained his desire to 
have Gumberg's assistance. A meeting was arranged between 
Gumberg and Hoover for Saturday noon, May 20. The two met 
again the following Monday for a total of two and one-half hours of 
private conversation. 32 
Gumberg later admitted that the meeting "was as good a time 
as I ever had in any two and half hours of my life." The unequal 
status between Hoover and Gumberg did not prevent the 
Russian-American from scoring a few well-aimed blows at the man 
he considered to embody all those anti-Russian attitudes of the 
Harding administration. Their conversation was extremely frank. 
Hoover flatly admitted to Gumberg that he had been informed by 
numerous members of the administration that Gumberg was a Bol-
shevik. Although Gumberg hotly contested the charge, Hoover 
went on to say," 'I don't give a damn what a man believes so long 
as I think he can be useful.' " The secretary of commerce told 
Gumberg he was not really afraid of American Bolsheviks in any 
event. The example of the mess Soviet Russia presented to the 
world was enough, the secretary asserted, to limit communism's 
influence. " 'I am sure,' "Hoover predicted," 'that five years from 
today there will be no bolshevism in Russia.' " Since Hoover ex-
pressed so little concern about American Communists, Gumberg 
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asked why it was necessary to attack some of the Russian relief 
agencies because of their radical leadership. "My suggestion that 
he leave all the Russian relief organizations alone was as wel-
come as smallpox," Gumberg later recalled. The Russian-American 
minimized the danger of those representatives of the Friends of 
Soviet Russia and the Russian Red Cross and characterized their 
ineffectiveness by calling them "superboobs." Hoover chuckled 
over Gumberg's choice of adjective, but when he asked Hoover 
"about the life ambition that he is supposed to have to eradicate 
'Bolshevism' from the earth, I did not get a merry ha ha." 33 
By the end of their two-day conversations, Gumberg and 
Hoover discovered grounds for substantial agreement upon the 
greatness of Lenin, the Russian need for a strong government, and 
Gumberg's departure to Russia to assist Goodrich in conversing 
with Kremlin leaders. Hoover asked Gumberg to quit his job im-
mediately and go see George Baker, director of ARA's New York 
headquarters. Arrangements would be made for Gumberg to travel 
to Russia without delay. Within twenty-four hours Gumberg re-
signed his post at the Special Trade Delegation of the Far Eastern 
Republic, joined the ARA, and traveled by train to Baker's New 
York office off Broadway to wait for the State Department's clear-
ance of his visa. Under the unusual circumstances Gumberg re-
ceived solicitous care from Baker who treated him "like a 
whiteheaded boy." Hoover, in fact, called from Washington to 
make certain Gumberg had been properly processed. 34 
Despite Hoover's promises, Gumberg's papers still had not 
been approved two weeks later. After seeking Wardwell's advice 
Gumberg quit the ARA and took a train back to Washington where 
he was reinstated in his former position. Gumberg asked Baker to 
communicate with Goodrich and explain the circumstances. Baker 
swore to Gumberg that the Russian Division of the State Depart-
ment had not held up his visa. However, as Gumberg phrased it to 
a friend, "I have not lost faith in the faithfulness of the visa division 
to the ghost of Czar Nicholas." 35 
The State Department later claimed that the delay had resulted 
from Great Britain's denial of a clearance; however, both Gumberg 
and Robins continued to doubt the integrity of the State Depart-
ment. 36 What actually occurred in those two weeks to prevent 
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Gum berg's departure long enough to make him give up his trip 
may not be known until the State Department visa records become 
public. Part of the problem may have stemmed from the tremen-
dous bureaucratic friction that existed between the State and 
Commerce departments. The commerce secretary expanded inter-
nationally the power of his department, much to the chagrin of 
America's diplomatic corps. Also, based on conjecture, there are 
two excellent reasons why the State Department might encourage 
a delay in processing Gum berg's papers even though he had the 
apparent support of the secretary of commerce. The first reason 
concerns the personnel within the State Department and the sec-
ond involves Gum berg's activities. 
Secretary of State Hughes's public and private statements 
against Russia received the unqualified endorsement of DeWitt C. 
Poole, chief of the Russian Affairs Division of the State Depart-
ment. Poole had been second in command at the Moscow Consul-
ship under Madden Summers in 1917-1918, shared his chief's 
anti-bolshevism, and was quite aware of Gumberg's sympathies. 
As head of the Russian Division, Poole had worked closely with 
the anti-Soviet ambassador, Boris Bakhmetev. While Gumberg en-
couraged Goodrich to influence President Harding toward a 
reevaluation of the entire Russian policy, Poole sent Harding 
memoranda which declared, "We must adhere firmly to the Rus-
sian policy expressed ... in the declaration of March 25, 1921 ... 
any change or apparent weakening in our policy now would be 
disastrous from every point of view." The persistent struggle be-
tween Poole and Gumberg to influence Harding knew few bounds. 
Gumberg participated in a conspiracy to discredit Poole with Hard-
ing. One may imagine Poole's reaction to Gumberg' s application as 
it came across his desk in May 1922.37 
Aside from the State Department personalities who might 
wish to thwart Gumberg's travel plans, the principal reason mem-
bers of the Harding administration held Gumberg in a highly sus-
picious light lay in the Russian-American's employment. In De-
cember 1921 Gumberg joined the Special Trade Delegation of the 
Far Eastern Republic. This commitment, through employment, to 
the broader interests of Soviet Russia led individuals such as 
Hoover to conclude simplistically that Gumberg represented the 
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Communist International. Sending an alleged Communist to aid in 
discussion with the Soviet government would not appear to be in 
the best interests of the United States. Seen in this manner the ap-
parent foot-dragging of the government in clearing the paperwork 
permitting Gumberg to join Goodrich on the mission was unfortu-
nate but understandable. Gumberg's association with the Special 
Trade Delegation did not, as administration officials thought, re-
flect his conversion to bolshevism but rather occurred as part of a 
larger political maneuver to achieve the recognition of Soviet Rus-
sia through the back door. 
6 
DELEGATIONS AND COMMISSIONS 
BY THE TIME Warren G. Harding delivered his Inaugural Ad-
dress, Alexander Gumberg's Union Square apartment had become 
the unofficial depository of information about Soviet Russia for 
numerous radical and liberal journalists. The salon over which 
Gumberg presided was amiably hosted by his wife, who provided 
tea in glasses after the Russian fashion. Their many guests around 
the samovar at various times included Bessie Beatty, Jessica Smith, 
Albert Rhys Williams, Maurice Hindus, Kenneth Durant, William 
Henry Chamberlin, William Hard, and Floyd Dell. Many members 
of this group journeyed to Russia and, upon their return, visited 
Gumberg's apartment to share impressions with the other in-
terested writers. While Gumberg could not accompany his friends 
to his homeland he gleaned worthwhile information from their ex-
periences and kept himself abreast of Soviet life. He received in-
frequent direct communications from his family and had to rely on 
members of his salon for more detailed news. He learned that his 
father, then residing in Kharkov, acquired monies he had sent. 
Veniamin had been reconciled with the Communist party and en-
gaged in a promising business career. Zorin lived in a modest 
apartment within the Kremlin. A troubleshooter for the Soviet 
government, he spent weeks away from Moscow but had time to 
put a good word in with the Bolshevik leadership for his capitalist 
brother. 1 
Gumberg used this salon as the tool of his trade. He pos-
sessed, as did few others, extensive knowledge about Russia which 
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he could dispense among his growing numbers of political contacts 
within the Republican party. His success in acquiring Soviet 
periodicals amazed contemporaries. Bundles of magazines and 
newspapers of the most recent date, a virtual library cataloging 
Soviet current events, lay about his apartment. No one may ever 
know precisely how he accomplished it, but Gumberg regularly re-
ceived these materials even before the Allies lifted the blockade 
and before the resumption of normal mail service in May 1921. He 
translated these periodicals and established a mini-news agency 
for his journalistic and political associates. 2 
During the course of 1921 Gumberg exhausted the possibilities 
of his relatively independent status. Although a capable translator, 
he did not yet possess sufficient command of the English language 
to follow his young friend William Henry Chamberlin into jour-
nalism. A natural diplomat, his emigre status and America's non-
recognition policy kept him from acting in any official diplomatic 
capacity. Yet he became a type of envoy. In order to establish him-
self as a liaison, Gumberg had to form institutional connections 
with Soviet Russia as well as with the United States. By the end of 
1921 he joined the Special Trade Delegation of the Far Eastern Re-
public, a pseudocountry Soviet Russia permitted to exist as a 
means of avoiding a direct confrontation with Japan's Siberian 
forces. 
With its capital at Chita, the Far Eastern Republic led a precari-
ous existence, poised between the Red Army west of Lake Baikal 
and the Japanese army to the east. Controlling much of the old 
czarist Maritime Provinces as well as Sakhalin Island, the Japanese 
encouraged various bands of Russian monarchists, adventurers, 
and thieves to prey upon the hapless republic. The resulting insta-
bility, fostered by the Japanese command, became the principal 
rationale for the continued presence of Japanese troops in Siberia. 
The Far Eastern Republic eschewed communism, but the govern-
ment's most important members, President Alexander Kras-
noshchekov, Transport Minister Bill Shatov, Foreign Minister Ig-
natius Yourin, and Defense Minister Vasily Blucher, maintained in-
timate ties with Moscow.3 
In 1921 the Far Eastern Republic had one hope to end Japanese 
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occupation. On November 11 the Arms Limitations Conference 
opened in Washington. As the world's capitals learned of the con-
ference, the Far Eastern Republic hoped Japan would be called to 
account for her Siberian adventurism. The Japanese government 
also recognized that the Washington Conference could focus world 
attention on Siberia. As a result, Japan, with great fanfare, began 
negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic at Dairen. The pro-
tagonists failed to resolve the central issue-Japanese evacuation. 
Obviously Japan agreed to the Dairen Conference to placate world 
opinion and defuse the issue of Japanese imperialism at the 
Washington Conference. Between October 14 and November 1, 
1921, the Far Eastern Republic commissioned three Russians, Alex-
ander A. Yazikov, Boris E. Skvirsky, and Peter N. Karavaev to act 
as a Special Trade Delegation to reestablish commercial relations 
between the United States and Siberia. Actually, once in America, 
the delegation directed a lobbying campaign to place Japan's occu-
pation of eastern Siberia on the agenda of the Washington Confer-
ence.4 
When the delegates arrived they appointed Alexander Gum-
berg secretary of the Special Trade Delegation. Since Gumberg had 
been kept at arm's length from the Ludwig Martens Mission, it 
would appear unusual that he could qualify to represent, via a cir-
cuitous path, the interests of Moscow. Howeverr in his associa-
tion with liberal journalists and in the Russian relief work, Gum-
berg overcame the counterrevolutionary stigma placed on him by 
John Reed. Jessica Smith, editor of New World Review, first met 
Gumberg when Williams took her to his apartment in 1919. Shere-
called that "some of my left friends mistrusted Alex." Neverthe-
less, Smith believed that the issues of trade, relations, and 
Japanese occupation "were of such importance to Lenin and the 
other Soviet leaders that the fact that Alex played such a unique 
and useful role in these spheres seems to me a sufficient explana-
tion of why Alex was able to work with the FER." Also, Gumberg 
knew several of the most important members of the Chita re-
gime, especially such Russian-Americans as Krasnoshchekov and 
Shatov. Finally, Zorin, in close daily contact with important Soviet 
figures in Moscow, may have recommended his brother to the del-
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rived, it sought out and hired Gumberg to be its translator and 
liaison with the American government and press. 5 
A fundamental question naturally arises in regard to Gum-
berg's employment by the Special Trade Delegation of the Far 
Eastern Republic. His ties with the Soviet-linked representatives 
seriously compromised his professed position as a witness sym-
pathetic, but not committed, to the Russian revolution. This new 
collaboration erroneously convinced Harding administration of-
ficials of Gumberg's bolshevism. Yet evidence suggests that the 
Russian-American believed both Soviet Russia and the United 
States and their policies could be advanced by the delegate's activi-
ties. 
Gumberg had a rather casual attitude toward his immediate 
employment with the delegation. On several occasions he revealed 
to Robins and Goodrich that he would quickly forfeit his job for 
one which appeared more important to his ultimate goal. In May 
1922 he quit his employment for two weeks because of the prospect 
of going to Russia as Goodrich's secretary and translator. In addi-
tion, he did not permanently move to Washington, where the del-
egation established its headquarters. Once the Washington Con-
ference ended, Gumberg spent considerable time in New York. 
Frankie did not accompany her husband on his many trips be-
tween New York and the capital. She worked in New York and 
earned more money than her immigrant spouse-a source of slight 
embarrassment for Alexander. Gumberg's monthly salary of $375 
was comfortable for the 1920s but not enough to purchase his com-
plete allegiance. He continued to accept temporary assignments 
from New York law firms to act as a Russian legal expert in Ameri-
can litigation. Two or three afternoons of court testimony netted 
the Russian-American more money than his salary from the dele-
gation.6 
After the Washington Conference, the delegation's chairman 
departed for Soviet Russia, leaving Skvirsky in charge. The corre-
spondence between Gumberg and Skvirsky is matter-of-fact and 
entirely lacking in the comradely spirit one might expect had 
Gumberg dedicated himself to the historic inevitabilities outlined 
by Karl Marx. Shortly before Gumberg quit, a strain developed in 
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his relationship with Skvirsky. At least one of Gumberg's ac-
quaintances in the 1920s attributed this to Gumberg's complete 
cynicism toward Communist ideology. His favorite pejoratives to 
describe Communists, "boobs" or "superboobs," were not merely 
for the ears of Herbert Hoover. Gumberg unhestitatingly ex-
pressed his skepticism about bolshevism to the many members of 
his salon, composed predominantly of radical writers. 7 
Since the Special Trade Delegation was a thinly disguised ex-
tension of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, a second important 
question emerges. Did the delegation possess some conspiratorial 
mandate from Moscow via Chita to employ Gumberg as its front 
or, worse, use Gumberg in some way for the benefit of the Com-
munist or Third International? Gumberg held the confidence of 
persons high within the American political system, and it might 
appear he helped Soviet agents gain entrance to officials of the 
United States government. The 1920s, however, lacked sophisti-
cated military weapons and the nuclear technology which in a later 
age might have been the object of attention by a superpower an-
tagonistic toward the United States. Soviet Russia was a weak 
country in 1921, partially occupied, and barely able to repulse, the 
previous year, an invasion by Poland. Surviving without a navy 
and forced to conduct at least 96 percent of its trade in foreign ves-
sels, Soviet Russia was no physical threat to the United States. 8 Fi-
nally, those goals advanced by the delegation, which in the most 
unsophisticated of intellects might be construed as trickery, con-
spiracy, or worse, were shared by the United States government. 
Rather than Gumberg' s being used by the Special Trade Dele-
gation, the Harding administration used the representatives to 
further American foreign policy in the Far East. When Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes issued invitations for the Washington 
Conference in July 1921, the State Department studiously avoided 
seeking the presence of Soviet Russia. American antipathy toward 
Moscow, however, did not mean that the United States would 
completely surrender Siberia to the exclusive advantage of Japan. 
A basic feature of American diplomacy, as subsequently revealed 
at the Washington Conference, was to minimize the imperial de-
signs of Japan and maintain, without force of arms, the Open Door 
in the Far East. Thus, after Japan indicated its willingness to 
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negotiate, the State Department supported the Far Eastern Repub-
lic to prevent Japan from acquiring a permanent foothold in 
Siberia. American Consul John K. Caldwell received instructions to 
journey to Chita and investigate its viability and independence. 
The very presence of an American official bolstered the Chita re-
gime and warned Japan of America's concern about the continued 
Japanese incursion in Russia's eastern provinces. The State De-
partment also permitted Chita to send, under the guise of a trade 
commission, an unofficial group to Washington. By December 1921 
the delegation arrived and requested that Hughes accept its cre-
dentials and authorize it to appear before the Washington Confer-
ence. Hughes denied to Yazikov, Skvirsky, and Karavaev any of-
ficial standing, but the State Department took the extraordinary 
step of allowing an unofficial delegation from an unrecognized 
government to submit memoranda for the benefit of America's rep-
resentatives to the Washington Conference. 9 
Gumberg played a major role in whatever success the delega-
tion achieved between December 1921 and February 1922. He 
knew and could brief the delegation on the nature of American 
foreign policy and the structure of the government which formu-
lated that policy. Having valuable contacts, including William 
Boyce Thompson, who chaired the Advisory Commission attached 
to the Washington Conference, he could be seen leading his em-
ployers through the halls of the State Department as well as Con-
gress. As a translator, he prepared documents for presentation to 
American officials and the press. Finally, he acted as the publicity 
agent for the Special Trade Delegation. The inside track he held 
with the liberal press, particularly the Nation, gave the delegation a 
forum among liberal intellectuals. 10 
As requested, Yazikov forwarded memoranda about the Sibe-
rian issue to the State Department. The department, however, per-
sisted in refusing to place the Siberian question on the agenda or to 
permit the Special Trade Delegation to speak before the 
Washington Conference. There were three cardinal features of 
American policy toward the Far Eastern Republic and the 
Washington Conference. First, the views of the Republic must be 
aired. Second, to avoid antagonizing Japan, the American delega-
tion should not become the instrument for permitting the delega-
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tion to appear before the conference. Third, if the delegation's posi-
tion, i.e., criticism of Japan, was not presented, it should be there-
sponsibility of the entire conference and not that of the United 
States. Under these circumstances, what occurred next was inevi-
table. Thwarted in their primary goal, Gumberg and the delegation 
began to bypass the State Department and to direct their appeals to 
the American press and the American delegates to the conference. 
In four days, from December 31, 1921, to January 3, 1922, the dele-
gates launched a publicity blitz which had a chilling effect on their 
relations with the American government but which ultimately 
forced the conference to take up the issue of Japan's Siberian occu-
pation. 
On December 31 Yazikov wrote Hughes and the other Ameri-
can delegates letters charging Japan had organized Russian bandits 
who conducted systematic and terroristic warfare on the popula-
tion of the Far Eastern Republic. The arguments apparently had an 
effect. On January 4, 1922, the Washington Conference's Subcom-
mittee on the Pacific and Far Eastern Questions issued to the 
American delegates a confidential report not only critical of Japan's 
Siberian intervention but also supportive of the position and 
legitimacy of the Chita regime. For three days, beginning January 
1, Gumberg and Skvirsky made available to the press a series of 
documents, communications between Japanese officers and Rus-
sian warlords, substantiating their charge of Japanese collusion 
with White Russian reactionaries. Damaging to the credibility of 
the Special Trade Delegation was the press release alleging a 
Franco-Japanese detente to transfer French-sponsored White Rus-
sians to Vladivostok. France immediately denied the documents' 
authenticity, claiming they were forgeries and Hughes publicly ac-
cepted the French position. Nevertheless, as the New York Times 
Washington correspondent stated: "Whatever the effect the inci-
dent has on the standing of the delegation from the Far Eastern 
Republic, which gave out the documents, it has at least brought the 
Siberian question squarely before the eyes of the world." 11 
This notoriety forced the American government to be more cir-
cumspect in dealing with Yazikov, Skvirsky, and Karavaev. How-
ever, the State Department, through January, continued to accept 
memoranda, without officially acknowledging them, and to hold 
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discussions with the Special Trade Delegation. Internally, the State 
Department accepted the validity of all the Far Eastern Republic's 
claims except for that of Franco-Japanese collusion. The worldwide 
publicity attained by the delegation forced Japan, on January 23, to 
make some statement on Siberia to the Washington Conference. 
Ambassador Shidehara promised, as Japan had done so many 
times before, that as soon as stability returned to Siberia his coun-
try would remove its occupying troops. Hughes responded the fol-
lowing day by reminding the ambassador of America's repeated 
notes of protest over the prolonged occupation. 12 Gumberg' s as-
sociation with the Special Trade Delegation helped bring the Sibe-
rian matter before the Washington Conference. The several treaties 
resulting from the deliberations did not include any settlement for 
Siberia, but continued international pressure, public and gov-
ernmental, coupled with Japanese internal problems, forced an 
evacuation of Siberia by October 25, 1922. 
After the Washington Conference concluded, Yazikov re-
turned to Russia. Subsequently, the Soviet government sent him 
back to North America as its official agent in Canada. The truncated 
delegation over which Skvirsky presided decided to take advan-
tage of its initial American invitation and remained to advance the 
cause of trade between the United States and the Far Eastern Re-
public. During the spring and summer of 1922 Gumberg guided 
the delegation on tours through various American industrial 
plants. Availing himself of his political contacts, he prevailed on 
Senator JosephS. Freylinghuysen of New Jersey to write a letter of 
introduction on behalf of Skvirsky to Felix Lacks, president of the 
United States Manufacturers Export Corporation. On the whole, 
however, Gumberg's endeavors on behalf of the Far Eastern Re-
public proved singularly unsuccessful. As long as Japan and the 
White Russian warlords held the Pacific Coast tight, the Far East-
ern Republic could trade only through Russia or by a circuitous 
route from Dairen, by way of the South Manchurian and Chinese 
Eastern Railroads, to Harbin and then to Chita. 13 
Typical of the impediments and complexities involved in 
commercial arrangements between the Far Eastern Republic and 
the United States was the case of Harry F. Sinclair. Early in 1922 
the Chita government granted the Sinclair Exploration Company 
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an oil concession in Sakhalin. By the time this arrangement became 
public in February 1923, the Far Eastern Republic no longer existed 
and for all practical purposes neither did the Sinclair concession. 
Japan retained control of all Sakhalin until the signing in 1925 of a 
Soviet-Japanese convention reestablishing relations and calling for 
the removal of Japanese troops from the northern half of the is-
land.14 
Surprisingly, Gumberg devoted little time toward achieving 
recognition of the Far Eastern Republic in the spring and summer 
of 1922. The State Department always discouraged the violation of 
Russia's territorial integrity even though it declined to recognize 
the government which ruled Russia. The patently synthetic nature 
of the Far Eastern Republic may have limited the delegation's 
credibility in seeking recognition. Writing to Goodrich in late fall 
1922, Gumberg dejectedly told the former governor that the "Dele-
gation has been here for almost a year with no apparent results. " 15 
By October two circumstances prompted Gumberg to focus his 
attention on gaining American recognition of the Far Eastern Re-
public. The State Department had earlier violated its own princi-
ples by elevating to ministerial status the United States consuls 
in Russia's former Baltic provinces of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. 16 The action raised the possibility that America might 
officially acknowledge the country at the opposite end of the Eura-
sian land mass. The pro-Soviet sympathies of the Republic's gov-
ernment meant that should it be recognized by the United States, 
the Far Eastern Republic might in turn ease the normalization of 
relations between Soviet Russia and America. Second, Japanese 
occupation of Siberia, except for Sakhalin, ended in October and 
allowed the expansion of the Far Eastern Republic to the Pacific 
Coast and the principal port, Vladivostok. 
Gumberg initiated strategy meetings with Thomas Thacher 
and Goodrich. Under these new circumstances, Goodrich agreed 
to communicate to the Harding administration his support for the 
recognition of the Far Eastern Republic. On November 6, 1922, he 
invited Gumberg to bring Skvirsky to his Winchester, Indiana, 
home to map plans. Swiftly these schemes ended as the Far East-
ern Republic's National Assembly took up the question of becom-
ing a Soviet Republic and rejoining Russia. As news of these far-off 
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deliberations reached Gumberg he canceled the tripartite meeting 
with Goodrich. He explained to the politician that "it is natural, 
that with no encouragement or sympathy from the only country 
[i.e., United States] from which such might have been expected, 
and the danger of Japanese aggression ... the Russian people of 
the Far East are turning to their mother country and want a closer 
alliance with it." Overnight the Special Trade Delegation lost its 
need for the surreptitious advocation of closer Soviet-American re-
lations. Under the leadership of Skvirsky the delegation remained 
in Washington, where Skvirsky assumed the title of commercial 
representative of Soviet Russia. By September 1923 the delegation 
evolved into the Russian (later, Soviet Union) Information Bureau. 
The termination of the Far Eastern Republic's independence on 
November 19, 1922, left Skvirsky in the position of semiofficial con-
sul for Soviet Russia. Thus, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
considered recognizing Russia in 1933, the United States turned 
first to Skvirsky as the best available avenue for opening discus-
sions with the Stalin dictatorshipY 
The synthetic nature of the Special Trade Delegation allowed 
Gumberg to pursue, at times with considerable success, the im-
provement of American-Russian relations. As Skvirsky's secretary, 
Gumberg could couple the Moscow lines of communications with 
his American contacts and act as a fixer, a go-between, an informal 
diplomat-consul in many areas involving politics and business. 
When Charles Recht, a Soviet sympathizer who attended the 
Genoa Conference, arrived in the United States in June 1922, he 
carried instructions from Anatole Lunacharsky, commissar of edu-
cation. Recht proceeded to the Washington headquarters of the 
Special Trade Delegation and produced his credentials for Skvirsky 
and Gumberg. Part of Recht's instructions enjoined him to act on 
behalf of the cinema section of the Commissariat of Education in 
negotiating with American movie companies for the exchange of 
films between the two countries. Gumberg wrote to Robins asking 
his friend to get an appointment with Will Hays. Involved in Re-
publican politics, Hays was also president of the Motion Pictures 
Producers & Distributors of America, Inc. Although Gumberg may 
have met Hays before, Robins sent Gumberg a letter of introduc-
tion to ease the arrangement for a meeting of Hays, Gumberg, and 
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Recht. Later Robins took the opportunity to see Hays so that by the 
time Gumberg and Recht had their interview on July 8, Gumberg 
could relate that Hays "was as nice as could be and quick as light-
ning. He treated me royally." 1B 
Robins had predicted that Gumberg would get along quite 
well with Hays. In strictest confidence he informed Gumberg that 
Hays secretly managed the "Hoover for President" boom. Sharing 
Robins's views on Russia, Hays hoped the secretary of commerce 
would "make good there," and Hays believed the United States 
should establish relations with Russia. The intricate line between 
business, politics, and the Russian sympathizers is illustrated by 
Recht's choice of counsel. Gumberg insisted that Recht seek the 
advice of the law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett. Most con-
veniently Thacher's firm was engaged by the Motion Pictures Pro-
ducers & Distributors, Inc. Not only did Hays appear receptive to 
Recht and Gumberg but in collaboration with Thacher a memoran-
dum was drawn up for the exchange of movies. Ultimately, 
Thacher's office helped incorporate a Soviet agency, Amkino Cor-
poration, to institutionalize the agreements reached in July 1922. 19 
The intimate ties Gumberg established with American 
political-business circles and with the Soviet government offered 
him a unique opportunity to coordinate the search for better rela-
tions with Russia. While his activities were not always as successful 
as in facilitating the exchange of movies, Gumberg exerted a com-
plex, intricate, and subtle influence in the backstairs movement for 
closer Soviet-American relations. At times he seemed to be the in-
visible director of a stage play. He created the scenario but would 
lose control to the prima donna actors hired by the producer. An 
example of his influence occurred in the summer of 1922 when, for 
a short period, there existed a very real possibility of some type of 
American commission being sent to Russia to improve trade and 
possibly to establish diplomatic relations. 
Unfortunately the conversation Gumberg had with Goodrich, 
shortly before the latter's departure for Russia in May 1922, has not 
been reported. Goodrich may have revealed to his Russian-Amer-
ican friend that part of his mission was to discuss trade and debts 
with Soviet leaders. Several days later, while Gumberg sat in the 
New York headquarters of the American Relief Administration, 
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Herbert Hoover directed George Baker to show Gumberg a 
confidential memorandum on the Goodrich trip. While he re-
peatedly refused to tell any of his acquaintances the substance of 
the secret document, Gumberg began to urge Robins to write to 
Hoover giving him Robins's support for some type of American 
commission to Russia. The colonel's procrastination frustrated 
Gumberg and in mid-June he wrote Robins: "I do hope that you 
will consider this matter seriously and do something about it." 20 
The timing of this communication and Gumberg' s obvious belief 
that a critical moment had arrived suggested that Gumberg knew 
Goodrich's itinerary in Russia. From the Special Trade Delegation 
he may have been able to predict Russia's response to an invitation 
for improved trade relations. 
At 2:30 P.M. on June 19, 1922, Goodrich entered the office of 
Leo Kamenev, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 
and titular head of the government following Lenin's stroke three 
weeks earlier. Kamenev and Goodrich discussed the debt impedi-
ment to Soviet-American trade. They were joined by Alexey 
Rykov, deputy chairman, Leonid Krassin, commissar of foreign 
trade, Gregory Sokolnikov, commissar of finance, and Maxim Lit-
vinov, assistant commissar of foreign affairs. 21 
Two days later Gumberg finally succeeded in getting Robins to 
send a memorandum to Hoover recommending that "a commis-
sion authorized through the Secretary of Commerce be sent at the 
earliest convenient date to Russia." The timing of this two-page 
memorandum to coincide with Goodrich's discussions in Russia is 
very apparent and makes understandable the imperative tone 
Gumberg used with Robins. Furthermore, Robins's suggested 
members of the commission included Dwight Morrow, John 
Sutherland, Allen Wardwell, Goodrich, Thacher, and Gumberg. 
The pro-Russian bias of the Robins recommendation helps explain 
Hoover's unenthusiastic response. Nevertheless, Goodrich re-
turned to the United States on July 15, 1922, to be greeted by Gum-
berg, who was privy to Goodrich's report to the Harding adminis-
tration. Gumberg admitted to Robins that Goodrich was hazy on 
the subject of recognition, but took heart when he read Goodrich's 
report which stated that "the first thing to do is to appoint a Com-
mission of experts to go into Russia, carefully examine the eco-
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nomic situation and report to our Government." The idea for a 
multipurpose American delegation to Russia, partially engineered 
and coordinated by Gumberg, took effect. The commission concept 
trickled through the United States government and received the 
endorsement of both President Harding and, unexpectedly, 
Hughes in the latter half of July. Hughes instructed America's am-
bassador to Germany, Alanson B. Houghton, to talk with a Soviet 
representative in Berlin on August 1, 1922. 22 
The unofficial negotiations between American and Soviet of-
ficials did not live up to the promise of Gumberg's initial success. 
Houghton proved to be a particularly inept choice to carry out 
these delicate discussions. Former congressman and president of 
Corning Glass, he had a seat on Metropolitan Life's Board of 
Directors. The insurance company belonged to the most vocal 
anti-Soviet business association in America, the National Civic 
Federation. At the outset the ambassador protested against his 
assignment to Hughes. Houghton believed the Soviet regime 
would topple at any moment because of political strife and eco-
nomic instability. 23 The subject of debts and national pride, more-
over, made it easy for Houghton to exert his negative influence. 
The Soviet government could not honor czarist debts to America, 
for such a policy would force Russia to pay even larger debts to the 
European countries with whom it was reestablishing relations. 
The immediate reason, though, for the failure of an American 
commission to materialize lay squarely at the door of national 
pride. Commissar of Foreign Affairs George Chicherin agreed to 
the proposed United States Economic Commission, but Russia in-
sisted on reciprocity. National honor dictated that Russia be per-
mitted to send an economic delegation to the United States at the 
same time she received an American commission. This exhibition 
of pique by a regime which outwardly showed contempt for 
nationalism perplexed Gumberg because it was totally unexpected. 
Gumberg expressed to Robins his hope that "the Russians will not 
stand on their dignity and will not give the cold shoulder" to the 
American proposal. Russian insistence and America's unwilling-
ness to honor the concept of equality caused the entire project to be 
abandoned by mid-September. 24 
An all-but-forgotten sidelight to Gumberg's exertions for bet-
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ter Soviet-American relations was that an unofficial commission 
did indeed go to Moscow in the fall of 1922. Early in July, shortly 
after the Harding administration had apparently ignored Robins's 
memorandum, Gumberg considered going to Russia with a group 
led by Allen Wardwell. This commission would act for the benefit 
of numerous private relief agencies in reporting on Russia's eco-
nomic condition and need for further aid. Other members of this 
proposed endeavor included Allen Burns, chairman of the 
National Information Bureau, and Graham Taylor, former as-
sociate of Edgar Sisson. When queried by Gumberg about par-
ticipating in this venture, Robins told his former secretary: "Burns 
is a radical and has absolutely no influence at Washington and little 
throughout the country. The commission is weak at these two 
points and they are points that very well may determine its value." 
Demonstrating great respect for the political acumen of the colonel, 
Gumberg and Wardwell decided not to accompany Burns and 
Taylor to Russia. However, Gumberg suggested to Burns indi-
viduals who would help make the mission successful. 25 
When Burns and Taylor returned from Russia in January 1923, 
Gumberg and Wardwell arranged for them to see Herbert Hoover 
and other political figures. The unofficial commission informed 
Hoover that Russia required additional relief. Hoover, noting that 
Russia had resumed the exportation of grain, did not consider new 
pleas for Russian relief to be appropriate. 26 Robins's instincts and 
assessment of this privately sponsored commission proved entirely 
correct. 
The lesson of these two commissions, one official but aborted 
and the other unofficial but powerless, was not lost on Gumberg. 
He realized that all his friends in the radical circles of New York, 
including those in his own salon, could not alter Russian-American 
relations through journalism, relief agencies, or visits to Soviet 
Russia. The near-establishment of a United States-sponsored dele-
gation to Russia demonstrated that Gumberg's greater asset had 
been his association with politicians, especially Robins and Good-
rich. Already successful in achieving a direct link to Moscow via 
the Special Trade Delegation, Gumberg learned that a meaningful 
change in the official policy of the United States might be possible 
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by augmenting his contacts with American political figures. The 
year 1922 had been, for Gumberg, one of working with delegations 
and commissions in a back-door endeavor to reestablish communi-
cation between the two countries. The following year would find 
him assuming an even greater political role in a direct effort to gain 
Russia's diplomatic recognition by the United States. 
7 
STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION 
IN THE EARLY 1920s Alexander Gumberg found himself in a per-
fect position to mediate reconciliation between America and Rus-
sia. The illness Raymond Robins suffered in 1921 projected Gum-
berg into an association with American political figures. Later that 
year he joined a group that evolved into an unofficial consulate for 
Soviet Russia. Gumberg wove a web connecting private and public 
American groups favorable to Russia while maintaining his link 
with Moscow. He moved back and forth to repair or strengthen 
broken or threatened lines of contact. Finally, the winds of fate de-
stroyed his pattern and forced him to build anew. 
Gumberg learned from Robins in September 1922 that the col-
onel considered speaking on behalf of several senatorial candidates 
who would later sponsor a recognition resolution in Congress. The 
Harding administration feared that Robins, using his oratorical tal-
ents in support of antiadministration candidates, might widen the 
breach between dissident and regular Republicans. On October 6 
President Harding tried to neutralize Robins by offering him an 
appointment to the Coal Commission. Harding's letter followed 
four days after Robins and Senator William E. Borah conducted a 
large Chicago rally criticizing the president, among others, for his 
Russian policies. 1 
Robins would not accept the appointment unless Harding 
compromised. He asked the chief executive to remember that the 
Soviet government had been in power nearly five years and had 
"raised the greatest armies in Europe, won peace through victories 
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on four fighting fronts, put down insurrections and survived the 
greatest famine of modern times." After criticizing President 
Woodrow Wilson's interventionist policies, he reminded Harding, 
"You spoke with understanding intelligence upon this subject 
while yet a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate. The platform upon which you were elected pledged our 
party to immediate resumption of trade relations with all nations 
with which we were not at war. Yet except for minor changes our 
present policy seems little changed from that of your predecessor. 
Russia has been forced into the arms of the Germans and the Turks 
and the menace of her isolation grows with the passage of time." 
The fear Robins expressed about Germany had indeed become a 
reality. Following the Treaty of Rapallo, Russia conducted much of 
her foreign trade and diplomatic relations through Berlin. 2 
The harsh quid pro quo Robins demanded of the president 
before he would join the government reflected the frustration of 
five years of trying to persuade the United States to adopt a 
realistic approach to the Russian Revolution. Privately he confided 
to Gumberg that his stern lecture may have caused a final break 
with the president. Actually, Harding responded in a most concil-
iatory manner. The chief executive spoke vaguely of "committed" 
policies but expressed his personal confidence in Robins's integ-
rity. Harding, however, seemed to have achieved his desired ends. 
While the president scoffed at Robins's belief that the colonel's 
support was being bought, Robins decided to abstain from political 
activities in the fall elections, although he continued to speak out 
for Russian recognition. 3 
The alliance between Robins and Borah, evident in the Chica-
go rally, strengthened in December 1922, when Robins had his 
Russian-American friend meet the senator from Idaho. Thereafter 
Gumberg became a critical figure in coordinating the public cam-
paign for recognition. His timely information on Soviet Russia 
aided speeches delivered by Robins, Borah, and Goodrich. 
Scholars have not been careful to delineate the connections 
Gumberg acquired which made him indispensable in this cam-
paign. Boris Skvirsky's trade delegation received regular bulletins 
from Soviet Russia through the Russian Telegraph Agency 
{ROSTA) via its counterpart, the Russian Trade Delegation of Lon-
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don. In January 1923 direct information became available when 
ROSTA opened a New York branch under Gumberg's associate 
Kenneth Durant. Along with his other duties Gumberg became a 
special correspondent for ROSTA. He helped Durant gain interviews 
with and prepare articles on various American political leaders 
favoring closer Russian-American relations. Thus Gumberg con-
tributed to the exchange of information between both countries. 4 
Gumberg's Russian ties became increasingly important after 
December 14, 1922, the date he held his first interview with Borah. 
Their talks went extremely well. The senator took Gumberg into 
his confidence immediately, in part because Robins's letter of in-
troduction praised the Russian-American for "his ability, his integ-
rity, his courage and his common sense." Gumberg became 
Borah's principal adviser in the struggle for an intelligent relation-
ship with Russia. He reciprocated the trust Borah gave so quickly. 
The New Yorker appreciated the fact that Borah had been a strident 
opponent of intervention, had called for American recognition of 
Soviet Russia, and had led the attack against Boris Bakhmetev, 
forcing the latter to retire as Russian ambassador in April1922. Al-
though Borah hounded Bakhmetev from office, the State Depart-
ment allowed the Russian embassy's financial attache to control the 
defunct Provisional government's funds. After a European sojourn 
Bakhmetev haunted Soviet sympathizers by opening a New York 
office which claimed to be the Russian Financial, Industrial and 
Commercial Association. 5 
Gumberg enjoyed functioning as Russian adviser to Borah and 
other congressional figures, but it should not be forgotten that he 
operated out of Skvirsky's Washington office. To September 1923, 
Skvirsky permitted Gumberg wide latitude to perform in areas that 
had little to do with the trade delegation's operation. Skvirsky un-
derstood that his secretary had potential to effect a complete 
change in Soviet-American relations. Gumberg appreciated his in-
dependence and took care, when in New York, to inform Skvirsky 
of his many activities. Throughout the period under consideration, 
however, Gumberg acted as Skvirsky's agent for improved trade. 
For example, he set up an appointment with Herbert Hoover for 
Isaac Sherman, New York director of the Anglo-Russian Com-
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pany, Arcos, Ltd. In the same month, January 1923, he briefed 
Philip Chadbourn, vice president of International Barnsdall Corpo-
ration. Barnsdall agreed, in a contract signed in Moscow, to con-
duct boring operations in the Baku oil fields. Gumberg supplied 
Chadbourn with information and letters of introduction and as-
sured visas for a group of Barnsdall engineers who departed for 
Russia on January 27, 1923.6 
Gumberg's broader scheme of putting congressional and pub-
lic pressure on the Harding administration to change its Russian 
policy overshadowed his work for Russian-American trade. He 
advised Borah to resurrect a resolution the senator earlier had in-
troduced calling for Russian recognition. Drawing a detailed plan 
of action, he asked Robins on January 12, 1923, to exert his 
influence with the senator to carry it out. Gum berg knew Borah's 
resolution would come before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee where Borah ranked second in seniority to Henry Cabot 
Lodge. He suggested that Borah head a subcommittee investigat-
ing recognition and use Thomas Thacher as counsel. Gumberg 
even worked up a list of sympathetic witnesses such as Allen 
Burns, Chadbourn, and Sherman, whose Arcos firm had recently 
purchased over $10 million worth of American goods for Russia. 7 
As Robins learned in his espousal of outlawry of war, Gum-
berg learned over the issue of Russian recognition that the Idaho 
senator could not be prodded to action until he discerned the 
proper psychological moment to launch a major campaign. A 
shrewd politician, he rarely threw his total weight behind his own 
pet projects when he had to compete with other national or inter-
national events which threatened to take away the limelight. Un-
fortunately for Gumberg, France chose January 1923 as the proper 
moment to occupy the Ruhr Valley because of Germany's default 
on reparation payments. Gum berg's plan simmered for exactly one 
year before Borah, on January 11, 1924, finally introduced a resolu-
tion, took charge of a subcommittee, and conducted hearings on 
the recognition of Russia. 8 
Even though Borah delayed following Gum berg's recom-
mendation for a period of time, he allowed the Russian-American 
to coordinate much of the propaganda work with which he had 
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been personally involved. The astute Borah frequently used vari-
ous women's groups, particularly the United States Section of the 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (wiLPF), to 
organize rallies before which he could speak and to garner public-
ity for his various campaigns in Congress. The WILPF's president, 
Jane Addams, had been a longtime friend of Raymond and Mar-
garet Dreier Robins, and Mrs. Robins had, until 1922, led the 
Women's Trade Union League (wTuL). In 1922 the WIPLF created a 
Women's Committee for Recognition of Russia, under the direction 
of Lucy Branham and containing many WTUL members. 9 Gumberg 
had been quite aware of the Women's Committee and had intimate 
knowledge of its operation through Robins's family and Bessie 
Beatty, who was on the executive committee. 
Shortly before the end of 1922 Robins placed Lucy Branham in 
touch with Gumberg and together they revived the Women's 
Committee for Recognition of Russia. Early in 1923 it began a 
letter-writing campaign to induce Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes to change America's Russian policy. The public, private, 
and political pressure resulted in Hughes's meeting with forty of 
the committee members. Among the many formidable women 
Hughes faced were Lucy Branham, Mrs. Robert La Follette, Bessie 
Beatty, Mrs. Edward C. King, representing the WTUL, and Mrs. 
Charles Edward Russell, wife of the journalist with whom Gum-
berg worked in 1917 on the Root Mission. 10 
Gumberg, with Branham, prepared the memorandum handed 
to the secretary of state on March 21, 1923.U The document took 
direct issue with the administration's previous statements that rec-
ognition could not be extended until the Russian government pro-
tected the rights of life, property, contract, and labor. Gumberg's 
thoughts are strongly apparent in the memorandum, which stated 
in part: 
Americans in Russia during the past year report that life is as safe 
there as elsewhere. Among these are ... ex-Governor Goodrich of 
Indiana. Since the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 
March, 1921, much legislation has been passed in Russia for the pro-
tection of life and freedom of the individual, involving guarantees 
for private property, the sanctity of contract and the rights of free 
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labor .... During the past year several American corporations con-
cluded contracts with the Soviet Government, among them the 
Sinclair Oil Company and the Barnsdall Corporation of New York. 
According to press reports, both these companies are working in 
harmony with the Soviet Government. 12 
The Soviet regime's apparent stability failed to impress the 
secretary of state. In answering the Women's Committee for Rec-
ognition of Russia, he expressed distaste for a regime which up-
held a consistent policy of confiscation and refused to honor inter-
national debts. The Soviets had compounded their disregard for 
property by promoting revolution through the propaganda of the 
Communist International. "Not only would it be a mistaken policy 
to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation," explained 
Hughes, "but it is also important to remember that there should be 
no encouragement to those efforts of the Soviet authorities to visit 
upon other peoples the disasters that have overwhelmed the Rus-
sian people." 13 
The committee did not change the administration but, through 
political pressure, had forced the issue before a public forum where 
both sides could be heard. Gumberg extended his unusual 
behind-the-scenes position to advance Russian recognition and to 
counterattack adverse public criticism against the Soviet regime 
through his political friends. Thus after Lodge, on February 21, 
1923, severely criticized Russia in the Senate, Gumberg asked 
Goodrich to write to the Massachusetts senator. In his speech 
Lodge claimed Russia had failed to live up to treaty obligations and 
had failed to prevent "marauding bandits" from roaming around 
the countryside. Goodrich wrote Lodge not one, but two, letters. 
In the first, he suggested that Lodge had erred in his perception of 
Soviet Russia's internal affairs. Goodrich personally saw no evi-
dence that supported tales of continuing anarchy in Russia. He had 
talked to "hundreds" of American Relief Administration "boys" 
and could assure the senator that "the information upon which he 
relied was entirely false." In the second letter, Goodrich reminded 
Lodge that Soviet Russia had upheld all its treaties, and he re-
ported personal assurances from George Chicherin "that every 
treaty and contract made by the Government would be carried 
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out." Lodge responded cordially enough for Goodrich to write 
G umberg, "I think I did some good." 14 
A dynamo, Gumberg generated support for his views. The 
voluminous correspondence he maintained attests to his belief that 
the year 1923 would be a year of decision in Russian-American af-
fairs. He asked Robert La Follette, Jr., to advocate recognition be-
fore an upcoming Farmer-Labor party convention. He encouraged 
the Foreign Policy Association in the same direction and advised it 
on the new constitution which created the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. By the same token he struck counterblows, as in the 
case of Lodge, against Soviet-baiters. Samuel Gompers exchanged 
letters critical of Russia with Hughes. President of the conservative 
but successful American Federation of Labor, Gompers strongly 
defended American business. In July he asked Hughes for a defini-
tive anti-Soviet statement and Hughes gladly obliged by publicly 
cataloging Soviet ills. Gumberg urged several senators, such as 
Democrat Burton K. Wheeler, to speak out against, as Gumberg 
described them, "inspired untruths" issued in the Gompers-
Hughes exchange. 15 
The most difficult and perplexing situation with which Gum-
berg had to contend in 1923 was the Soviet execution in March of 
Monsignor Constantine Buchavich. Vicar general of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Russia, he committed the Soviet sin of counter-
revolutionary activity. The specter of bearded, bomb-throwing Bol-
sheviks reappeared suddenly in the American press and severe-
ly damaged Soviet Russia's image. Catholics shared their horror 
with many Americans who believed the Soviets had condemned 
themselves when they killed a priest. The execution reconfirmed 
communism's black reputation as the devil' s own. 16 
Gumberg's secular funeral in 1939 helps explain his attempt to 
rationalize the Buchavich execution among friends and acquaint-
ances in March and April1923. Officiated without benefit of clergy, 
the affair was conducted by Floyd Odium. RKo's male quartet pro-
vided appropriate music as Thomas Thacher, Robert La Follette, 
and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins delivered short eulogies 
over the casket. 17 Gumberg had been serious when in May 1922 he 
told Herbert Hoover he did not believe in anything. His anti-
ideological views extended to the realm of religion. 
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Gumberg's atheism, however, did not keep him from seeing 
the damaging results of religious persecution in Russia. He pri-
vately admitted to Robins that the Soviet government blundered. 
"Ever since they [Soviets] pinched the Roumanian minister andre-
pudiated the foreign debts," he wrote, "they seem to have a 
periodical [sic] crazy stunt." Noting the political realism of Lenin, 
Gumberg could not believe that the "big chief" would tolerate such 
a damaging course of action. Unfortunately, Gumberg thought, 
Lenin had suffered strokes which prevented him from dealing ra-
tionally with the Buchavich affair. Early the next year Lenin experi-
enced a fatal attack. 18 
To his other friends, however, Gumberg defended the execu-
tion on three grounds. He partially accepted official Soviet explana-
tions that the Roman Catholic prelate had committed treasonable 
acts during the Russo-Polish War. It was plausible to him that 
anti-Bolshevik Catholics might have assisted their co-religionists. 
Second, he knew from the past that the Soviet government's anti-
religious activity occurred within the broader movement of separat-
ing church from state, a movement which had frequently been a 
painful and violent process in the Western world. Third, he blamed 
the war, revolution, civil war, Allied intervention, and blockade for 
the hate and cruelty which existed in Soviet Russia. This became a 
principal line of defense argued by Russian sympathizers, such as 
Borah. 19 
As Gumberg remarked to Goodrich, the execution presented a 
golden opportunity for Russia's enemies. For a considerable period 
the American anti-Bolshevik press had been relatively quiet. 20 The 
execution renewed a brief flurry of anti-Sovietism and threatened 
to unravel the threads of Soviet-American relations Gumberg labo-
riously had woven over the past year. 
Although Gumberg had a casual, even callous regard for reli-
gion, trials and executions always disturbed him. He possessed a 
genuinely humane instinct in the preservation of life; indeed, his 
support of the Bolsheviks originated out of a belief that the Soviet 
government advanced social and economic reform for the benefit 
of individual Russians. Thus Gumberg was briefly caught in the 
middle, striving to increase beneficial Soviet-American contacts 
but repulsed by Soviet actions. He laid his soul bare to his longtime 
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friend Jerome Davis, a sociologist at Dartmouth College. Davis had 
first met Gumberg in Russia in 1917-1918 when the youthful 
scholar worked for the Young Men's Christian Association. The au-
thor of many articles and books favorable to Soviet Russia, Davis 
frequently consulted Gumberg in preparing his manuscripts. 
When Davis asked about the execution of a Catholic priest, Gum-
berg exhibited his distress by the length of his response-two 
typed single-spaced pages. The letter outlined his thoughts on the 
previous five years of Russian history and stated in part: 
My personal viewpoint is that it was a very unfortunate occurrence. 
Of course I do not believe that a priest is exempt from punishment. 
... It raises the question whether one believes in capital punish-
ment or in terror in time of revolution. Not being a bloodthirsty indi-
vidual I never liked executions especially on a large scale, as took 
place for some weeks during 1918. But as you know I am not a revo-
lutionist, but all these years have been a platonic sympathizer of the 
Russian Revolution. I always had an unpleasant feeling when I used 
to read about the executions during what was called "the red ter-
ror" .... But all these years I have also been reading the tales of 
"white terror" .... a composite picture in my mind of all these hor-
rors of the "whites" so completely blots out any feeling that I might 
have about the "red terror," that it is difficult for me to write and 
condemn these people in Russia who have been carrying the burden 
... for the past five and half years. You and I were in Russia for the 
first six months of the Revolution. You must remember that during 
that time there were no political executions, no terror. I do not like 
executions, but I will not lift my pen and write an indictement [sic] of 
those men in Russia who prior to the Revolution and since have 
courageously fought for what they believe and always risked their 
lives. So many of my dearest friends have perished on the battle-
fields while fighting in the civil war, ... that I feel that I, who is [sic] 
comfortably removed from all these horrors, have no right to criti-
cise these people for using methods in saving and protecting their 
revolution and their lives as well, of which I do not approve. 21 
Fortunately for Gumberg, the public animosity raised by the 
execution of the Catholic official was intense but brief. Many 
American Catholics, however, had a long memory and did not 
possess Gumberg' s sophistic mentality; members of the church 
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hierarchy maintained a significant degree of prejudice toward 
Soviet Russia. 
Other types of news began to dispel the cloud religious perse-
cution brought to Russian-American relations. In the spring of 1923 
Russia received several important American visitors including 
Congressman Carroll L. Beedy of Maine and Senator Wheeler of 
Montana. In both instances Gumberg talked at length with the 
travelers, provided them reading materials, letters of introduction, 
and, through Skvirsky, assuring their acquisition of proper visa 
documents at the Russian embassy in Berlin. Wheeler especially 
appreciated Gumberg's aid, and after his return in June 1923, he 
continued to seek Gum berg's advice for press interviews and arti-
cles on Russia. Through Robins, Gumberg helped the senator ar-
range a speaking tour, remunerative to Wheeler and favorable to 
Soviet-American relations. 22 
It was only natural that Gumberg should also desire to see 
Senator Borah make the excursion. Goodrich dissuaded him from 
pushing this idea too far, however, sensibly recognizing that any-
thing Borah would see in Russia "would only confirm his present 
judgment. Having arrived at that conclusion before leaving, people 
back here would jump at the conclusion that he saw everything 
through partisan eyes." 23 
While Borah did not make the journey, Gumberg assisted in 
preparing the self-constituted Unofficial Congressional Commis-
sion's departure to Russia in the summer of 1923. He became close 
to Congressman James A. Frear of Wisconsin who accompanied 
Senators Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota and William H. King of 
Utah on a European junket between July 14 and October 15, 1923. 
The Unofficial Commission was quite a coup for the pro-Russian 
forces and generally received fair treatment from the American 
press. The Soviet government realized the important effect this 
delegation might have on future Russian-American relations and 
arranged meetings with Commissar of Foreign Trade Leo Krassin, 
Commissar of Education Anatole Lunacharsky, Premier Leo 
Kamenev, Armand Hammer of the Allied-American Corporation, 
and the president and directors of the State Bank. Acknowledging 
the damage done by the execution of Buchavich, the Soviet gov-
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ernment also made an appointment for the delegates to visit Pa-
triarch Tikhon of the Russian Orthodox Church. When the Un-
official Commission returned to the United States its members 
unanimously called for a renewal of trade relations. 24 
"Never since the Revolution," Gumberg wrote Borah in early 
July, "have there been in Russia Americans as prominent in busi-
ness and political life as are going there this summer." The stream 
of visitors, particularly politicians, entering Moscow gave rise to 
great expectations on Gumberg's part. In his correspondence with 
the Idaho senator, then out West delivering pro-Russian speeches, 
he predicted that Borah would have considerable support in Con-
gress for his Soviet recognition resolution. 25 
The optimism Gumberg displayed to Borah peaked that sum-
mer as he witnessed the strongest bid yet made for Russian recog-
nition. In late April and early May 1923, the Russian-American 
coordinated a series of strategy meetings between Borah, Robins, 
and Goodrich. These discussions led the politicians to make an all-
out effort to change the administration's Russian policy by talking 
to individuals at the highest levels-Secretary of Commerce Her-
bert Hoover and President Warren G. Harding. Borah's special task 
was to pressure Hoover; Goodrich's, to talk with the president; and 
Robins's, to prepare a detailed Russian memorandum, which was 
subsequently hand-carried to President Harding by Will Hays in 
mid-June. After reminding Harding again of his position in 1920, 
the stability of the Soviet regime, the failure of Wilson's interven-
tionist policies, and the need for trade to help America's farming 
interests, Robins concluded his memorandum by stating: "Surely 
this policy of diminishing moral, political and economic relation-
ship between the American and the Russian people is unsound. I 
believe this condition to be a continuing and growing menace to 
the economic welfare of America and the general well being and 
peace of the world." The president declined to make any im-
mediate decision, but Goodrich advised Gumberg that the chief 
executive promised to reopen the whole Russian matter upon his 
return from a western trip. Gumberg confidentially predicted to his 
friend Boris Freeman, a correspondent for Pravda, that some type 
of relations between the United States and Russia would be estab-
lished before the end of the year. 26 
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There followed a peculiar development which historian Wil-
liam A. Williams claims indicated that America and Russia almost 
resumed diplomatic ties in 1923. Robins went to Europe, ostensibly 
to advance his project for the outlawry of war. After meeting politi-
calleaders in London and Paris, he proceeded to Berlin at the end 
of July. According to Williams, Robins was poised in the German 
capital waiting to proceed to Russia should President Harding de-
cide on the resumption of either diplomatic or full-trade rela-
tions. 27 While Williams's thesis is interesting and logical, existing 
evidence is unsupportive. Nevertheless, Robins certainly made 
himself available had Harding suddenly decided to concur with 
those Russian sympathizers belonging to the Republican party. 
While Robins discussed Lenin's deteriorating health with 
Nicholas Krestinsky, Soviet ambassador to Germany, Harding 
died on August 2, making the conjecture about Robins's European 
sojourn patently unimportant and destroying several months of 
preparation by Gumberg, Borah, Goodrich, and Robins. While still 
in Berlin, Robins wrote Gumberg that the new president, Calvin 
Coolidge, would be more intolerant toward Russia than Harding or 
his predecessor, Wilson. Robins's assessment was sound. Only a 
few days earlier, Vice President Coolidge had sent his heartiest 
congratulations to Hughes for his Russian policy as publicized in 
the letter exchange with Gompers. 28 
Gumberg expressed his distress over Harding's death to ROSTA 
correspondent Kenneth Durant, then in Moscow. Gumberg 
thought Coolidge would want to be elected in his own right in 
1924; where this left the Russian issue he could not predict. He 
hoped the new president might want to do something spectacular 
to earn the Republican nomination the following year. To Goodrich 
and Borah, Gumberg spoke of his shock at the president's un-
timely demise. Genuinely upset, the normally dispassionate Gum-
berg could not hide his extreme disappointment with the turn of 
events. He wrote Skvirsky that he suffered severe stomach pains 
which incapacitated him. Within five days, from August 16 to 
August 22, 1923, he lost ten pounds. 29 
Harding's death was a severe blow to the Russian sympathiz-
ers, but with equanimity and determination Gumberg single-
handedly forged anew the coalition of politicians seeking to sway 
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President Coolidge to their position. Toward the end of August, 
while still weak from his ailment, he began to talk and to corre-
spond with his political acquaintances. He urged Senators Wheeler 
and Borah to contact the new chief executive. Coolidge remained 
uncommitted but not unreceptive. Goodrich followed with an ex-
change of letters demonstrating to Coolidge that the American 
press was amenable to trade and recognition by citing favorable ar-
ticles in the heretofore rabidly anti-Bolshevik Indianapolis News. Fi-
nally, in mid-October when the Unofficial Congressional Commis-
sion to Russia arrived in New York, Gumberg talked for several 
hours with its members. He convinced Frear, as coordinator for the 
group, to see Coolidge, but the congressman reported back to 
Gumberg negative results. 30 
The intermixture of ups and downs, hopes and despairs, 
rumors and facts associated with the new Coolidge administra-
tion's attitudes toward Russia left Gum berg feeling great sadness 
on the day of the sixth anniversary of the Bolshevik insurrection. 
He recalled for Robins a conversation he had with Leon Trotsky 
years earlier. He had predicted to the then-commissar of foreign 
affairs that America would overcome its prejudice for the Russian 
Revolution because, in contrast with the countries of Europe, it was 
guided by principle. Six years later, however, Gumberg lamented 
that he had failed to see the "bigoted, short-sighted official mind" 
which was also a part of the American experience. "It seems to 
me," he continued, "that the job which I set out to do, of trying to 
help in bringing about a better understanding between my native 
land and the country of my adoption, was poorly done." Robins 
himself apparently felt by November that the Russian issue was 
dead. His communications with Coolidge concerned outlawry of 
war, not Russia. Gumberg admitted to Goodrich that even Borah's 
attitude had changed. Still assuring Gumberg that he would intro-
duce a resolution, he conceded nevertheless that Coolidge was 
hopeless. 31 
Then on December 1, 1923, the pessimism of the previous 
month lifted. In the morning Robins conferred with Borah on his 
twin interests of Russia and outlawry of war. When he returned to 
his Washington hotel he discovered the White House had called 
several times. He immediately contacted Coolidge's secretary, Bas-
Struggle for Recognition 115 
com Slemp, and learned he had been invited to lunch with the 
president. "After luncheon," Robins elatedly told Gum berg, "I 
was with the President for more than two hours and the whole 
matter was Russia. I was able to give him a better idea I think of the 
whole situation than I have been permitted to give Harding in all 
the time I discussed this question with the late President, and I 
felt Coolidge was really eager to act." 32 
The president did indeed act. Five days later he delivered a 
message to Congress which appeared to call for negotiations be-
tween the United States and Soviet Russia on outstanding prob-
lems. A flurry of activity occurred in succeeding days. Using his 
Moscow connections, Gumberg along with Robins prepared a draft 
response for the use of George Chicherin, Soviet commissar of 
foreign affairs. Received in mid-December Chicherin's response to 
the president stated the Soviet government's "readiness to discuss 
with your government all problems mentioned in your message." 
On the subject of propaganda Chicherin called for "mutual non-
intervention" and as for debts the commissar looked forward to 
negotiations based on "reciprocity." 33 
Although the tone of Chicherin' s note was friendly and con-
ciliatory, the hint that America had been a participant in prop-
aganda (through the American Relief Administration) or might 
owe debts to Russia (because of intervention) was anathema to the 
secretary of state. Hughes indignantly replied, "The American 
Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated ob-
ligations. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow 
the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no 
negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are aban-
doned."34 
It was a mystery to Gumberg at the time and remained unclear 
why, if indeed whether, Coolidge allowed his secretary of state to 
slam the door on his own initiative.35 The text of Hughes's note 
and the speed with which it was prepared and released to the 
American press (a matter of hours after receipt of the Chicherin 
telegram) indicated that Hughes had acted on his own. He did not 
even bother to say that he was replying on behalf of Coolidge. Ap-
parently the Chicherin statement, including concepts of reciproc-
ity, provided Hughes with enough justification to act unilaterally. 
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It was the second time in 1923 that Hughes had jumped at an oppor-
tunity to retain America's nonrecognition policy. 
In analyzing the perplexing about-face from December 6 to 18, 
1923, Goodrich told Gumberg that the Soviet government should 
have expressed more positively an interest in restoring confiscated 
property and settling debts. The postmortems, however, did little 
to disguise the fact that politically the issue of Russia was dead. 
Borah, dumbfounded about the exchange, continued to seek rec-
ognition through Congress and the press. But at the very moment 
he led a committee to investigate the Russian question, the scan-
dals of the Harding administration erupted and all attention fo-
cused on the removal of the tainted attorney general, Harry M. 
Daugherty, and the unsavory characters belonging to Harding's 
"Ohio Gang." 36 Russian trade and recognition could not compete 
with a spicy domestic issue that gave the American press such 
good copy and provided a temporary shock to the Republican 
party. For Robins and Borah, neither outlawry of war nor the cause 
of Russia was more important than avoiding House approval of a 
bill of impeachment against a member of Coolidge's cabinet. Not 
only had the cause of Russia collapsed, but, with few exceptions, it 
remained in the background until the full weight of the depression 
and a Democratic administration came in. While the Soviet and 
American governments might have benefited by a resumption of 
relations, adding the Soviet albatross to the charges of corruption 
was more than the Coolidge government could be expected to 
handle. 
When Goodrich wrote to the new president, he tacitly ac-
knowledged a key factor in the recognition issue. He informed 
Coolidge, in so many words, that the administration would not be 
hurt by reestablishing diplomatic ties with Soviet Russia. This 
negative argument may have confirmed an all-important point for 
Coolidge and the several Republican regimes of the 1920s: the rec-
ognition of Russia involved no compelling interest except whether 
the Soviet government should promise to honor czarist debts and 
denationalize American property. Thus nonrecognition was a safe 
policyY 
Gumberg learned in 1923 that Russian recognition required 
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more than a few friends situated close to the top of the American 
political structure. The prominence of his political associates 
guaranteed nothing more than that the case for Russia would be 
placed before those individuals in actual charge of America's Rus-
sian policy. Presidents and bureaucratic functionaries alike, how-
ever, found no vital need for recognition. The seeming bankruptcy 
of his political maneuvers led him subtly but irrevocably toward a 
group which would at one and the same time bring Russia and the 
United States together and develop broader pressure for the re-
sumption of diplomatic relations. Gumberg never gave up his 
political associations, but by the end of 1923 he reentered the 
American business world, where he sought to achieve yet another 
medium of bringing America and Russia closer together. 
8 
GUMBERG & RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRADE 
FOR SIX YEARS Alexander Gumberg had been a knight-errant tilt-
ing at the windmill of American prejudice against Communist Rus-
sia. Little wonder the immigrant son of a rabbi perished long before 
his allotted three-score-and-ten! He had lived a lifetime by 1917 in 
the culture shock of emigration, in the struggle for livelihood in a 
strange land, in the chaos of Russia's revolution. Then followed six 
strenuous years, years not without their successes and enjoy-
ments, but difficult and heartbreaking years for a man dedicated to 
a policy scorned by the vast majority of his contemporaries. Gum-
berg's work with writers and politicians failed to achieve the im-
mediate objective of securing Russian recognition. But frequently 
movements and trends which seem to have been eclipsed and 
placed in obscurity are necessary antecedents in the synthesis of 
those dramatic events recorded for posterity. 
Ten years after President Harding's death a Democratic presi-
dent, Franklin D. Roosevelt, initiated moves leading to the recogni-
tion of Russia. By that time the internal economic situation of the 
two countries had vastly changed; indeed, conditions cruelly re-
versed themselves, so that by 1933 America's capitalism had be-
come just as suspect in an age of depression as communism had 
been in the period of insecurity after World War I. Depression and 
Japan's revival of imperialistic adventures set the stage for Presi-
dent Roosevelt's action. 
Four circumstances made the 1933 decision possible. The polit-
ical and economic milieu Roosevelt faced permitted him to make a 
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dramatic foreign policy gesture which satisfied his penchant for 
personal diplomacy. Second, many prominent Russian sympathiz-
ers, whom Gumberg had advised, belonged to the opposition 
party. So enmeshed had Gumberg become in the political struggle 
for Russia that, of the four men considered leading candidates to be 
America's first ambassador to Soviet Russia, Gumberg was on in-
timate terms with three-Raymond Robins, Jerome Davis, Philip 
La Follette-and shared mutual acquaintances with Roosevelt's 
choice for the Moscow mission, William C. Bullitt. Third, jour-
nalists and scholars writing favorably about Russia in the early 
1930s benefited from this alternative view established in the early 
1920s by the assistance of Gumberg. Fourth, after 1923, the United 
States had enjoyed a lively commercial relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, the Roosevelt administration feared a declining 
trend and hoped recognition might be a harbinger for greater trade 
as a small but important part of the struggle to lift America out of 
the economic collapse. In the ten years prior to recognition, 
Russian-American trade revived and exceeded prewar levels. This 
renaissance in commercial relations found Gumberg in a dramat-
ically different setting. No longer was he the quiet secretary, trans-
lator, adviser, behind-the-scenes mystery man whose life, accord-
ing to William Henry Chamberlin, would make an intriguing plot 
for a novel. 1 He now became a major public figure in the recon-
struction of Russian-American trade. 
The premature death of Harding in August 1923 marked a wa-
tershed in Gumberg's life. Along with his Russian associate, Boris 
E. Skvirsky, he instinctively accepted the possibility that irregular 
and nongovernmental relations between America and Soviet Rus-
sia would continue indefinitely. Each sought to institutionalize 
those paths they perceived to better relations in the context of both 
short- and long-term benefits. In August, Skvirsky began to fash-
ion the Russian (later, Soviet Union) Information Bureau and ex-
pected his secretary, Gumberg, to play an important part in the 
bureau's establishment and operation. Gumberg had different 
ideas. "I am just about fizzled out," he wrote to ROSTA's Kenneth 
Durant. He had tired of working for Skvirsky and, with the col-
lapse of the recognition movement after Harding's demise, de-
cided "it may be as good a time to quit as any." 2 
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One could speculate at considerable length on why Gumberg 
made up his mind to leave Skvirsky in mid-August. Perhaps 
Skvirsky disliked his secretary's indifference to the Communist 
party. Then, too, Skvirsky's circle may have suffered dissension 
reflecting the disunity in Russia as factions within the party 
positioned themselves for power in anticipation of Lenin's death. 
At any rate Gumberg quite obviously had become bored with 
Skvirsky and loathed the loss of freedom he feared he would sus-
tain by working for the new bureau. Early in September he went to 
Washington to confer with Skvirsky. Their discussions on Sep-
tember 5, 1923, degenerated into an argument because their posi-
tions had become irreconcilable. When Skvirsky insisted the Gum-
bergs give up their New York apartment for a Washington resi-
dence, Gumberg flatly refused. Suffering ill health, he pleaded un-
successfully for a vacation. Skvirsky issued an ultimatum: either 
Gumberg had to come to Washington immediately and organize 
the information bureau or resign. Gumberg chose the latter. His 
place was eventually taken by Harold Kellock, former secretary of 
the American Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Rus-
sia.3 
The idea of organizing an information bureau had little appeal 
for Gumberg. From firsthand experience he knew the limited value 
of propaganda. Furthermore, the job would tie him down to work-
ing on petty details and prevent him from keeping up his volumi-
nous correspondence and personal contact with literary and politi-
cal figures. A foretaste of the type of chores he would have to per-
form for the bureau had come shortly before the unsatisfactory 
conference of September 5. Skvirsky instructed him to collect pho-
tographs of Soviet officials and to gather a master list for press 
releases addresses of all American publishers, magazines, and 
newspapers. For six years Gumberg had been associated with, if 
not the matrix of, great schemes and had worked with even greater 
personalities. He decided the daily tasks of the bureau would be a 
waste of his time. He began to refer to Skvirsky as a "pin head" 
whose "only fun in life seems to be keeping me busy" with matters 
"that do not mean anything." His opinion of the efficacy of the 
Soviet Union Information Bureau has been generally sustained by 
American historians, who resurrect the bureau only to discuss it as 
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a channel of communication to Soviet Russia used by the United 
States in 1933.4 
Despite their differences and apparently rancorous arguments, 
Skvirsky and Gumberg did not irrevocably end their relationship. 
Gumberg remained employed by Skvirsky until the latter part of 
November and the two continued to correspond and talk on those 
occasions when Gumberg visited Washington to meet Robins or 
various politicians such as Senator William E. Borah. 5 Gumberg's 
dream of reconciling the United States with Russia did not permit 
him to terminate his relationship with the semiofficial representa-
tive of Soviet Russia. Skvirsky may have considered Gumberg 
rather independent and ideologically suspect but he understood 
the political usefulness of his secretary. While the two retained a 
working relationship, an undercurrent of suspicion and mild bit-
terness always remained. 
Three months before Gumberg and Skvirsky had their unfor-
tunate interview, an event took place which intimately involved 
Gumberg and ultimately changed the course of his life. On May 31, 
1923, Victor P. Nogin, president of the All-Union Textile Syndicate 
(VTs) in Moscow, wrote Skvirsky asking for assistance in securing 
an American visa. His projected trip to the United States would 
have a momentous effect on Russian-American trade. The creden-
tials Nogin carried were impressive: vice president of the Central 
Executive Committee, member of the Presidium of the All-Russian 
Soviet, and one of nineteen leaders guiding Soviet Russia's Eco-
nomic Council. Formerly a commissar of trade and industry, Nogin 
helped negotiate the first Anglo-Soviet trade agreement. 6 His trip 
to the United States was equivalent to Herbert Hoover's visiting 
Soviet Russia. Under those conditions it would have been a gross 
insult to the Soviets had the United States refused a visa, and great 
care was exercised by individuals in both countries to avoid un-
necessary embarrassment. 
Skvirsky immediately turned Nogin's letter over to Gumberg, 
who was then deeply concerned with coordinating the effort to re-
verse America's nonrecognition policy. Gumberg asked James P. 
Goodrich to intervene with the State Department on Nogin's be-
half. Gumberg did not have to use an excessive amount of persua-
sion, for the former Indiana governor recalled a pleasant meeting 
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with Nogin when he had been in Moscow the previous summer. 
Writing Secretary Hughes, Goodrich urged that Nogin's visa ap-
plication not be arbitrarily refused. He went so far as to pledge his 
honor and accept responsibility for Nogin's character and actions 
while in the United States. After Hughes assured Goodrich that 
Nogin's application would be approved, Gumberg relayed this bit 
of good news to Skvirsky, who in turn cabled details of these 
confidential maneuvers to Maxim Litvinov, deputy commissar of 
foreign affairs. 7 
From the time these arrangements were completed, July 5, 
1923, until Nogin's arrival in New York on November 20, Gumberg 
seems to have given little thought to the impending visit of the 
president of VTS. Even a few days before N ogin' s arrival, he was far 
more concerned about getting President Coolidge to mention Rus-
sia in his first congressional message. Gumberg's final assignment 
in the employ of Skvirsky was to greet the Soviet official. He need 
have done little more than direct Nogin to the New York offices of 
Arcos and perhaps introduce the visitor to a few people. Within six 
days, however, he became Nogin's American assistant. 8 
Gumberg never clearly divulged in his correspondence pre-
cisely why Nogin invested complete confidence in a man who ini-
tially acted as nothing more than a tour guide. It may have been 
significant that Gumberg's younger brother, Zorin, was a lieuten-
ant of Gregory Zinoviev, third member of the ruling troika then 
presiding over Russia. More likely, Nogin quickly appreciated the 
talents of a man with sufficient contacts to gain Hughes's assurance 
of a visa for a Communist. Nogin barely disembarked before ex-
pressing his deep appreciation to both Gumberg and Goodrich for 
their part in his travel arrangements. 9 Gumberg' s ingratiating per-
sonality and excellent connections fitted neatly into Nogin's plans 
of finding some means for Russia to acquire large amounts of 
American cotton. 
As grain harvests improved in Russia, peasants demanded 
more finished products. The New Economic Policy replaced "War 
Communism," which had expropriated grain during the difficult 
days of the civil war. With much of Russia's industrial plant de-
stroyed in war, civil war, intervention, and haphazard nationaliza-
tion, the Soviet government had to devise some means of manufac-
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turing industrial goods which could be exchanged for the peasant's 
wheat. The none-too-subtle conflict between city and country was 
not resolved until the end of the decade when the state exerted, 
through collectivization, control over the land and converted peas-
ants into pseudoproletarians. This issue formed an important 
backdrop to the power struggle that arose even before Lenin's 
death in 1924. During the interim, textiles played a vital role in 
maintaining the flow of goods between rural and urban Russia. 
The Soviet government took two steps to resurrect its ravaged 
textile industry. First, late in 1921 officials made an arrangement 
with Sidney Hillman's Amalgamated Textile Workers to provide 
capital and technical skills for what ultimately became the Rus-
sian-American Industrial Corporation (RAIC). When Nogin visited 
America, RAIC operated fifteen reasonably efficient and productive 
textile mills. Second, Russia decided to augment its meager cotton 
crop by importing nearly as much of the important raw material as 
could be raised within its own boundaries. 10 It was this second 
point which prompted the president of the All-Union Textile Syn-
dicate to journey to the United States in November 1923. 
If Gumberg seemed to Nogin exceptionally personable and 
eager to please, it was because the Russian-American had spent 
the previous two and one-half months trying to find some type of 
employment which he felt was meaningful to him personally and 
to his goal of assisting in the reconciliation between Russia and 
America. While Gumberg provided the answer to Nogin's problem 
of how to secure American cotton without long-term loans or Rus-
sian gold, which America refused to accept, Nogin solved Gum-
berg's employment problem. On December 13, 1923, Gumberg be-
came vice president, secretary-treasurer, and director in charge of a 
million-dollar corporation, the All-Russian Textile Syndicate, Inc. 
(ARTS). 11 Formation of the corporation was the first serious step 
taken to restore Russian commercial relations with the United 
States. It became the means for Russia to purchase American cot-
ton, dyes, and textile machinery. 
Prior to ARTS, Russian-American trade had been conducted by 
a New York branch of the Anglo-Russian company, Arcos, Ltd., 
and by Products Exchange Company and had been so paltry as 
nearly to defy statistical measurement. The creation of ARTS 
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spawned a whole series of Russian corporations in America: Am-
Derutra, Amkino, Manganese Export, Amkniga, Platinum Prod-
ucts, Soviet Photo Agency, Intourist, and the most important, Am-
torg Trading Corporation, established on May 27, 1924. Eventually 
Amtorg became the principal vehicle for Soviet-American trade. 
However, as long as Gumberg remained in charge of the syndi-
cate's New York office, 1923-1926, ARTS handled over 50 percent of 
the total turnover in Soviet-American trade and approximately 65 
percent of the total American exports going to Russia. ARTS alone 
exported 50 percent more goods (by dollar) than the United States 
had exported to czarist Russia in the period before World War I. 
The moment Nogin arrived Gumberg knew these incredible statis-
tics would become a reality, for the Soviet executive told him that 
Russia wanted to buy no less than $50 million worth of cotton. 
Gumberg, who had hoped to accomplish his dream through acting 
as a publicist, lobbyist, and political adviser and had found these 
areas wanting, understood the power of money. Suddenly the vis-
tas opened. Through business a means appeared for instantly im-
proving Soviet-American relations. 12 
Gumberg received his position in the new corporation as are-
sult of Nogin's appreciation for the New Yorker's abilities, knowl-
edge, and connections. Gumberg had brought Nogin into contact 
with one of America's leading corporate law firms, Simpson, 
Thacher & Bartlett. Many of the leading lawyers and public figures 
of the 1920s and 1930s, including a future ambassador to Mexico 
(Dwight Morrow), solicitor general (Thomas Thacher), and vice 
president of Chase National Bank (Reeve Schley), had begun their 
careers with the firm. Gumberg easily engaged Simpson, Thacher 
& Bartlett as the general counsel for the proposed corporation, but 
the major stumbling block, finance, required considerable thought 
and negotiation late in November and early December 1923. 
As long as Soviet Russia refused to honor czarist debts and to 
restore confiscated American property, the United States govern-
ment objected to the sale of Soviet securities in America and the 
extension of long-term loans. Another impediment to the reestab-
lishment of Russian-American trade resulted from the United 
States prohibition of the importation of Russian gold. 13 America 
felt that Soviet gold had been illegally acquired from the czarist 
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government by an illegal regime, but such logic failed to acknowl-
edge the simple fact that Russia was a major world producer of 
bullion. Rich in natural resources and only just starting to rebuild 
her destroyed industrial base, Russia required some type of finan-
cial flexibility in order to carry on trade. Great Britain and Germany 
enjoyed a considerable portion of Soviet trade principally because 
the long-term credits extended to Russia by British and German 
industrialists had the guarantee of their respective governments. 
One of the telling arguments Nogin used among American 
businessmen during his short stay was that Germany had profited 
considerably by acting as the middleman in Soviet commerce. Be-
fore his visit, the syndicate he headed had purchased nearly $40 
million worth of cotton through British and German middlemen. 14 
The Soviets, however, were enamored with American technology 
and productivity and in the 1920s and early 1930s desperately 
wanted American capital to help rebuild their industrial structure. 
Nogin hoped to deal directly in American cotton, to establish the 
credit of Soviet Russia among United States financial institutions, 
and thereby to expand the capital Russia could draw from America. 
Through Gumberg, Nogin acquired the financial backing of 
Chase National Bank which facilitated the incorporation of the 
All-Russian Textile Syndicate. Gumberg took Nogin to visit Schley 
at Chase. Born in 1881, the same year as Thacher, Schley had been 
Thacher's classmate at Yale and had joined his friend's law firm. 
The year Thacher went to Russia as part of the Red Cross Commis-
sion, Schley had joined Chase National Bank, and he soon rose to 
an executive position. 15 Fortunately for Gumberg and Nogin, 
Chase had placed only a minor investment in czarist Russia and 
thus lost little during 1918 when Soviet Russia nationalized and 
confiscated American properties. Furthermore, various Russian 
sympathizers, from the millionaire William Boyce Thompson to the 
counselors at Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, had connections with 
Chase. Even Gumberg used its facilities for his modest savings and 
investments. Thus Schley was more than receptive to Gumberg's 
plea that Chase become the principal bank for the transaction of 
the proposed cotton syndicate. 
Though receptive, Schley could not be irresponsible to the 
bank nor unmindful of American governmental policy. He re-
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quested and received certain assurances from Nogin when these 
two and Gumberg held their talks early in December. One of 
Schley's demands was that the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) 
guarantee the syndicate's business. This cross-institutional ar-
rangement gave Chase some hope that it might be able to become 
directly involved in the financial sphere within Soviet Russia. Sec-
ond, Schley wanted the syndicate to deposit with Chase $1 million 
cash-subsequently ARTS supplied $2 million. While the new syn-
dicate secured the backing of Chase, the bank could extend only 
short-term credit, rarely exceeding the $2 million paid-up stock, 
based on trade acceptances and warehouse receipts of such Soviet 
exports as furs, fish products, manganese, flax, bristles, sausage 
casings, and seeds. 16 Through Chase and the use of receipts the 
syndicate received short-term credit ranging from six to twenty-
four months. 
Five days after the completion of the financial and legal steps 
leading to the incorporation of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate, 
Inc., Hughes sent Chicherin a telegram closing off all possibility for 
negotiations between Russia and America. Suddenly, Gumberg 
understood the importance of Soviet-American commerce. The 
Hughes demarche had no negative impact on the functioning of 
ARTS. To the contrary, the publicity on Soviet-American relations 
and the notoriety caused by the evident confusion of the Coolidge 
administration seemed to gain for ARTS additional interest from 
several New York financial institutions. On Christmas Day 1923 
Gumberg informed Goodrich that after the Hughes statement, he 
and Nogin had been invited to lunch by the presidents of no fewer 
than four banks. While Hughes effectively blocked formal negotia-
tions, his counterpart at the Department of Commerce was in no 
way reluctant to discuss with Gumberg and Nogin on January 15, 
1924, the new trend ARTS presented in Soviet-American tradeY 
After a whirlwind of talks with lawyers, banks, and Secretary 
of Commerce Herbert Hoover, and brief visits to various southern 
states, Nogin departed from the United States leaving his secre-
tary-treasurer in charge of ARTS and the New York office at 120 
Broadway. Before Nogin arrived in Moscow on February 13, 1924, 
Gumberg saw clearing port the first ship carrying $2 million worth 
of American cotton to Russia. 18 He discovered a remarkable twist 
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in roles as a result of the new and powerful position he had ac-
quired in an equally remarkable short span of time. After De-
cember 13, 1923, politicians and businessmen, particularly from the 
South, came to him instead of the reverse. He ultimately used his 
new position to establish more permanent relations between 
America and Russia than that provided by the temporary Russian 
need for cotton. 
Few knew better than Gumberg the fickle nature of his source 
of power. Soviet trade practices were as alien to capitalism as Mark 
Twain's imaginary Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court. In 
the first place foreign trade had been a state monopoly in Russia 
since the decree of April 22, 1918.19 It effectively removed profits 
from Russia's international entrepreneurs and deposited these 
monies in the coffers of the Soviet government. The foreign trade 
monopoly sanitized whatever influence foreign capital might have 
had on the new Communist regime. Second, Russia, similar to any 
developing nation, held a theory of foreign trade at variance with 
the prevalent ideas of the Western world. In the catastrophic eco-
nomic situation Soviet Russia faced in the early 1920s, imports be-
came essential and exports the necessary evil used to acquire vital 
technology and materials. 
Between 1921 and 1928 Russia had a mixed economy under the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). No longer did the state force peasants 
to yield grain to feed the soldiers and workers as in the period of 
War Communism, a euphemism for confiscation. Small businesses 
flourished, and the peasant could sell a sizable portion of his pro-
duce on the free market, while the government retained the 
"commanding heights," i.e., operated major industries. While the 
NEP signaled a retreat from communism, it also marked a period 
when factories were organized into trusts and trusts combined into 
syndicates until a number of key industries possessed a type of ver-
tical integration in the productive process that surpassed the 
dreams of Andrew Carnegie. Ironically, the NEP has been charac-
terized as an economic relaxation which many in the West, particu-
larly Gumberg's political and business associates, equated with 
capitalism. Yet in 1921 the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) 
started coordinating a fifteen year plan, GOELERO. The broad eco-
nomic policy emanating from Gosplan identified imports essential 
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to meet Russian requirements and indicated those products which 
would be sacrificed as exports in order to pay for the incoming 
goods. In the field of international trade the Soviet Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade (Commissariat of Trade and Industry until June 11, 
1920) had overall responsibility to fulfill the plan. The commissariat 
completed its regulatory mission by issuing licenses and defining 
limits and prices to special export and import organizations. Thus 
the actual implementation of Gosplan occurred among the twenty-
two main export-import groups such as Exportkhleb (Grain Ex-
port), Rudaexport (Ore Export), Textilimport {Textile Import), and 
Khimimport {Chemical Products Import). 20 
The year 1921 also found Soviet Russia abandoning an exper-
iment with a moneyless economy. Formation of the Gosbank led 
not only to the recreation in 1922 of a stabilized currency (cher-
novets) partially backed by gold but also to the Gosbank's becom-
ing the agency for financing foreign trade. Soviet money had been 
strictly an internal currency, which could be neither sent abroad 
nor quoted on international exchanges. All payments from and to 
Russian organizations engaged in foreign trade proceeded through 
Gosbank. A more elaborate balancing act, however, was required 
in dealing with foreign trade. For example, Arcos or Products Ex-
change (later Amtorg) might sell x-number of dollars' worth of furs 
in the United States. While actually deposited in an American 
bank, these dollars would be "sold" to Gosbank for rubles used to 
pay for the furs. The same dollars would then be "purchased" from 
Gosbank by an importing firm and used to pay for American 
goods. 21 Since Gumberg and Nogin could not defy the United 
States government and obtain anything more than short-term 
credit, the Soviet government had to be extremely careful and to 
maintain adequate exports to pay within six to twenty-four months 
for the imports. This explains why Amtorg Trading Corporation 
was established six months after the All-Russian Textile Syndicate, 
Inc., began to buy millions of dollars worth of cotton. A well-struc-
tured trading organization had to be in operation in America in 
order to assure adequate Russian exports to the United States. 
The parent company employing Gumberg received its charter 
on February 28, 1922. The All-Union Textile Syndicate (vTs) was, in 
fact, one of the first major conglomerations fashioned under the 
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Communist regime. Comprised of forty-two trusts and companies 
in the cotton, wool, linen, silk, and hemp industries, VTS operated 
342 factories, employed over half a million Russian workers, and 
controlled 95 percent of the entire textile production within Soviet 
Russia. Capitalized by member companies and trusts and super-
vised by a Managing Board in Moscow, VTS served two main func-
tions. It coordinated trade activity by distributing orders, determin-
ing prices and quality controls, and organizing the sale of textiles 
through 127 wholesale and retail outlets. It also purchased all raw 
materials and arranged storage facilities. 22 Heavy demand for cot-
ton, far exceeding Soviet production, had forced the syndicate into 
the world market. To facilitate purchasing, VTS opened locally in-
corporated export firms in Berlin, London, Riga, Paris, and finally 
in New York. 
Although Gum berg's office was the last to be established, it 
quickly became the most important. In the fiscal year ending on 
September 30, 1924, VTS provided member cotton textile companies 
with over half a million bales of cotton. Of these bales, 38,747 
originated in Persia, 48,350 in Egypt, 162,212 in Russia, and 261,600 
in the United States. Even though other VTS agencies in Europe ac-
quired some 38,955 bales of American cotton, Gumberg's office 
supplied nearly half the entire raw cotton for Soviet Russia. The 
importance of these figures to the total textile industry are further 
revealed by the fact that in 1924 there were 202,011 cotton looms 
while the nearest rival fiber, wool, used only 21,165looms. 23 
For the three years Gumberg worked for ARTS, the syndicate 
paid $116,815,282.42 in the total process of chartering seventy-
seven ships to transport 784,193 bales of cotton as well as dyes and 
textile machinery to Russia. Overseeing this gigantic effort, Gum-
berg faced a difficult task compounded by the punctilio and pecu-
liar specifications insisted on by the parent syndicate in Moscow. 
The extreme accountability of ARTS appeared in 1924 a natural con-
comitant to the stringent financial arrangements with which Rus-
sian trade was burdened. However, as George Herring discovered 
while researching his book Aid to Russia, this proved to be a per-
manent trait. Even during the darkest moments of World War II, 
Soviet representatives haggled, hassled, and harassed American 
officials interested in helping the besieged Russians. 24 
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Through these several years Gumberg repeatedly used his 
congenial personality to intervene between American businessmen 
and the syndicate's scrupulous demands. The syndicate bought 
only the best cotton from the best-known cotton merchants, Silvan 
Newburger & Son, Weil Brothers, and Anderson, Clayton & Com-
pany. To facilitate transactions, Gumberg's corporation maintained 
subsidiary offices in Houston and New Orleans. Frequently the 
syndicate used cotton purchasing experts; always cotton mer-
chants had to submit many samples for inspection, and only a 
small percentage of the cotton firms offering business gained con-
tracts. 25 
One major problem cotton merchants learned they had in sell-
ing to the syndicate lay in the unusual specifications Gumberg had 
to demand for the actual bales of cotton. Russians required, in the 
first instance, small round bales rather than the traditional large 
square bales of cotton. Also, the syndicate insisted that the tare 
(wrapping) around the bales be reduced by 87 percent in weight. 
The reason for these unusual measurements had to do with Soviet 
Russia's tariffs. When cotton reached Murmansk, the syndicate 
had to pay 5.83 cents per pound. By reducing the tare weight the 
syndicate reduced the duty by 5 percent and by using round bales 
they reduced their payments another 4.43 percent. Thus, VTS saved 
9.43 percent or $2.75 off the tariff duty on each bale of cotton. 26 
Multiplying each bale by hundreds of thousands gives an indica-
tion of the significant savings these methods brought. 
Aside from these understandable changes, ARTS instructed 
cotton merchants in the precise methods for preparing cotton for 
export. They had to compress it, weigh it, sample it, compress it a 
second time, and be certain that no sample holes showed through 
the tare. The excessive ranging of the cotton induced one of ARTS 
major cotton merchants, Anderson, Clayton & Company of Hous-
ton, to consider seriously placing a representative at Murmansk so 
that the cotton could be weighed and sampled and accounts settled 
at the Russian port rather than in America. 27 
Gumberg was not an autonomous self-made director of an in-
dependent corporation over which he had exclusive control. 
Throughout the entire period of his employment, VTS almost al-
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ways maintained a Russian representative with the American 
branch who participated in the operation of ARTS and who received 
appointment on the Board of Directors. During the early period 
Nikolay Matveyev, president of a subsidiary trust belonging to VTS, 
performed this function; he was replaced later by a member of the 
VTS Managing Board. ARTS also had the supervision of A. M. 
Fushman, senior vice president in charge of purchasing, toward 
the close of Gumberg' s employment with ARTS. While ARTS and VTS 
maintained an interlocking directorate, once the Amtorg Trading 
Corporation had been established its first chairman of the board, 
Isaiah J. Hoorgin, sat on the Board of Directors for ARTS. 28 Thus the 
Soviet Union kept strict control over Russian companies incorpo-
rated in the United States. 
Nonetheless, as general manager of the New York office, vice 
president, and secretary-treasurer, Gumberg assumed a leading 
position and played many key roles in operating the syndicate for 
VTS. He coordinated the establishment of the entire American 
operation, which necessitated extensive traveling, particularly 
through the South. As treasurer, he succeeded in broadening the 
credit arrangement for ARTS. Undoubtedly Gumberg's fortunes 
had been elevated by Victor Nogin principally because of his ability 
to secure the financial backing of Chase National Bank. Gumberg, 
of course, could not acquire long-term loans, but he was able to 
convince other financial institutions, particularly the Equitable 
Trust Company of New York, to do business with ARTS. In the 
spring of 1925 Equitable and ARTS formed a credit arrangement 
after ARTS began to deposit funds with Equitable's Banking De-
partment, and Gosbank agreed to guarantee up to 50 percent of all 
loans made by Equitable to ARTS. Even before the Equitable account 
had been started Gumberg could boast to Goodrich "that our 
Company was the second largest foreign borrower in the United 
States." 29 
As secretary, Gumberg prepared news releases on the syndi-
cate's activities. He was the chief public relations officer who inter-
preted ARTs's functions in the media. On one occasion when he vis-
ited Will Clayton in Houston, he took the extraordinary (for him) 
step of speaking about ARTS and Russian-American trade before 
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the Town and Gown Club of Rice Institute. Until the end of 1923, 
he had never been so consistently and frequently before the public 
eye. He had spent years in a seemingly fruitless back-door attempt 
to rejuvenate Russian-American ties. After 1923, a fourth role, pur-
sued with relish, involved increasing public interest in recognition 
and trade agreements with Russia. In his press releases and inter-
views Gumberg always managed to point out that the millions of 
dollars ARTS spent on American cotton could increase many times 
in diverse areas if Russia could but secure long-term loans. For 
example, in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1925, ARTS bought 
$53,349.55 worth of textile machinery. That same year Russia pur-
chased from England $9,262,800 worth of machinery simply be-
cause British recognition made credit more flexible. Operating 
without a commercial treaty, Gumberg had additional arguments 
to lay before the American business world. Russia levied nearly 
five times the normal port charges on American ships than on 
ships from countries with which the Soviet Union had exchanged 
ambassadors. Thus the ships ARTS engaged to transmit cotton to 
Murmansk were registered to countries other than the United 
States, mainly to Norway, Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain. 
On a less public note Gumberg reminded congressmen and 
senators of the information he provided to the press concerning 
trade. Significantly Gumberg could and did encourage cotton mer-
chants to place the same data before their political representatives 
in Washington.3° 
Just as he had done for Nogin, Gumberg assured potential 
Russian visitors visa documents from the United States. Had he 
not been able to provide this service important developments in 
Soviet-American trade might never have taken place. Aside from 
the personnel involved with VTS, Gumberg secured through Good-
rich and Hoover visas for Valerian Ossinsky, former commissar of 
agriculture. The professor visited the United States late in the 
summer of 1925 to study American agricultural methods, especially 
the use of mechanization to increase productivity. Through Good-
rich and others, Ossinsky was able to establish a dialogue with 
Henry Ford and J. D. Oliver, the plow manufacturer. These con-
tacts led Amtorg to announce in October the purchase of 9,000 
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Fordson tractors. By 1927, 85 percent of all tractors used in the 
Soviet Union originated at the Ford plant in Detroit. An unusual 
rapport developed between Ford and Russia, based on greed and 
grudging respect, and continued to the late 1930s. In 1929 Ford and 
Amtorg signed a $30 million pact for automobiles and assistance in 
establishing a plant in Soviet Russia at Nizhni-Novgorod. 31 
For the first time in years Gum berg's association with the syn-
dicate required a singular devotion to work which prevented him 
from pursuing other major projects. His enthusiasm existed mainly 
because of the merging of avocation with vocation. Between the 
end of 1923 and the end of 1925 he continued his extensive cor-
respondence and visits with longtime political and journalist 
friends, but his letters and discussions centered almost exclusively 
on the syndicate. By the end of 1925, however, the syndicate had 
been well established and the major battles-securing a good repu-
tation, physical organization, and financial credits-had been 
won. 
In 1926 Gumberg began to capitalize on a job well done and 
use his increasingly available spare time for related activities. Early 
that year he took renewed interest in the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, which sponsored in February a debate on Russia between 
Boris Bakhmetev, former ambassador, and Colonel William N. 
Haskell, former director of the American Relief Administration in 
Russia. Later in the year Bakhmetev faced Raymond Robins on the 
same topic at the annual meeting of the Academy of Political and 
Social Science. Robins spent much of his time after 1923 on the out-
lawry of war and thus leaned heavily on Gumberg for material for 
this debate. Robins's former secretary wrote pages of arguments 
and gave him sources to use at the May meeting. 32 
Gumberg also continued to hold salons for writers interested 
in Soviet Russia. Early in 1926, at his instigation, the salon evolved 
into an institution, a "Committee for Recommending Books to the 
U.S.S.R." While Gumberg took a post with which by then he had 
become intimately acquainted, treasurer, the remainder of the 
executive board consisted of John Farrar, Clinton W. Gilbert, 
Horace M. Kallen, Freda Kirchwey, Robert Morss Lovett, Secretary 
Floyd Dell, and Chairman Mark Van Doren. The committee was es-
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tablished to provide Russia with titles of American books 
suggested by prominent authors and critics. Initial communica-
tions with Soviet representatives were arranged by Gumberg 
through his old friend Alexander Yazikov, then Soviet consul gen-
eral to Great Britain. 33 
Gumberg's salon had expanded to include Walter Duranty, 
the New York Time's Moscow correspondent. Duranty had been 
covering Soviet events more sympathetically after he left in 1921 
the anti-Bolshevik center of rumors in the Riga "listening post" for 
direct observation in Russia. Thus it was not surprising that on 
February 19, 1926, Gumberg held a luncheon in honor of Duranty 
before he departed again for the Soviet Union. What may have 
been surprising was that the luncheon was held at the Bankers 
Club. Individuals representing Amtorg, Gosbank, and Textilim-
port at the send-off party ate with executives of Chase National 
Bank, Equitable Trust Company, National City Bank, J. P. Morgan 
& Company, International Banking Corporation, W. A. Harriman 
& Company, and other companies and manufacturers. 34 
Gumberg delivered a short oration in honor of his guest which 
began: "One of the most difficult tasks now confronting a person 
who wants to know what is going on in Russia is to weed out fact 
from fancy from the tremendous quantity of information that is 
printed in newspapers, magazines and books." 35 As he continued 
to develop these thoughts into praise for Duranty, Gumberg 
viewed from the dais leaders in business and finance capital. Per-
haps he himself paused to reflect on his own fortunes. In a little 
over two years he had immersed himself in the inner sanctum of 
America's financial structure. Partially through his own endeavors 
he saw capitalist and Communist sharing a meal, common inter-
ests, camaraderie, a link in the human spirit. Perhaps, too, Gum-
berg reflected that the years he had spent in the political and liter-
ary world trying to redirect American foreign policy went for less 
than seeing the one-to-one relationship between Russian and 
American. Even in the absence of trade agreements and recogni-
tion, Gumberg managed to aid in establishing relations between 
two countries. After years of apparent failure between 1918 and 
1923, he must have attained a certain sense of satisfaction in noting 
the beneficial results of renewed Russian-American trade by 1926. 
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Before the year was out, his work in establishing ARTS com-
pleted, Gumberg resigned. But the direction taken in November 
and December 1923 marked a permanent change in his life and a 
permanent change in the methods he used to bring America and 
Russia nearer to one another. After 1923 Gumberg chose business 
relations as the principal vehicle to accomplish the goal of his life's 
work. 
9 
THE IMPRESARIO 
BY 1929 THE UNITED STATES government had been bypassed in 
the realm of Soviet-American relations. Despite nonrecognition, 
relations existed on a nearly normal scale. The two countries ex-
changed news services, business and cultural representatives, 
books, and ideas, and unofficial consulates busily worked in the 
capitals of both nations. Alexander Gumberg stood astride this 
activity, an impresario conducting, planning, and strengthening 
Russian-American affairs. 
Between 1926 and 1929 Gumberg helped revive the Amer-
ican-Russian Chamber of Commerce, create the American Society 
for Cultural Relations with Russia (ussR), advise Chase National 
Bank on Russian commerce, and establish through dinners, tours, 
conferences, and cultural exchanges a means for bringing Russians 
and Americans together. Gumberg's failure to influence the gov-
ernment sharply contrasts with his success in the private sector. 
Although he maintained excellent rapport with James P. Goodrich, 
William E. Borah, Dwight Morrow, and J. Reuben Clark, the gov-
ernment's view of Russia remained unchanged. As a result, like 
old and exasperating acquaintances, the problems of Soviet gold, 
visas, and finance imposed themselves with frustrating regularity 
immune to solution. Washington's arcane position left the Ameri-
can government in the unenviable role of an obstacle blocking 
normal communications and commerce. 
During the 1920s American antipathy toward Soviet Russia 
hardened and became institutionalized within the Departments of 
Impresario 137 
State and Commerce. The anti-Bolshevik chic fossilized with mod-
est alteration, measured only by degrees of intensity for the next 
half-century. Important policymakers associated with Woodrow 
Wilson instinctively feared bolshevism, less for reasons of eco-
nomic ideology than for the apparent anarchy of Soviet Russia con-
trasted with the orderly reform of America's Progressive Era. In the 
succeeding administration, President Harding's lackluster leader-
ship permitted an ideologue, Herbert Hoover, to fill an intellectual 
and power vacuum left by Harding and to place America's non-
recognition policy in negative terms of Capitalism versus Com-
munism. Ably supported by Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes (to 1925), Hoover's negative attitude toward bolshevism 
percolated through the government. 1 
The feudalistic structure of bureaucracy allowed little room for 
opposition. Individuals employed by the State Department and 
possessed of a refreshingly flexible mentality, such as Morrow and 
Clark, were limited in the scope of their influence. There is no bet-
ter example of the pervasiveness of blinding ideology than that 
provided by President Coolidge's second secretary of state. Despite 
governmental restrictions on Russian gold, securities, and long-
term loans, Frank B. Kellogg unabashedly informed the chairman 
of the Republican National Committee in 1928: "As concerns com-
mercial relations between the United States and Russia, it is the 
policy of the Government of the United States to place no obstacles 
in the way of the development of trade and commerce between the 
two countries." 2 Only a rascal or a person infected by an idea sys-
tem could make a statement which added plus one and minus one 
to get two. 
Gumberg and his former employer Boris Skvirsky understood 
in 1923 that the anti-Soviet policy either was or might become a 
semipermanent fixture with the American government. No other 
reason satisfactorily explains why Skvirsky bothered to erect an in-
stitutional clearinghouse for information about Soviet Russia. By 
the same token, Gum berg's drift into the realm of Soviet-American 
trade reveals his concern to establish a means to counter gov-
ernmental opposition to the Soviet Union. He thought renewed 
and lively commercial relations would raise American business 
pressure against governmental trade and recognition policies. For 
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three years Gumberg played an exciting part in the reconstruction 
of Soviet-American trade through his work for the All-Russian 
Textile Syndicate. Although trade increased in the mid-1920s, 
Gumberg discovered that the Departments of State and Commerce 
had not budged in their Russian views. Through his knowledge of 
the complex structure surrounding Russian trade, Gumberg 
realized that ARTS, once established, had become a stagnant or-
ganization. Indeed, by 1925 any dramatic improvement in trade 
could come only after the American government lifted restrictions 
against Soviet gold, securities, and long-term loans. 
Few knew better than Gumberg the debilitating effects of 
America's trade restraints. He worked assiduously to gain more 
banking facilities for ARTS. The syndicate suffered from the excep-
tionally tight loan situation even with Gumberg's connection with 
Chase National Bank. Chase gave ARTS a clean line of credit for 
$500,000 and, by using cotton as collateral, 80 percent of the invoice 
value of $2 million worth of cotton. Until ARTS produced cash or 
warehouse receipts from Russian imports, Chase frequently 
owned cotton awaiting Russian shipment. By a special convention 
signed between Chase and ARTS, shipping time was actually used 
as a means of credit extension. Under this arrangement, a shipload 
of cotton purchased on Chase credit enroute to Murmansk would 
stop at Bergen, Norway, and await its release by Chase after satis-
factory payment arrangements had been made. For an export com-
pany purchasing $40 million worth of cotton a year, this was insuf-
ferable. Trade existed on a day-to-day basis. Once minimal credit 
had been established Gumberg saw that the future expansion in 
Russian-American trade depended entirely on a revision of Ameri-
can policy. In order to accomplish this end and further facilitate 
trade, Gumberg and Reeve Schley of Chase National rejuvenated 
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce in June 1926. By 
then Gumberg and Schley had become more than just casual busi-
ness acquaintances whose relationship was cemented by mutual 
commercial interests. The previous year Gumberg and the vice 
president of Chase had gone to Russia. 3 
For the first time since 1918 Gumberg had been able to secure 
the necessary travel papers. Thomas D. Thacher, then judge of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
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personally intervened with British Military Control to gain Gum-
berg's transit visa through Great Britain. Until the day before 
Gumberg left America aboard the Majestic on July 3, 1925, he could 
not be certain Great Britain would provide the needed documents. 
Gumberg' s problem with British officials is not revealed in his cor-
respondence, since the matter received partial settlement through 
oral discussions with the British consul in New York City. How-
ever, the available evidence suggests that the British government 
confused Gumberg's identity with an active but unidentified Bol-
shevik revolutionary. The British may have thought Gumberg was 
Michael Borodin. This is suggested by a minor State Department 
investigation conducted in 1927 to confirm that Gumberg was not 
the infamous activist for the Communist International in China. 4 
Frankie accompanied her husband along with Schley's wife 
and son and Lamar Fleming, a cotton merchant. Once in London, 
Gumberg's party increased with the addition of William Henry 
Chamberlin. After a short visit in London and Paris the group de-
parted from Riga on July 31 for Moscow in a private car Gumberg 
secured through Amtorg. Goodrich joined them in Moscow. 
Gumberg devoted most of his month-long stay in Russia to the 
business affairs of ARTS, renewing old friendships (Alexander 
Yazikov happened to be in Moscow at the time), visiting family, 
and interceding with Commissar of Foreign Affairs George Chiche-
rin on behalf of a constituent of Senator Borah. Soviet officials un-
doubtedly encouraged Gumberg and Schley to find some means to 
change America's trade policies. Whether they discussed resurrect-
ing the moribund American-Russian Chamber of Commerce is un-
clear. Nonetheless, that the Soviet government demonstrated con-
tinued high interest in furthering credit arrangements with 
America is evidenced by Gum berg's appointment as United States 
representative for the Commercial and Industrial Bank of the ussR 
(Prombank). 5 
When Gumberg' s group returned to America in mid-
September, the New Yorker orchestrated a campaign, as he had 
done so often before, to eliminate those remaining obstructions to 
Soviet-American commerce. He consolidated his business and 
political connections by suggesting Schley meet Borah. He then 
called on Hoover on September 19, 1925, for a two-hour interview 
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to whet the secretary's appetite over America's prospects in Russia. 
At the same time, Albert H. Wiggin, president and chairman of 
Chase National Bank's Board of Directors, was urged to give a 
luncheon for Wall Street financiers on behalf of Schley. The vice 
president used the luncheon to inform America's banking interests 
about trade with Russia. Finally, through Hoover, Goodrich 
gained an interview with President Coolidge and told him: "The 
nations of the world have tried political ostracism, blockade, inva-
sion and support of counter-Revolutionists in Russia .... isn't it 
just possible that a different line of action, the manifestation of a 
more tolerant spirit toward a people struggling towards the light, 
might not only help the progress going on, but tie to America in the 
years to come a people that are naturally friendly with us and trust 
us?" 6 
While governmental officials seemed favorably disposed to 
current developments in Soviet-American trade, no change was 
made in American policy. The ideological paths of the government 
confused and perplexed Gumberg. Hoover told Gumberg that he 
regarded Russian-American commerce favorably, that he knew 
about Russia's economic progress under the New Economic Policy, 
and that he was quite aware of existing American handicaps to 
further progress in this trade. Yet the secretary did nothing tore-
duce those handicaps. 7 Eight years after the Bolshevik insurrec-
tion, anti-Sovietism had been institutionalized to the point where 
not only recognition but apparently even small adjustments in 
American trade policy could not be effected. 
Gumberg patiently waited over the winter of 1925-1926 for the 
government to demonstrate some change as a result of his fall 
campaign. Time forced him to reconsider his approach. Like his 
former employer, Skvirsky, Gumberg came to appreciate the pos-
sibilities of the institutional approach to change American policy. 
In March 1926 he began to prod Allen Wardwell and Schley tore-
suscitate the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce as a means 
to improve Soviet-American relations and to counter the obstinate 
position of the Departments of State and Commerce. 8 
Gumberg could not have chosen a more opportune moment to 
push for the institutionalization of Soviet-American commercial re-
lations. Although the total turnover in American trade with Russia 
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remained slight in comparison with that of other countries, the 
sharply upward swing between 1923 and 1925, due primarily to 
ARTS, presented a tantalizing picture to American businessmen. 
The value of American exports to Russia between 1923 and 1925 
jumped from $7.5 million to nearly $69 million. Admittedly Great 
Britain and Germany accounted for almost half of Russia's total 
trade, but by the end of the fiscal year 1925 the United States briefly 
held third place despite impediments and nonrecognition. Fur-
thermore, export figures indicated to the Western businessman 
that Lenin's New Economic Policy had been a success. In the first 
four years of NEP the value of Russian exports jumped by over two 
billion rubles with the share in the value of manufactured products 
over food and raw materials moving from 27.1 percent to 44.2 per-
cent. These advances made Russia appear to be an exciting coun-
try, ripe for enterprise. 9 
Aside from the impressive trends in Russian trade, Soviet of-
ficials eased their concession policy. After 1923 American com-
panies contracted to develop Russian industry or to extract natural 
resources discovered that, although they could never acquire prop-
erty rights absolutely, the Soviet government subordinated its 
anticapitalist pretensions to promise American and foreign conces-
sionaires ample profits. With rare exceptions, American conces-
sionaires and all types of businessmen learned that the country 
which sponsored international communism also upheld contracts 
with capitalists. 10 
Finally, Gumberg's decision in regard to a chamber of com-
merce was timely because all other organizations which aspired to 
foster Russian-American commerce were moribund. The Amer-
ican-Russian Chamber of Commerce had been incorporated in 1916 
to promote economic relations between America and czarist Russia 
during World War I. Besides Chase National Bank, the chamber 
contained major financial firms such as the House of Morgan, 
National City Bank, and New York Life Insurance Company. Ex-
cept for Chase National, members had lost millions of dollars due 
to Soviet Russia's confiscation policy. Understandably, the 
chamber converted into a staunch supporter of the government's 
antirecognition policy. Only two and one-half years before Gum-
berg urged New York businessmen to resurrect the chamber, he 
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considered it a hopeless propaganda front for the Russian embassy 
and former Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev. 11 
Actually, Gumberg erred. While the chamber opposed, after 
1917, both trade and recognition, its enigmatic position became too 
much to bear for its leaders, especially its president, former Secre-
tary of Commerce William Redfield. In 1923, when Gumberg had 
sought American recognition of Russia, Redfield had offered the 
services of his organization to send a group to Russia and reopen 
communications without forcing the government into any official 
comment. The State Department quickly rejected Redfield's 
suggestion. 12 Without any reason to exist, the chamber quietly dis-
banded. At the time, Gumberg and other Soviet sympathizers 
chalked up the chamber's demise as a negative victory. 
After 1918 the unusual position vis a vis Russia held by the 
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce left a vacuum in the in-
stitutionalization of commercial relations. In 1919 the American 
Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia attempted 
to fill the void. Led by Emerson P. Jennings of Lehigh Machine 
Company, the association tied itself closely to Ludwig C. A. K. 
Martens, the hapless Soviet representative forced to flee America 
in 1921 before his scheduled deportation. Martens liberally en-
gaged numerous small firms, including Lehigh Machine Company, 
in contracts based, however, on an alteration in American trade 
and recognition policies. When Martens left America, the contracts 
he had let out became null and void. Jennings failed, in a personal 
trip to Moscow, to persuade Soviet leaders to honor the 
agreements. The contracts, including Lehigh's multimillion dollar 
deal for printing presses, were canceled. When Jennings left Russia 
empty-handed in the summer of 1921, the American Association to 
Promote Trade with Russia died from financial embarrassment and 
wounded pride. 13 
Before the Gumberg-Schley alliance guaranteed the reestab-
lishment of a trading organization, Armand Hammer's Allied-
American Corporation partially fulfilled the original goals of the 
groups headed by Redfield and Jennings. Shortly after Jennings 
left Russia there arrived a young American physician, Hammer, 
who, despite his original interest in saving Russian lives during the 
famine, accepted a concession to operate an asbestos mine. Soviet 
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authorities accorded Hammer special treatment, allowing him and 
his family corporation to trade without the immediate supervision 
of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Through offices in Moscow 
and New York, Allied-American became a type of chamber of 
commerce promoting the interests in Russia of thirty-eight major 
companies. In 1924, however, the Soviet government began tore-
strict private trading institutions and Hammer moved on to secure 
a pencil concession which ultimately made him a millionaire. 14 
Gumberg's timing, his employment with ARTS, and his associ-
ation with several important financial and business concerns 
placed him in perfect position to act as a catalyst for the renewal of 
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce on June 11, 1926. 
His suggestion naturally received support from cotton firms, from 
banks such as Chase National and Equitable Trust, and from the 
law firms of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett and Davis, Polk, 
Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed. More importantly key directors of the 
old chamber found it convenient to take a leading part in the reor-
ganizational move: Vice President Maurice A. Oudin of Inter-
national General Electric, Vice President Charles M. Muchnic of 
American Locomotive, W. A. Harriman of W. A. Harriman & 
Company, H. H. Westinghouse of Westinghouse Air Brake Com-
pany, and W. H. Woodin of American Car and Foundry Company. 
Although most of the individuals and firms had been a part of the 
original chamber, they each found it more profitable to accept Rus-
sian contracts than to castigate Soviet Russia. Schley presided over 
the revised chamber and Gum berg's comrade from the Red Cross 
Commission, Allen Wardwell, was vice president. Gumberg 
quickly took an active part in coordinating the chamber's activities 
with Soviet institutions and with the International Chamber of 
Commerce. His work received acknowledgment by his selection to 
the Board of Directors the following year. He kept his position with 
the chamber for the remainder of his life. 15 
At one of the first meetings of the chamber held in the Bankers 
Club on July 23, 1926, Schley spoke on the organization's purpose: 
"I want to emphasize the fact that this Chamber has been revived 
for the sole purpose of fostering trade and commerce between two 
of the greatest nations of the earth. That is its only function. So 
long as the present Board of Directors has anything to do with it, it 
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will not become a political debating society." 16 Clearly the chamber 
did not want to become embroiled over recognition, but it did be-
come an important lobby with the American government to reduce 
trade restrictions. 
The New York offices, first at West Fifty-seventh Street, then 
50 Broad Street, and finally on 261 Fifth Avenue, maintained a li-
brary of statistics on Soviet-American trade. For the one hundred 
dollars contribution members received regular bulletins on Soviet 
production, exports, railway operations, finance, sailings between 
the countries, names and dates of Soviet representatives coming to 
America, names and dates of American businessmen going to Rus-
sia, plus a wide variety of special reports dealing with every aspect 
of Soviet economic life from the addresses of Soviet syndicates to 
governmental regulations. Besides economic news, the chamber 
provided other important services such as visa applications, cus-
toms, travel, and hotel information for members visiting Russia. 17 
Significantly, the chamber established a Moscow office and 
representative shortly after reorganization. In March 1926 when 
Gumberg began to urge Schley and Wardwell to revive the 
chamber, he had also been receiving letters from Charles H. Smith, 
pleading with him to find a suitable position for the then finan-
cially embarrassed mining engineer. Like Hammer, Smith's ca-
reer bordered on the exotic. Originally part of the Inter-Allied 
Railway Commission which attempted to maintain Siberian rail-
roads during the intervention period, Smith remained in Russia to 
try a variety of financial schemes including the operation of a gold 
mining concession in the area formerly occupied by the Far Eastern 
Republic. By the mid-1920s the State Department had written off 
Smith as a bad risk, if not an outright Communist. The department 
had a penchant for considering any individual to be a Communist 
who advocated closer commercial and political relations with Rus-
sia. In the case of Smith, however, they may have been right. He 
belonged to the short-lived Peasant International. 18 
During the spring of 1926, Smith was in Paris, in between 
concessions. Gumberg tried to get him a job with W. A. Harriman 
& Company, among others, but Smith possessed too much sym-
pathy for Soviet Russia to be a trusted employee for any major 
American firm. While Smith's reputation had suffered in America, 
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however, he still had Moscow's trust. The previous summer 
Chicherin had expressed to Gumberg his interest in the mining 
concessionaire. When the American-Russian Chamber of Com-
merce reorganized in June and considered opening a Moscow 
office, Gumberg advanced Smith's name as the best candidate for 
the post. In July 1926 Schley announced the chamber's intent to 
open a Russian branch. Shortly thereafter Smith became a vice 
president of the chamber and went to Moscow. For a gold mining 
engineer, Smith's modest salary of $7,500 reflected a decline in for-
tunes, yet on balance he performed well for the chamber. He spoke 
Russian, he was familiar with the process involved in securing con-
cessions and trade agreements, and he had good rapport with 
Soviet officials.t9 
At first, the Moscow office remained independent of the Soviet 
bureaucracy. The chamber rented its own office and hired a stenog-
rapher. By 1929, however, it had become a financial burden for an 
organization with only 156 members. Chase National repeatedly 
lent money to the chamber to keep it financially operational. Late 
in 1929 the Moscow office moved from its Spaso-Peskovsky ad-
dress to occupy a room with the ussR Chamber of Commerce for 
the West. The ussR chamber also provided the services of Tatiana 
Sofiano, an expert translator and statistician. This gracious and 
friendly gesture by the Soviet government revealed its extreme 
concern to improve commercial relations with the United States. 20 
Regardless of where the office existed, the chamber's Moscow con-
nections played a vital role in fostering Russian-American com-
munications. It was also the first such organization to keep a Mos-
cow post. 
Early in 1928 Smith returned to the United States for a series of 
speaking engagements sponsored by the chamber. Shortly thereaf-
ter he undertook one of the more extraordinary assignments to 
arise in Soviet-American relations. From the United States and 
through Smith in Moscow, Gumberg promoted the publication in 
Russia of a yearbook. It contained a complete directory of members 
of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, advertisements 
from United States manufacturers, and a statistical abstract on 
American industrial developments, prepared by economist Rex-
ford Guy Tugwell. As Gumberg boasted to the Department of 
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Commerce, "This is the first time such a book has been published 
in Russia." Although printed in the summer of 1929 in a limited 
2,000 copy edition, the free volumes reached syndicates, trusts, 
banks, trading organizations, managers of industrial plants, tech-
nical schools, economic publications, and various Soviet gov-
ernmental departments dealing with trade. Gumberg learned 
shortly after publication that several Russian universities used it as 
a handbook on America. 21 
The book, Smith's salary, and the separate Moscow office 
placed the chamber $12,000 in the red by 1929 and nearly bank-
rupted the organization. Fortunately for the chamber, Gumberg 
streamlined and reorganized the Moscow facilities. By 1929 his as-
sociate from the Special Trade Delegation of the Far Eastern Repub-
lic, Alexander Yazikov, had been appointed a director of the ussR 
Chamber of Commerce for the West. Gumberg arranged for the 
American office to move in with the ussR chamber in the Moscow 
Commodity Exchange Building off Ilinka Street, to use the latter's 
personnel, and thereby to save considerable money. In the shuffle, 
the American chamber requested Smith's resignation. 22 
The request did not please Soviet officials. Gumberg wrote 
Yazikov that he "always tried to protect Smith's interests," but 
members felt Smith was not "energetic enough for the job." More 
than likely, members of the chamber found Smith too energetic-
overly enthusiastic in support of the Soviet Union. Once the 
American organization demonstrated its adamant position toward 
Smith, however, the USSR chamber agreed to the resignation on 
condition it share in the decision on Smith's replacement. 23 
After an extensive selection process, the Moscow office 
reopened under the direction of Spencer Williams, a thirty-two-
year-old native of Utica, New York. Williams had been a corre-
spondent for many newspapers. In 1925 he joined the staff of the 
Daily News Record where he specialized in Russian-American textile 
news and became an ally of Gumberg. Williams had traveled ex-
tensively throughout the Soviet Union. His experience, knowledge 
of Russian-American trade, and association with Gumberg guaran-
teed his new position, which he held throughout the 1930s. Since 
the 1929 yearbook proved such a financial burden, the chamber 
waited two years before completing another such project. In 1931 
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the chamber published an Economic Handbook of the Soviet Union and 
a similar volume in 1936, both designed for the American, not Rus-
sian, businessman. 24 
During the same period that Gumberg urged the reorganiza-
tion of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, he under-
took a number of personal projects to improve Soviet-American re-
lations. An author-lecturer, Sherwood Eddy, led a small group of 
writers and businessmen to Russia in the summer of 1926. Gum-
berg answered their inquiries and staged a luncheon for Eddy on 
the author's return. 2s 
Another writer, Upton Sinclair, had quite a different problem. 
He wanted Gumberg to ask a Moscow associate to go to the office 
of the State Publishing House (Gosizdat) "and punch the manag-
er once or twice." While Soviet Russia awarded patents and 
copyrights to citizens, the ussR did not adhere to international 
copyright conventions. As a result, Sinclair discovered his works 
were being pirated. Worst of all, he sent Gosizdat a manuscript, 
Oil, and learned it had been published without so much as a word 
of thanks. Justifiably upset, Sinclair asked Gumberg and Gum-
berg's friend from Navy Mir days, Alexandra Kollentai, then a 
Soviet diplomat, to intervene. Within a short period, Sinclair re-
ceived a check for $2,500. Gosizdat also agreed to use a member of 
Gum berg's salon, Albert Rhys Williams, as Sinclair's literary agent. 
Williams was then in the ussR writing his book The Russian Land. 26 
Several years later Sinclair became embroiled in another con-
troversy involving the Soviet Union. He backed the production of 
Sergei Eisenstein's movie "Thunder over Mexico." 27 The movie 
turned into a financial nightmare for Sinclair and an artistic fiasco. 
In 1925, however, the Soviet producer created a classic, "The 
Cruiser Potemkin," a film depicting a Russian naval mutiny which 
occurred during the disturbances against the czarist government in 
1905. Gumberg loved movies. He may have become enchanted 
with them when he distributed films for the Committee on Public 
Information in Russia over the winter of 1917-1918. Gumberg went 
so far as to buy his own equipment and subject his friends to 
homemade movies he had taken of Russia. In July 1926 Amtorg re-
ceived a single print of "Potemkin." When Gum berg learned of the 
film he became an impresario arranging for acquaintances and the 
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American-Russian Chamber of Commerce to view it as well as tak-
ing the movie to Washington, where he arranged its preview by 
the Overseas Writers' Association. 28 
Gumberg achieved a modicum of success in strengthening 
Soviet-American relations in a variety of ways. Late in 1926, how-
ever, an old problem-visas-reappeared to haunt him. In May 
1925, when Gumberg asked Goodrich to secure State Department 
approval for Valerion Ossinsky's visa, there occurred an easing of 
travel restrictions against Russia. The general counsel for all Rus-
sian businesses in America, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, received 
permission to apply directly for documents for Russian busi-
nessmen through the United States consul general in Berlin. 29 
On balance, the alteration of State Department policy seemed 
minor. Nevertheless, by early 1927 several hundred Russian repre-
sentatives had been able to visit the United States without any em-
barrassing advance in the activities of the American Communist 
party. 
The stratagems of Gumberg, Goodrich, Thacher, and Schley 
and the revival of Russian commerce signified by the All-Russian 
Textile Syndicate prompted the normalization of travel arrange-
ments. However, the change in American policy did not indicate a 
lessening of American ideological objections to Soviet Russia. A 
particularly instructive illustration of the capriciousness of the 
"new" policy within the American government arose in the case of 
George L. Piatakov. Former chairman of Gosbank, chairman of 
Chief Concessions Committee, and vice chairman of Supreme 
Economic Council in charge of all manufacturing industries, Piata-
kov directed the Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank. In the 
late fall of 1926, the Soviet government decided that Piatakov 
should go to America and take complete charge over all Russian 
business interests. Since Gumberg had been appointed Piatakov's 
representative, it seemed natural that he should handle Piatakov's 
travel arrangements. As in the case of other prominent Soviet visi-
tors, Gumberg tried to prevent the American bureaucracy from 
impeding an important development in Soviet-American relations. 
On November 11, 1926, he wrote Dwight Morrow, formerly with 
Thacher's law firm, a J. P. Morgan partner, and classmate of Presi-
dent Coolidge at Amherst. Gumberg asked Morrow to talk with 
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State Department officials and find out the climate of opinion in 
regard to Piatakov' s application. 30 
Early in December, when Morrow returned to New York from 
one of his frequent journeys to Washington, he suggested that 
Gumberg talk to Assistant Secretary of State Robert E. Olds. Three 
days later, December 7, Gumberg entered Olds's office carrying 
with him letters of introduction from Morrow, Thacher, and Alexis 
V. Prigarin who had replaced Isaiah}. Hoorgin as chairman of Am-
torg Trading Corporation. Morrow wrote Olds that he felt 
"confident that Mr. Piatakoff's presence here would not be embar-
rassing to our government and would be of great assistance in de-
veloping trade with their country, particularly the export of cot-
ton." Armed with documents, arguments, and statistics on 
Soviet-American trade, Gumberg talked at length with Olds and 
found him very cordial. After this first exchange Olds asked Gum-
berg to return later in the day for his decision in the matter. Gum-
berg reappeared that afternoon and received Olds' s assurance that 
the Piatakov case would be settled favorably. Later, Gumberg told 
Morrow that the assistant secretary of state promised he would 
send necessary instructions to America's consul in Berlin. 31 
Two days after the interview, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett re-
ceived a letter from Coert du Bois, chief of the Visa Office, permit-
ting them to make direct contact with Berlin. As a result, on De-
cember 11 the law firm cabled the American consul, requesting ap-
proval of Piatakov's application. The procedure followed policy es-
tablished in May 1925, even though Gumberg thought the applica-
tion had been approved during his meeting with Olds. The du Bois 
communication worried Gumberg who asked Morrow to tele-
phone the assistant secretary of state and confirm that Piatakov 
would have no difficulty once he entered Berlin. 32 
Toward the end of January, Piatakov left Moscow and made 
reservations to sail for the United States on board the Mauretania. 
Then on January 29, 1927, Prigarin opened a cablegram from 
Piatakov which stated that the American consulate had refused his 
visa application. On Morrow's advice, Gumberg and a member of 
the Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett firm went immediately to 
Washington to confer with Olds and duBois. They were horrified 
to learn that Olds had not given the Berlin consul any instructions 
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and that diplomatic decorum prevented Olds from reversing the 
consul's decision. While Piatakov cooled his heels in Berlin, Gum-
berg tried every maneuver possible to get the American govern-
ment to reverse the decision. Gumberg failed, so a red-faced 
Piatakov meekly returned to Moscow in mid-March. As a consola-
tion, Piatakov became Soviet ambassador to France and then in 
1928 resumed his old position as director of Gosbank. 33 
Gumberg had decided to resign from ARTS long before the 
Piatakov affair had run its dismal course. That fiasco reconfirmed, 
though, a conclusion he had reached during 1926. Although re-
vived, Soviet-American trade had reached a plateau beyond which 
it could not go unless the American government took positive steps 
to alleviate trade restrictions. As a result Gum berg's new associa-
tion with the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce had far 
greater potential for the improvement of American-Russian rela-
tions than his employment with ARTS. 
Gumberg officially left ARTS on December 15, 1926. As usual in 
such affairs, newspapers and journals of commerce recorded the 
event, providing ARTS with as much publicity as the acclaim Gum-
berg received for his services. Undoubtedly he accepted with far 
greater appreciation the numerous warm letters from business as-
sociates and former employees. Cotton merchant Silvan New-
burger wrote sadly, "I don't know of anything that has happened 
in the business world that has upset me more than the report of 
you severing your connection with the All-Russian Textile Syndi-
cate, Inc." Will Clayton of Anderson, Clayton & Company, ex-
claimed that ARTS's good reputation had been due to Gumberg's 
"wise and equitable administration of the Syndicate's affairs." Weil 
Brothers, the merchants, had been impressed by Gumberg's "cour-
tesies" and his "frank and open manner." 34 
Shortly after Gumberg' s departure, these major cotton firms 
did indeed have good reason to be upset, to miss Gumberg's equi-
table administration and his courtesies. In the succeeding year, 
Russian members of ARTS became more irascible than ever, institut-
ing a new policy of purchasing small quantities of cotton from large 
numbers of merchants. Without Gumberg' s soothing personality 
to maintain order and efficiency, internal squabbles abounded in 
the ARTS organization and resignations became commonplace. 35 
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Concurrent with his resignation, announcements went out 
publicizing Gumberg' s new connection. On January 1, 1927, he be-
came vice president and a director of the United States Company. 
Half-jokingly, the New Yorker told Schley that his new job meant 
that "in addition to all my other ideals I will add the American and 
universal (except Russia [sic]) ideal of trying to make money." The 
United States Company was an investment firm and precursor of 
Atlas Corporation. Except for Richard B. Scandrett, Dwight Mor-
row's brother-in-law, the other board members represented a type 
of alumni association for Thacher's law firm and included Schley, 
George H. Howard, L. Boyd Hatch, and the guiding spirit, Floyd 
B. Odium. Gumberg received $7,200 per annum plus a negotiable 
sum for any business he originated. Unlike his change in jobs in 
1923, Gumberg had his new association well in hand before of-
ficially terminating his position with ARTS. He and his wife took a 
two-week vacation at the Florida home of Raymond and Margaret 
Robins before Gumberg began his new employment on January 
3.36 
Gumberg returned to New York ambitious to keep his solid 
business reputation. Yet, strangely enough, he was relatively silent 
about his new job in the days and weeks that followed. Exactly 
three months after he assumed the vice presidency of United States 
Company, he told Robins that he had wanted to write him "for a 
long time but was hoping to accumulate some good news .... My 
present job has not been working out well. The principal man in 
our organization with whom I was to work in European business 
resigned .... As a result of this change I have been making plans 
which may take me to Russia." 37 
Three weeks later, April 22, 1927, Gumberg boarded the 
Majestic for a voyage that would take him to Paris, Geneva, and 
Moscow. Since Gumberg's services to his company depended 
upon the development of European investments, the resignation 
Gumberg referred to in his letter to Robins cut the Russian-Amer-
ican adrift. Gumberg gravitated to his primary connections-those 
with Soviet officials. The various investment schemes he proposed 
while in Moscow in the first part of June failed. There was a fleeting 
prospect of forming a company to handle storage for American cot-
ton. The warehouse company never materialized. 38 
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The multifaceted Gumberg rarely involved himself in only one 
project at a time. His Moscow visit, seemingly unfruitful, showed 
results nonetheless. He acted as a direct liaison between the New 
York and Moscow offices of the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce. He assisted Colonel Hugh Cooper in negotiations for 
the famed Dnieper Dam project. Shortly thereafter the Hugh L. 
Cooper & Co., Inc., engineers of Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals in 
America, received a Soviet contract to supervise the 650,000 horse-
power dam project. Gumberg also interviewed Olga Kamenev, 
wife of Soviet leader Leo Kamenev and president of the ussR Soci-
ety for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Treasurer of the 
Committee for Recommending American Books to the ussR, Gum-
berg had been empowered by the committee he helped found to dis-
cuss the activities of the American group with Olga Kamenev. 39 
Earlier that year Kamenev requested that the Americans not 
only suggest titles but actually mail copies of the recommended 
books to Russia. Her inquiry caused a stir. Secretary Floyd Dell, 
radical journalist for the Liberator and later the New Masses, ex-
pressed doubts to Gum berg whether "ALL the God dam [sic] books 
in that list" could be sent. An emergency meeting was held in Feb-
ruary at Gum berg's apartment. Apparently Gumberg and his 
friends succeeded in raising a considerable sum. By mid-summer 
the Weekly News Bulletin of Skvirsky's Russian Information Bureau 
reported that the Book Exchange Bureau of the ussR Society for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries had received over 14,000 
books from the American committee. Since Dell admitted to having 
only two dollars for the purchase of books, Gumberg and the 
others must have contributed sizable amounts of money. 40 
The principal issue Gumberg and Kamenev discussed was the 
establishment of an American branch of her society. Shortly after 
Gumberg returned to New York his committee joined in the forma-
tion of the American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia 
(ussR). In the new group Wardwell replaced Gumberg as treasurer, 
Lucy Branham took Dell's post as secretary, and Dell became vice 
president with John Dewey and Lillian D. Wald. The executive 
committee was chaired by Graham Taylor, who had unsuccessfully 
tried to get Gumberg to join him on the unofficial commission to 
Russia in 1922.41 
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Gumberg's European junket passed, as he told Thacher, like a 
"whirlpool" in meetings with Soviet European ambassadors, the 
commissar for foreign affairs, the new commissar for foreign and 
domestic trade, Anastas Mikoyan, and representatives of the ussR 
Chamber of Commerce for the West. Of all his varied activities in 
Europe in 1927, perhaps the most interesting occurred before he 
reached Moscow. Armed with letters of introduction from Mor-
row, Borah, and others, Gumberg made contact with Henry 
Robinson, chairman of the American Delegation to the Economic 
Conference meeting in Geneva in May. Through Christian 
Rakovsky, then Soviet ambassador to France, Gumberg also con-
tacted the chairman of the Soviet delegation, Valerion Ossinsky. In 
this fashion Gumberg, as an intermediary, established an informal 
dialogue between the two groups. 42 
In mid-May, he hosted a private dinner whose guests were 
members of the American delegation: Robinson, Norman Davis, 
Alonzo Taylor, and Arthur Bullard (in charge of publicity), and 
Soviet representatives Ossinsky, Gregory Sokolnikov, former 
commissar of finance, and L. M. Kinchuk, deputy commissar of 
foreign affairs and president of the ussR Chamber of Commerce for 
the West. The occasion marked the only time in the latter half of 
the 1920s when responsible officials of both countries sat down to 
investigate the wide range of problems and differences separating 
their governments. As reported to the State Department, the din-
ner turned out to be exceptionally pleasant. Afterwards, Gum-
berg's guests broke up into three groups. Davis and Bullard talked 
with Ossinsky about ideological questions and the activities of the 
Communist International. Robinson queried Sokolnikov on the 
internal economy of the ussR. Taylor and Kinchuk conferred on 
Soviet-American commerce. While Gumberg situated himself per-
fectly to be the liaison for official relations, inflexible ideological 
postures prevented this remarkable conference from becoming the 
first stage toward recognition. 43 
Gumberg returned to New York at the end of June 1927. He 
carried with him communications from Soviet banking officials to 
Schley. In succeeding weeks he prepared a number of memoranda 
for Schley concerning the financial condition of the ussR, the textile 
industry in particular, and the Soviet political situation which then 
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existed in a state of flux-ultimately Stalin resolved the interparty 
strife under his stern direction. 44 
Because Schley held posts with Chase, United States Com-
pany, and American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, the 
Gumberg-Schley alliance caused Gumberg's role to blur among 
those three organizations. Increasingly Schley relied on Gumberg 
for the chamber's operation and for advice on Russian business. 
Eight months after Schley gave a welcome-home party for Gum-
berg, the latter resigned his post with the United States Company 
to accept an $18,000 per annum job as Russian expert for Chase 
National Bank.45 
In the latter half of 1927, the only operation Gumberg under-
took which clearly involved the United States Company was an in-
vestment scheme to underwrite the purchase of American textile 
machinery for Russia. Late in the summer and early fall two groups 
of Soviet visitors arrived in the United States. The first, led by 
Leonid Serebriakov, Gumberg's close friend and assistant commis-
sar of transportation, received special attention from Gumberg and 
members of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce.46 The 
second, a purchasing commission from the All-Union Textile Syn-
dicate (VTS) arrived with the intent of placing large orders for textile 
machinery. Two Soviet engineers accompanied A.M. Fushman on 
a tour of plants before deciding to place a preliminary order in ex-
cess of $1 million for textile machinery with the Saco-Lowell Shops 
of Boston. 
Fushman demonstrated why he subsequently became vice 
president of the ussR Bank of Foreign Trade. He developed an in-
triguing plan for circumventing the American government's stric-
ture against long-term loans. The Boston company agreed to break 
down and separately finance seven shipments of the $1,217,518 
order with each six-month loan subject to at least three renewals. 
In this fashion VTS conceivably could have accomplished the financ-
ing well beyond the maximum of twenty-four months, since the 
separate shipments would span the better part of a year. 47 
While Fushman's financial legerdemain was impressive, the 
contract went unsigned because of a fundamental problem-
money. VTS wanted 100 percent credit and left it to Saco-Lowell to 
worry about cash. Foreign Sales Department Manager J. F. Hovey 
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asked Gumberg to try and raise the capital. The United States 
Company, however, pledged only $100,000. A pair of Gumberg's 
acquaintances, including Goodrich, offered an additional $75,000 
so Gumberg fell short by over a million dollars. Late in December, 
another purchasing commission left Moscow, this time for England 
where the textile machinery could be bought on credit with long-
term loans. 48 
The collapse of the Saco-Lowell contract underscored the con-
tinuing problem of financing Soviet-American trade. In the previ-
ous fiscal year (1926-1927) the ussR had amassed an unfavorable 
balance of trade totaling $62,985,900. Since the time when Gum-
berg assisted in the reconstruction of Russian-American commer-
cial relations, Soviet Russia had accumulated an American trade 
deficit exceeding a quarter of a billion dollars. Such statistics, con-
sidering the dependency on short-term loans, are amazing. Natu-
rally, Soviet Russia tried numerous plans to gain sounder credit 
arrangements. In 1926 Gumberg's friend Wardwell of Davis, Polk, 
Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed attempted an indirect scheme. Repre-
senting W. A. Harriman & Co., Inc., Wardwell's firm asked the 
State Department whether Harriman could extend long-term cred-
it to a consortium of German banks and industries doing business 
with Russia. The ruse failed, Leland Hand of the State Department 
advised Harriman's counsel that the $25-35 million loan would not 
find "favor at the present time" with the American government. 
Another indirect attempt to garner long-term credit was tried two 
years later. Gosbank issued railway bonds and convinced several 
American banks, including Chase, to act as agents for redeeming 
the interest coupons. The State Department opposed even this rel-
atively harmless plan. 49 
In 1927 the direct approach received no better treatment. 
Serebriakov sought to buy railroad equipment through Charles 
Muchnic of American Locomotive Sales Corporation. The purchase 
would have necessitated bank financing for a minimum of five 
years. In a particularly revealing statement, Robert Olds informed 
Muchnic that "no restrictions are imposed upon the carrying on of 
trade and commerce with ... the Soviet regime." One breath later 
the State Department official stated: "The Department has ob-
jected, however, to financial projects involving the flotation of 
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loans." Two years later the same Muchnic, then vice president of 
Baldwin Locomotive Works Company, signed a contract with Am-
torg made possible by a system of revolving credit. 50 
Not all officials concerned with American foreign affairs pos-
sessed the ideological myopia of the State Department. The agent 
general for reparations, S. Parker Gilbert, whom Gumberg met 
through Morrow, felt the United States could play a stronger role 
in maintaining German reparation agreements by supporting 
Russo-German trade. Germany needed access to the Russian mar-
ket in return for raw materials and grain. In January 1928 Gilbert 
asked Gumberg to use his influence with Chase to form a consor-
tium of American and German banks which would finance 
Russo-German trade. 51 The concept appeared so similar to the un-
successful Harriman proposal of a year and a half earlier that it 
never moved beyond the planning stage. 
A month later still another project arose in the continuing 
drive to stimulate Soviet-American trade. Through Gumberg, 
Schley, Amtorg, and a representative of Gosbank, Vitaly S. Korob-
kov, Chase and Equitable Trust agreed to act as agents for Soviet 
gold. Gosbank' s German correspondent, Garantie und Kredit 
Bank fuer den Osten, shipped $5 million in gold bars from Ham-
burg. It arrived in New York on February 21, 1928. News items 
about the gold appeared in the American press before it arrived. 
Immediately Undersecretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills made an 
inquiry with the State Department over what the Assay Office 
should do in the event Gosbank or Chase and Equitable sought to 
exchange the gold. The State Department confirmed the position 
against accepting Soviet gold, outlined in 1920. Due to Soviet Rus-
sia's confiscation policy America did not purchase gold which 
might be subject to litigation. The ussR made a major blunder or an 
audacious challenge to American policy. It sent gold stamped with 
its own seal. Although the ussR annually produced 30,000 kilo-
grams of gold, Schley had hoped the ussR would send bars ac-
quired through trade and still bearing the seal of governments 
other than Soviet Russia. 52 
The American government may have played an unconscion-
ably foul trick on the public in order to ease the criticism arising out 
of the gold affair. On March 5 the French ambassador informed 
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State Department officials that Bank of France intended to sue 
those parties claiming ownership with the Assay Office. During 
World War I France had purchased fifty-two million francs of Rus- · 
sian gold which remained with the czarist government. The follow-
ing day the American government issued a press release. It offered 
to accept the gold if Chase and Equitable would change their status 
from agents to owners by purchasing the gold from Gosbank. 
Naturally, the banks, subject to litigation for six years, refused, 
outwardly placing the onus on Chase and Equitable. 53 
The gold controversy of February-March 1928 illustrated the 
type of government obstacle Gumberg could not hurdle in placing 
Soviet-American relations on a sounder footing. The refusal of the 
Assay Office to accept Soviet gold, based primarily on ideological 
considerations, ignored the very real fact that millions of dollars 
worth (estimated in excess of $350 million) of Soviet gold entered 
America through third parties such as Germany, Sweden, and 
Great Britain. Ideology, in this particular case, did irreparable 
damage to American foreign trade and may have served the pur-
pose of a foreign power, France. Between May 1925 and February 
1928, the gold turnover handled by Gosbank exceeded $100 mil-
lion. Yet the Bank of France did not threaten lawsuits against this 
activity with any other country except the United States. 54 
France made a triple play by taking advantage of American 
ideology. First, no other government which recognized Soviet 
Russia would have supported French claims. Second, the French 
government, still negotiating with Soviet Russia over wartime 
gold, used the controversy in America to embarrass and pressure 
the Soviets for favorable terms. Third, France had no intention of 
seeing Soviet-American trade dramatically increase from those 
levels already attained after 1923. Such an increase might come at 
the expense of Franco-Soviet commerce. In March, the Bank of 
France initiated a lawsuit with the United States District Court, 
Southern District of New York, to take possession of the Soviet 
gold. The Bank of France, however, could not prove that the gold 
was the same as that held by the Imperial Russian Bank on behalf 
of Bank of France during World War I. Gosbank, in contrast, sub-
mitted evidence that the gold had been smelted and assayed be-
tween 1925 and 1927. If the case had continued, it seemed likely 
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that Gosbank would have won. The Soviet government, though, 
could not afford the luxury of tying up $5 million in gold. Early in 
April Gosbank asked Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett to ship the gold 
back to Germany effectively ending the suit. 55 
Gumberg and other individuals and institutions did not give 
up the fight for Soviet gold. The American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce approved a resolution calling for a change in American 
policy. Chase National and Equitable Trust continued their com-
munications with the Treasury Department hoping to reverse the 
March decision. By May the new chairman of Amtorg Trading 
Corporation, Saul G. Bran, reported that in the previous twelve 
months the Soviet's unfavorable balance of trade with America 
reached a whopping $90 million. In press reports, published May 
5, Bran optimistically spoke of adjusting the deficit by importing no 
less than $30 million in Soviet gold. A few days earlier Gumberg 
visited Mexico City to enlist Morrow's support in persuading the 
State Department to remove the various restrictions, including 
those on gold from Soviet commerce. The only bright sign, how-
ever, occurred in the summer when J. Reuben Clark, Morrow's 
protege, replaced Robert Olds at the State Department. 56 
Through the summer Gumberg continued to present reports 
on Soviet Russia's trade to Chase. His contacts with ARTS and Am-
torg placed him in an excellent position to advance Chase's inter-
ests. Gumberg knew, for example, the tentative plans for Soviet 
purchases before the Soviet fiscal year began. The financing of 
Soviet trade, however, remained a key problem. For that reason, 
and to study the general economic conditions of Russia, Gumberg 
left New York for that country on August 16, 1928.57 
Unlike his other journeys, Frankie did not accompany her 
husband on the voyage. She had left in May for an extended Euro-
pean vacation. After spending a few days in Paris and Berlin, 
Gumberg joined his wife on September 1 in Moscow. The first 
week of his stay in the Soviet capital passed by in a nonstop series 
of meetings with Korobkov, Kinchuk, Vice Premier and Commis-
sar of Communications Yan Rudzutak, and the acting commissar of 
foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinov. The latter had been particularly 
eager to glean Gumberg' s views on the forthcoming election. It 
seems that the Russians assumed that a victory by Herbert Hoover 
Impresario 159 
would lead to at least the removal of the more onerous trade re-
strictions. Gumberg wrote Schley after the Litvinov interview: 
"Too bad Russians cannot vote in the coming elections, otherwise I 
think Hoover would get a lot more votes." 58 
On September 8 the Gumbergs and Leonid Serebriakov began 
a four-thousand-mile journey through the southern heartland of 
Russia. While Serebriakov acted as a guide, Frankie took charge of 
the movie camera and Gumberg sat back to enjoy the scenery as 
they traveled by boat and rail to Kazan, Saratov, Stalingrad (for-
merly Tsaritsyn, now Volgograd), Rostov, Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev, 
and back to Moscow. His travels and talks with Soviet officials 
prompted Gumberg later to write down his observations in a 
memorandum, "Stability and Solvency of the Soviet Govern-
ment," copies of which went to Chase National and Gumberg's 
Wall Street, congressional, and State Department acquaintances. 59 
Aside from high finance, Gumberg had a more mundane mis-
sion on behalf of Schley. At the time of his visit, Moscow's Grand 
Hotel served patrons their meals on czarist china and the pro-
letariat customers availed themselves of napkins embroidered with 
the Romanov crest. Schley, ussR's American banker, wanted more 
than anything else for Gumberg to purchase a set of these memen-
tos.60 
While in Moscow, Gumberg had another unusual request. 
Boris Pilnyak, famed Soviet author, stopped by to see Gumberg. 
The writer anxiously hoped to visit America but could secure per-
mission only if invited by a foreign organization friendly to the 
ussR. Gumberg contacted Lucy Branham and Floyd Dell and got 
the necessary invitation from the American Society for Cultural Re-
lations with Russia (ussR). Over two years passed before the re-
quired arrangements allowed the writer to come to the United 
States. Red tape in both countries and a book Pilnyak wrote, The 
Volga Flows to the Caspian Sea (1930), ill received by Soviet critics, 
delayed his travel plans. Not until April1931 could Gumberg hold 
a dinner-reception for Pilnyak in New York. Unlike his friend Rob-
ins, who devoted an excessive amount of mental and physical 
energy to the cause of prohibition, Gumberg joyfully allowed him-
self the pleasure of maintaining the Russian tradition for imbibing 
strong drink. The dinner-reception Gumberg sponsored took place 
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in a speakeasy. Besides the entire staff of the Nation, a large 
number of liberal writers attended the underground party and 
spent the evening in a freewheeling debate on the freedom of art-
ists under capitalism and communism. 61 
Gumberg returned from his lengthy Russian visit in mid-
October 1928 in time to enjoy the last battles fought during that 
great American spectator sport, the election of a president. While 
Hoover's victory gave hope to a number of Soviet sympathizers 
and Soviet officials that a new direction might be taken toward 
Russia, Gumberg possessed more reserve, a caution built upon 
years of fruitless work. He solidly based on logic the limited op-
timism he revealed to Walter Duranty, when he wrote the New York 
Times correspondent that Hoover as president might change 
United States policy but only because the former secretary of com-
merce had committed himself to the development of America's 
foreign trade. Furthermore, Gumberg dismissed as pedantic the 
speculation over Hoover's choice for secretary of state. He told Du-
ranty that whoever assumed those duties "will be carrying out 
Hoover policies." 62 
Nonetheless, Gumberg and his political and business ac-
quaintances were tantalized by the prospect of Morrow's appoint-
ment to direct the State Department. Gumberg had an opportunity 
to discuss this possibility with the ambassador when he spent 
Christmas Eve in the Morrow home in Englewood, New Jersey. 
Exactly one month later, January 24, 1929, president-elect Hoover 
talked with Morrow about the same subject. Morrow's biographer, 
Harold Nicolson, implied that the ambassador's successes made 
him too powerful for Hoover's liking. It would appear that Hoover, 
through compliments, maneuvered Morrow into remaining at his 
Mexican post. Shortly thereafter,. the press announced Hoover's 
designation of Henry L. Stimson for the post. Those Americans 
sympathetic to improved Soviet-American relations greeted the 
appointment with mixed feelings. Goodrich could not imagine a 
better choice; Robins characterized Stimson as a mindless puppet 
for the ideas of Elihu Root and Charles Evans Hughes. Gumberg 
acknowledged Hoover's dominant personality and remained neu-
tral. 63 
The ussR chose the transitional period between the administra-
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tions of Coolidge and Hoover to send Gosbank executive A. L. 
Scheinman to America. Invited by Chase National Bank, Schein-
man eagerly undertook the journey, apparently accepting his gov-
ernment's delusion that a change in American presidents por-
tended a change in policy. As usual Gumberg did considerable leg-
work to assure some modicum of success for the visit. Five days 
before Scheinman arrived on January 9, 1929, aboard the 
Mauretania, Gumberg went to Washington to set up appointments 
for the bank executive with Senator Borah and J. Reuben Clark. 
Gumberg spent an hour with Clark in an open-ended conversation 
on Russia. As he later told Schley, Clark impressed Gumberg by 
his opposition to the Treasury Department's ruling on Russian 
gold. Gumberg also talked with Assistant Attorney General John 
Marshall. He asked Marshall to ride with him to the dock and 
smooth wrinkles raised by Immigration. 64 
Accompanied by Serebriakov, Scheinman discussed business 
with Chase National. He took time out to attend a dinner given in 
his honor by the Council on Foreign Relations. Then on January 17 
Scheinman went with Gumberg to Washington to meet with sev-
eral government officials with whom Gumberg had secured ap-
pointments. Gumberg accomplished all that he could under the 
circumstances. He left Scheinman in Washington and took a brief 
Florida vacation, driving down with Senator Robert La Follette and 
meeting Frankie, who had arrived earlier, at Robins's estate. In 
terms of intergovernmental relations, the Scheinman visit was in-
significant. The transition between administrations permitted less, 
not more, room for change. In addition, Scheinman soon discov-
ered that he was personally involved in a different type of transi-
tion. Three months after Scheinman talked with Clark, George L. 
Piatakov replaced Scheinman as vice commissar of finance and 
chairman of Gosbank. Discussions in the private sector, however, 
made Scheinman's journey worthwhile. Gumberg established, in 
January and February, a series of meetings and luncheons between 
American railroad executives and Scheinman and Serebriakov. 
One result of those discussions occurred on April12, 1929, when 
the Soviets signed a technological and sales agreement with 
Baldwin Locomotive Works. 65 
Gumberg did not dwell on the inability of Scheinman to effect 
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a change in American policy. He had been justified to place his 
trust in business. When Jerome Davis called on Borah to start a 
new congressional movement for reconciliation with Russia, the 
senator informed the scholar on March 20 that American business, 
not Congress or the government, held all the initiatives. 66 
In seeming confirmation of Borah's opinion, the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce approved a month later the spon-
soring of an extravaganza in Soviet-American relations-a huge 
delegation of American businessmen to Russia. From July 16 to 
August 15, ninety-five Americans traveled nearly six thousand 
miles by train, steamer, and automobile through the Soviet Union. 
Never had such a large excursion been undertaken, and as a result 
the chamber and the push for better trade relations with Russia re-
ceived considerable play in the American press. This was not a 
group of radicals. The delegation contained mainly executives, in-
cluding nine millionaires, socialites, such as Rosemary Bauer, Alice 
De Lamar, and Mabel S. Ingalls, niece of J. P. Morgan, and jour-
nalists including the Nation's editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, and 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle's associate editor, H. V. Kaltenborn. The jun-
ket had been carefully timed to follow the meeting of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce held in Amsterdam July 8-13. 
Because the delegation consisted of so many prominent leaders in 
industry and communications, Gumberg, who directed the affair, 
worked out the logistics of the trip in minutest detail. 67 
Gumberg developed the initial plans with American Express, 
Amtorg, Am-Derutra, and Intourist before mailing out over one 
thousand invitations in May. While Hannah Pickering, the 
chamber's New York secretary, handled much of the mail, Gum-
berg carried on a voluminous personal correspondence to guaran-
tee the delegation a large representation. On June 19 he and Fran-
kie sailed for Europe, arriving in Paris on June 26. In Paris, and 
later Berlin, he made the preliminary visa arrangements which the 
Foreign Office confirmed after he reached Moscow on July 2. As 
soon as he stepped off the train, the ussR Chamber of Commerce 
for the West invited him to a meeting. The Soviet chamber and 
Gumberg, using the list of businessmen who accepted the invita-
tions and would shortly arrive with the delegation, prepared a 
series of interviews, conferences, and receptions. Later, when the 
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group entered Soviet Russia, they were greeted by five official re-
ceptions and conducted through a series of conferences in which 
twenty-two separate business contracts between Americans and 
Russians were discussed. Due to Gumberg' s groundwork with the 
Soviet chamber, the delegation later had the opportunity to ex-
change ideas on Soviet-American trade with Vice Premier Rud-
zutak, Gosbank President Piatakov, Commissar of Foreign Trade 
Mikoyan, Chairman Leo Kamenev of the Chief Concessions Com-
mittee, and various members of the Supreme Council of National 
Economy including F. F. Kilevitz, who also directed the All-Union 
Textile Syndicate. 68 
Until Gumberg left Moscow for Berlin on July 10 to meet the 
delegation, he spent his time with Intourist completing special ac-
commodations for the group. Through Gumberg's foresight, the 
delegation suffered few annoyances. It could exchange currency in 
hotels, experienced minimal customs inspection (none whatsoever 
when it departed), could use cameras without censorship, and, by 
an agreement between TASS and Associated Press, received daily 
stock market quotations, baseball scores, and other news from 
America. The American chamber also provided the group 
amenities such as American coffee, cigars, and cigarettes. Gum-
berg's arrangements were topped off by the receipt of a luxury train 
from the Soviet government for the delegation's use throughout 
their journey. Pulled by two engines, the train had eight sleeping 
cars, two diners, service and baggage cars, plus an ice car to keep 
the Prohibition-ridden Americans delightfully refreshed. The ma-
hogany-trimmed cars contained fans, showers, and a battery of 
valets and attractive female translators who surprised the 
businessmen by refusing, as bourgeois decadence, all tips. 69 
Small wonder that when the delegation completed the grand 
tour of Russia, all the businessmen, socialites, and journalists ex-
pressed favorable views toward American recognition of Soviet 
Russia. Considering the apolitical nature of the American-Russian 
Chamber of Commerce, Gumberg's report carefully explained that 
he had nothing to do with press reports recording the delegates' 
opinions. When the delegation returned to Berlin in August, sever-
al correspondents conducted an opinion poll. A surprising result 
from the inquiry was that fully one-third of the well-heeled group 
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felt the United States should exchange diplomatic representatives 
with the Soviet Union without any preconditions over debts and 
confiscation. An additional third believed the only precondition to 
recognition should be Soviet Russia's repayment of the Provisional 
government's debts to America. 70 
It would be grossly erroneous to claim that the delegates 
based their conclusion on Russia from a balanced, reasoned, or 
even knowledgeable vantage point. The entire trip smacked of a 
Hollywood spectacular staged to entertain without any real sub-
stance. It would be equally wrong, though, to ignore the favorable 
impression these leaders in business and public opinion brought 
back with them to America. The businessmen represented an im-
pressive list of American corporations such as Westinghouse, 
Gillette Safety Razor, Remington Rand, Underwood, Cowham 
Engineering, and International Business Machines. Fourteen par-
ticipating firms did not even belong to the American chamber. 
Many of the businessmen secured a good return for their thou-
sand-dollar ticket. Negotiations for contracts were actually com-
pleted, in two cases, during the hectic thirty-day marathon-Aus-
tin Company for the construction of the Nizhni-Novgorod Ford 
facility and Westinghouse for the electric equipment in the Stalin-
grad Tractor Plant. 71 
The 1929 delegation marked the halcyon days for Alexander 
Gumberg as the focal point in Soviet-American relations. He 
moved with ease among governmental circles in America and Rus-
sia, his presence received appreciative welcome from economic 
strategists in New York and Moscow, and the list of opinion-mak-
ers with whom he communicated contained all the principal lead-
ers of American liberal journalism. When Louis Fischer turned 
from newspaper work to writing his history, The Soviets in World 
Affairs, he first turned to Gumberg. 72 By the end of the 1920s all the 
strands of Soviet-American association seemed to pass between 
Gumberg's fingers. Finally, Gumberg's influence had a strong im-
pact, through his work for Chase National and the American-Rus-
sian Chamber of Commerce, on changing the climate of business 
opinion about Russia. 
10 
RECOGNITION 
IN 1930 JOHN REED's ghost rose from the grave and struck, 
through Veniamin Gumberg, one last dreadful blow at his nem-
esis, Alexander Gumberg. The Communist party's folk hero nearly 
accomplished by memory of his greatness what he failed to achieve 
during his lifetime-permanently labeling Gumberg a counter-
revolutionary. Veniamin reconciled himself with the Bolsheviks 
after November 7, 1917. In the Russian civil war he worked as 
special quartermaster supplying a Red Army division with food 
and supplies. His beneficial service received due reward during the 
NEP reconstruction period with an appointment as head of Am-
torg' s German equivalent, the Russian-German Trading Com-
pany. By 1930 Veniamin's German connections, particularly in 
chemicals, prompted his elevation to vice president of Soviet Rus-
sia's Chemical Syndicate. 1 
Veniamin would have been the first to admit that he could not 
have predicted his subsequent career on November 7, 1917. On 
that date he held the military rank of captain and more importantly 
functioned as secretary of the Menshevik party's Military Section. 
Shortly after noon Captain Gumberg bumped into John Reed, as 
the correspondent rushed up and down Nevsky Prospect trying to 
determine whether the Bolsheviks had begun their bid for power. 
Reed had just arisen, since he had not left Smolny Institute until 
4:00A.M. The last person Reed talked to had been Zorin Gumberg, 
who informed the excitable journalist that orders had been issued 
for the Red Guards to occupy the state bank and telephone and 
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telegraph exchanges. Appropriately the first person Reed talked to 
when he got up was the eldest Gumberg brother. Breathless and 
agitated, Reed eagerly asked Veniamin about the insurrectionists' 
progress. II 'The devil knows!' " Veniamin answered in typical 
Gumberg fashion. II 'Well, perhaps the Bolsheviki can seize power, 
but they won't be able to hold it more than three days. They 
haven't the men to run a government. Perhaps it's a good thing to 
let them try-that will finish them.' " 2 
Unfortunately for Veniamin and Alexander, Reed recorded 
Captain Gumberg's views in Ten Days That Shook the World. On 
February 8, 1930, Pravda published an attack on Veniamin, based 
on Reed's observations. Written under the pseudonym L. Ninin, 
the article led to Veniamin's removal from power. Stalin had im-
posed a new revolution-collectivization and five year plans-on 
Russia. A premium on allegiance to the party and its dictator pro-
duced fear and permitted a macabre upward mobility in Russia's 
economic system to those willing to unseat their superiors by ques-
tioning their Communist integrity. L. Ninin, apparently one of 
Veniamin's employees, accomplished his goal. He not only quoted 
Reed but connected Veniamin with the ousted followers of 
Trotsky. 3 Zorin had already been eclipsed by his ties with Stalin's 
opposition. It now became Veniamin's turn to join his youngest 
brother in Soviet Russia's version of purgatory-the unperson 
world of prisons, camps, and labor battalions. 
These calamities would not have moved beyond the level of a 
family tragedy had Ninin not linked Alexander with Veniamin in a 
conspiracy to gain riches off Soviet Russia's proletariat. In the 
lengthy diatribe against Veniamin, Ninin mentioned Alexander, 
"who grew rich, became naturalized in America, and who had the 
audacity to come to Moscow as a representative of American firms. 
Of course this is a family affair: did the two brothers meet in Mos-
cow, and if they did, what was their brotherly conversation 
about?" 4 
News of these slanders first reached Alexander through the 
dispatches of American correspondents in Moscow. On February 
11, 1930, Gumberg handed Reeve Schley two letters of resignation: 
one for his position as Chase National Bank's consultant on Rus-
sian business and the other as director and member of the execu-
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tive committee of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. 
He later explained to Louis Fischer that he could not function to 
improve Russian-American relations while his reputation suffered 
from Soviet innuendos. "It would be absolutely impossible," wrote 
Gumberg, "for me to do any work unless this story is re-
pudiated." 5 
Aghast at these developments, Schley called for a meeting 
with Gumberg and Peter G. Bogdanov, chairman of Amtorg Trad-
ing Corporation, in the Chase National Bank on February 13. 
Schley expressed dismay with the Pravda article and refused to ac-
cept Gum berg's letters of resignation. He told Bogdanov that 
Gumberg possessed such integrity that his word was "absolutely 
good" on Wall Street and in Washington. In addition, as ARTS 
financial adviser, Schley knew Gumberg had not profited from his 
direction of that corporation. Schley handed Bogdanov a letter de-
manding a full explanation. 6 The same day Thomas Thacher, 
shortly appointed solicitor general of the United States, also gave 
Bogdanov a letter. Since Thacher helped incorporate ARTS and had 
been a director, he could vouch for Gumberg and stated: 
He not only managed the business with extraordinary skill and abil-
ity, purchasing cotton well below the average of the market price, 
but in his dealings and contacts with American bankers and mer-
chants succeeded in establishing a reputation for honesty and fidel-
ity which in my opinion has contributed more than any other thing 
to the creation of credits since extended to the Russian agencies in 
this country .... Under these circumstances I cannot believe that 
such irresponsible statements could have been published in the 
"Pravda". . . . I am not only concerned because of my knowledge of 
the great contribution which Mr. Gumberg has personally made to 
the establishment of friendly trade relations between this country 
and Russia, but looking to the future and to the success of your ef-
forts toward the same end I am greatly concerned lest such state-
ments should destroy his usefulness and embarrass your efforts. 7 
Messages piled on top of one another in the effort to clarify 
Gumberg's position and clear his name. Bogdanov hastened to 
cable his government. He could not afford to lose his lawyer and 
banker. Boris Skvirsky and Harold Kellock assured Robins that 
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Gumberg had not been purposefully discredited. Kenneth Durant 
of TASS wrote indignant letters to United Press International for dis-
torting the Gumberg story in American news releases. Gumberg 
himself communicated at length with Leonid Serebriakov, Alexan-
der Yazikov, and George Melnichansky, chairman of the All-Union 
Textile Syndicate. Not only did important people in America exert 
their influence on Soviet representatives but American journalists 
in Moscow spoke up against Pravda's slander. Fischer told Gum-
berg "that the whole matter of Soviet-American relations cannot 
remain unaffected. To many people, like Borah, Dwight Morrow, 
Robins, Governor Goodrich and lesser figures you are Russia, and 
that you should be so disgracefully disavowed and covered with 
mud will not reflect credit on the ways of the authorities here." 8 
Before the end of February, Bogdanov received a cable from 
the Commissariat of Trade expressing the "high regard" Soviet 
Russia had for Gumberg. Vice Commissar L. M. Kinchuk urged 
Gumberg to compose a statement refuting the charges; the gov-
ernment would see to its publication in Pravda. For several days 
Gumberg prepared his response which he handed to Bogdanov for 
retransmittal on March 7. 9 Exactly one month later it appeared in 
Pravda. Gumberg's letter stated: 
In the "Pravda" of February 8th there appeared an article signed 
"L. NININ," in which although my name is not mentioned, there is 
a statement which refers to me and also to my work in the New York 
office of the Textile Syndicate. I consider it necessary to make public 
certain facts, which prove the absolute falsity of Ninin's statements 
and the entire lack of foundation for his insinuations concerning me. 
The Textile Syndicate never sent me to America, where I resided 
since 1903. In the fall of 1923, V. P. Nogin, with whom I became ac-
quainted in America upon his arrival here for the organization of 
purchases of cotton in the American market, requested me to take 
charge of the organization of the American offices of the All-Russian 
Textile Syndicate, and appointed me its managing director. I oc-
cupied that position for a period of three years, when I resigned of 
my own accord. 
I visited Russia during the Revolution, spending a year there 
from May, 1917 until May, 1918. At that time I was connected with 
the American Mission of Red Cross to Russia under the command of 
Colonel Raymond Robins. I did not visit the U.S.S.R. from May, 
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1918 until July, 1925. In 1925 I spent a month in Moscow on the busi-
ness of the All-Russian Textile Syndicate. Since my resignation from 
the All-Russian Textile Syndicate in December, 1926, I have visited 
the Soviet Union on three different occasions-in 1927, 1928 and 
1929. All my trips to the U.S.S.R. were well known to the Soviet au-
thorities. During each visit I had occasion to meet and discuss 
American business with leading officials of the Commissariat of 
Trade, the State Bank, the Textile Syndicate, and various other So-
viet commissariats and institutions. I always enjoyed the most 
courteous reception from the representatives of Soviet institutions 
with whom I came in contact. My last visit to the U.S.S.R. was in the 
summer of 1929, when I went with the American Business Delega-
tion, organized by the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. 
As a Director of the Chamber, I took a most active part in the organi-
zation of the Delegation, and did so at the invitation of the People's 
Commissariat of Trade. During my visits to the U.S.S.R., I had occa-
sion to give out interviews to the Soviet press, which were published 
both in Moscow and provincial newspapers. 
My reputation in the business circles in America and in the 
U.S.S.R., and my many years of work in connection with the de-
velopment of economic relations between America and the 
U.S.S.R., make it unnecessary for me to make any further reply to 
misleading insinuations contained in Ninin's article. But in view of 
the fact that a reference was made to my work for the Textile Syndi-
cate, I will quote an extract from a letter written to me by Victor Pav-
lovich Nogin, then the Chairman of the All-Russian Textile Syndi-
cate. This letter is dated January 31, 1924, and was written by him 
while en route home: "I would like to tell you as I am nearing 
Russia-and I already feel myself close to Russia although we are 
now only coming to England-that I am deeply gratified and happy 
that I have met you: my meeting you I regard as fortunate for the 
Textile Syndicate and myself." 
I also quote the text of a resolution adopted at a meeting of the 
Board of Directors of the American office of the All-Russian Textile 
Syndicate, in connection with my resignation on December 15, 1926: 
"Resolved that Mr. Gumberg's resignation as a Director and an 
Officer of this Corporation be and it hereby is accepted with regret, 
this Corporation taking this occasion formally to express in its rec-
ords and to Mr. Gumberg its appreciation of his singularly distin-
guished and able services rendered since its incorporation in estab-
lishing its business and credits." 
This resolution was adopted unanimously, and was introduced 
by I. I. Yonov, who succeeded me as the head of the American office 
of the A.R.T.S. after my resignation, and it was seconded by A. V. 
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Prigarin, who at that time was the head of Amtorg, and who was 
also a Director of the A.R.T.S., Inc. I do not doubt that the Board of 
Directors of the All-Union Textile Syndicate in Moscow will now 
also confirm this statement in regard to my work for the Syndicate. 10 
The extraordinary length to which individuals in America and 
Russia went to clear Gumberg's name and to guarantee publication 
of his letter attest to the high esteem he enjoyed in both countries. 
Soviet and American officials recognized Gumberg as the principal 
agent for improved relations. Had his reputation been destroyed 
much of his work would have perished as well. Gumberg's exon-
eration kept Soviet Russia's most effective defender at his station 
with the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. He did, how-
ever, resign his job with Chase National Bank at the end of the fol-
lowing year.U Ironically, it would not be Soviet, but American, 
events which indirectly forced his resignation from active participa-
tion in Soviet-American commerce. 
Following the stock market crash of 1929, a new insecurity 
crept in with the economic decline. The retreat businessmen ef-
fected to maintain their solvency directly affected the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce. While the organization remained 
viable, members could no longer afford frivolity. Tours of Russia 
planned by Gumberg and the chamber in 1930 and 1931 had to be 
canceled due to nonparticipation. 12 Member firms welcomed the 
existence of the chamber's Moscow office and sent representatives 
directly to Moscow when warranted, but the days for extravagant 
delegations touring Soviet Russia had passed. 
More importantly, Soviet-American trade-particularly ex-
ports to the ussR-declined steadily as the depression worsened. 
Amtorg purchased 60 percent less in 1931 than in 1930. Gumberg's 
strategic position as liaison between Chase and various Soviet trad-
ing organizations enabled him to be one of the first Americans no-
ting the new trend. He blamed the fact that "Russian business of 
the Bank has been declining" for his letter of resignation to Schley. 
The same reason explained why Schley surrendered his director-
ship of the chamber to HughS. Cooper, elected president by the 
Board of Directors at a meeting held in the Recess Club on No-
vember 21, 1930.13 
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The precipitous reduction in Soviet purchases of American 
products can be explained in a number of ways: American trade re-
strictions remained; Soviets obtained easy credit from England and 
Germany; declining Soviet exports made difficult the purchase of 
American products. Gumberg, however, believed the "great tur-
moil" in America damaged Soviet-American commerce. The agita-
tion grew after a consecutive series of attacks by the American 
press, private groups, and public officials against the ussR, begin-
ning in 1930. Soviet Russia may have used trade as punishment for 
American actions. 14 
In May 1930 a New York police commissioner released docu-
ments linking Amtorg Trading Corporation with subversive prop-
aganda against the American government. Ten years earlier Soviet 
sympathizers would have cringed and barricaded themselves from 
the inevitable onslaught of anti-Communist hysteria. By 1930, 
however, Gumberg's work with business and government permit-
ted a strong counterstroke. Thacher had been appointed solicitor 
general; Robins regularly lunched with President Hoover; Secre-
tary of State Henry L. Stimson formerly worked with Thacher in 
New York; Dwight Morrow entered Republican politics and pos-
sessed national fame from his Mexican ambassadorship; and the 
chamber kept in close touch with the United States Department of 
Commerce. The chamber sent a committee, led by Cooper and 
Allen Wardwell, to discuss Amtorg's activities with Secretary of 
Commerce Robert P. Lamont on May 27, 1930. Lamont agreed with 
the chamber that Amtorg operated legitimately for the benefit of 
commerce and did not aspire to lead a revolution against the 
American government. Accompanying the committee to Wash-
ington, Gumberg took the opportunity to call on Undersecretary 
of State Joseph P. Cotton. The State Department official revealed 
that neither he nor Russian Division Chief Robert F. Kelley had 
to be convinced that the New York police commissioner distrib-
uted forged documents. Although the government dismissed 
the matter, New York Congressman Hamilton Fish conducted 
hearings into Amtorg, keeping the anti-Soviet flame burning 
brightly. 15 
On July 1, 1930, a bombshell blew the lid off Soviet-American 
trade. Customs authorities temporarily held up cargoes of Russian 
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pulpwood based on the recently enacted Hawley-Smoot Tariff. 
Section 307 allowed the United States to embargo goods produced 
by convict labor. Trade with Russia had already come under a 
strain when Andrew Mellon, secretary of the treasury, criticized 
the Soviet practice of dumping cheap matches on the depressed 
American economy. Finally, on July 25 Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Seymour Lowman banned outright all Soviet pulpwood 
and Treasury officials hinted that most other Soviet products in-
cluding matches would be forbidden. 16 
Regrettably many Americans linked the dumping charge to a 
Communist plot to undermine the weakened capitalist system. Al-
legedly Soviet convict labor provided the ussR a means of export-
ing large quantities of cheap raw materials and finished products. 
At the time, too few people stopped to realize that Soviet exports 
either did not compete with American products or did not enter 
America in sufficient quantity to be measured in anything more 
than a fraction of 1 percent in terms of American production or 
total imports. Matches, however, were different. Soviet Russia had 
dumped large quantities of matches on the American market in 
1929 and early 1930-as had all match-producing countries in 
order to avoid high duties imposed by the 1930 tariff. Yet Russian 
matches accounted for less than 10 percent of all match imports. In 
addition, Russian matches did not compete with any existing 
American product, but rather with matches produced by an inter-
national cartel, headquartered in Sweden, which controlled 80 per-
cent of the world market. 17 
The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce naturally had a 
better grasp of Soviet-American trade patterns. Gumberg and the 
other directors decided on July 30, 1930, again to exert their 
influence with the government. That same day a special committee 
composed of Cooper, Lamar Fleming, and S. R. Bertron sent tele-
grams to Mellon, Lamont, and Hoover. The government agreed 
with the chamber's view that an investigation should be conducted 
before an arbitrary decision prohibited any Soviet product. Within 
a week after Lowman issued his statement, the famous pulpwood 
entered American ports. Even though Hoover spoke against an 
embargo of Soviet goods, the Treasury Department retained the 
right, upon complaint, to challenge any ship carrying Soviet prod-
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ucts and left it to importers to prove convict labor had not been 
used. 18 
The resulting uncertainty caused irreparable damage to Soviet 
export groups and American importers while generally wreaking 
havoc with Soviet-American trade as seen in the case of pulpwood. 
The ussR lacked shipping and chartered foreign steamers. At the 
time Lowman banned pulpwood twenty-three ships destined for 
America were either being loaded at Archangel or on the high seas, 
and forty-three more ships had been chartered. Freight charges ac-
counted for 45 percent of the pulpwood's value and Soviet export 
organizations had to pay 50 percent of the shipping charges in ad-
vance. Even the slightest delay spelled financial disaster. These 
ships could not be diverted to European paper markets because 
American importers demanded cords four feet in length or six in-
ches longer than that required by European paper manufac-
turers.19 
Paradoxically the decline in trade eased recognition three years 
later. As early as August 1930 Gumberg wrote Fischer that the 
press had not been eager to jump on the anti-Soviet bandwagon 
when the Fish committee investigated Amtorg. As the American 
economic system declined further, the value of Soviet trade in-
creased in the eyes of many American businessmen. The Amer-
ican-Russian Chamber of Commerce gained strength with the 
addition to its Board of Directors men representing important cor-
porations: Radio Corporation of America, General Motors, Inter-
national General Electric, Socony-Vacuum, Chrysler, and Thomas 
A. Edison. The lure of Soviet trade tantalized businessmen to the 
point where Gumberg and other board members agreed to canvass 
in December 1932 American firms on the question of recognition. 
The "overwhelming expression" in favor of "official diplomatic 
and trade relations" led the Board of Directors to reverse the 
chamber's 1926 decision on recognition. The chamber's press re-
lease, issued July 13, 1933, argued that "early recognition, to be fol-
lowed by the negotiation of an equitable trade agreement, would 
make it possible to obtain a very substantial share of these [Soviet] 
orders for American industry in time to put many thousands of our 
unemployed back to work before next winter. This much needed 
employment for our labor cannot presently be obtained, however, 
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except by the extension of reasonable governmental or private 
credits, or a combination of both." 20 
Gumberg so identified his lifelong goal with the Republican 
party that he participated in only a minor role when recognition 
finally took place. Had President Hoover not restrained his secre-
tary of state when Stimson investigated the issues two years earlier, 
Gumberg might have had the opportunity to render more im-
mediate service. Stimson's concern with Japan's occupation of 
Manchuria presented a golden opportunity for realpolitik. The idea 
of checking Japanese Far East adventures formed an important 
backdrop for recognition when President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
sent Soviet Russia a message calling for negotiations on outstand-
ing problems between the two countries on October 10, 1933. 21 
Three days later Raymond Robins entered the White House for 
a brief chat with Roosevelt in support of recognition. The two men 
discussed the areas that particularly concerned the president, 
Communist propaganda and freedom of religion. Gumberg had set 
up the appointment through Philip La Follette, former Wisconsin 
governor. 22 Progressive Republicans, the La Follette brothers en-
joyed a close relationship with Roosevelt during the early New 
Deal period. Like Robins, Philip had recently visited Soviet Russia 
and public conjecture placed both men high in the field of candi-
dates for the first ambassador to the ussR. 23 Subsequent to Robins's 
interview with Roosevelt the documents leading to recognition ex-
changed by Roosevelt and then Commissar of Foreign Affairs 
Maxim Litvinov dated November 16 did include communiques 
promising freedom of religion for American nationals in Russia and 
forbidding Third International activities in America. It would be 
wrong, however, to credit Robins with any direct influence on 
negotiations. Rather, Robins was part of the long list of Gumberg 
associates who wrote, called, telegraphed, or personally told 
Roosevelt of their support for recognition. 24 
Probably Roosevelt, conscious of public opinion, had greater 
respect for the work of Gumberg's acquaintances Wardwell, 
Cooper, William N. Haskell, Thomas W. Lamont, and others on 
the Committee on Russian-American Relations of the American 
Foundation. The committee queried a thousand newspapers to 
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discover American opinion about recognition. Their findings, re-
leased a week before Litvinov arrived on November 7, demon-
strated that 63 percent of the newspapers favored recognition; only 
26.9 percent opposed it outright. Significantly the question used-
"Does your paper favor or oppose the recognition of Russia?"-
contained an explanatory note which stated that "recognition" 
meant the immediate exchange of ambassadors without precondi-
tions.25 
Unable to contribute to the immediate decisions regarding rec-
ognition, Gumberg continued as the impresario bringing Ameri-
cans and Russians together. He organized a testimonial dinner for 
Maxim Litvinov on behalf of the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce held in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel a week after recogni-
tion had been accomplished. Robins delivered the principal ad-
dress. He expressed the sentiment of Gumberg's heart when he 
began: "For sixteen long years we have waited for this hour." 
Robins went on to outline the benefits diplomatic relations offered 
both countries and to praise Soviet progress in adversity. The colo-
nel did not dwell on the long struggle nor did he lay any laurels 
for himself or others. Privately he praised Gumberg: 
Congratulations old Comrade and dear friend for this culmination of 
your wise, brave, unfaltering labors for the common good of your 
homeland and your adopted country. From the first hours of the 
travail and birth of the Soviet Government . . . yours has been the 
wisest and most constructive mind in American-Russian relations. I 
have I think been familiar with most of your undertakings in the be-
half of Russian-American trade and diplomacy, and always you 
have understood the essential elements and held a realistic attitude 
to the facts of the situation. If justice were done in this curious world 
of cross purposes and false values, you would wear on your breast 
both the Order of Lenin and the Distinguished Service Cross of the 
United States. 26 
Oswald Garrison Villard thought Robins should have spoken of 
those journalists who fought for recognition but told Gumberg: 
"Otherwise I congratulate you upon the occasion, and the de-
served tribute to you personally. You certainly are entitled to every 
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honor, and as for seeing the captains of industry sitting under the 
'red flag of anarchy' and applauding the Internationale, why that 
was worth a lifetime of abuse!" 27 
Less than six years after this gratifying celebration at the Wal-
dorf, Gumberg suffered a heart attack and died on May 30, 1939. 
He remained to the end an anomaly for his time. Closely linked 
with Communists, Gumberg died a public relations officer for Atlas 
Corporation, trustee of the New York Neurological Institute, and 
on the Board of Directors of Franklin Simon, Inc., American Com-
pany, Inc., and American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. While 
contemporaries endured depression-wrought hardships, the 
Gumbergs moved to a Fifth Avenue hotel suite, owned a country 
estate near Norwalk, Connecticut, and switched from a Buick to a 
prestigious LaSalle automobile. These outward signs of prosperity 
were due to another anomaly: the financial wizardry of Floyd Od-
Ium's Atlas Corporation, an investment house which thrived dur-
ing economic disaster. 28 
Gumberg enjoyed the fruits of American capitalism, yet he 
never lost interest in the Soviet experiment. He remained the 
liaison for the chamber with their Moscow office and also with 
Soviet officials in America. After November 16, 1933, Boris 
Skvirsky became charge d'affaires of the ussR embassy in 
Washington. The two men had overcome their bitter 1923 feud. In 
1936 the ussR appointed Skvirsky Soviet ambassador to Afghanis-
tan. As soon as he heard about the appointment, Skvirsky wrote 
Gumberg: "You and I have had our personal differences, but I 
think I never let it out of my mind during the difficult pre-recogni-
tion period that you were doing many helpful things in your own 
way and were sincerely interested in aiding better relations be-
tween the two countries." Through Skvirsky a warm friendship 
formed between Gumberg and Soviet Ambassador Alexander 
Troyanovsky. When Gumberg went to Washington he lunched 
with the Soviet official, who in turn frequently visited the Gum-
bergs in New York or on their farm. 29 
Troyanovsky required Gum berg's soothing and friendly as-
sociation, for after 1933 Soviet-American relations seemed not to 
improve at all. Trade continued its decline to 1935; Soviet debts and 
confiscations could not be settled; America and Russia did not col-
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laborate to check Japan or other militaristic powers; and Soviet 
irascibility piqued America's Ambassador William C. Bullitt, who 
gladly resigned his post in favor of heading the United States dip-
lomatic mission to France. Bullitt's ebullient replacement, Joseph E. 
Davies, achieved no more, although he did not become as disen-
chanted with the ussR as his predecessor. Davies may have had a 
more realistic level of expectation based on a series of conversa-
tions he had with Gumberg in December 1936, shortly before his 
departure. While Gumberg did not keep a memorandum of their 
talks, Davies praised Gumberg for his "inestimable help ... in get-
ting some understanding of the situation in Russia." 30 
Besides damaging official relations, Soviet purges estranged 
many American liberals from Soviet Russia. Stalin cleansed the 
party of former opponents who allegedly took their orders from the 
exiled Trotsky and Soviet Russia's fascist enemy, Germany. Fortu-
nately Gumberg's brothers lived, but he had to use all his contacts 
with Troyanovsky, Spencer Williams, and Louis Fischer just to 
keep track of them. Zorin wound up in exile in the Urals and Ven-
iamin, after a year of incarceration following the Pravda article, be-
came a clerk first in Leningrad and then in Moscow. However, 
many of Gum berg's dearest Russian friends, such as Alexander 
Yazikov, suddenly disappeared forever. Most distressingly, Stalin 
permitted between August 1936 and March 1938 a series of notori-
ous public treason trials in Moscow. To this day Sovietologists 
puzzle over why the defendants fell over each other in their efforts 
to place their guilty pleas before the court. Except in Russia, the 
trials made a mockery of Soviet justice. Gumberg knew or worked 
with many of the famous defendants found guilty, including 
Radek, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Krestinsky, Rakovsky, and 
Piatakov. Worst of all, Leonid Serebriakov was found guilty in the 
second show trial of January 1937. Not since Dwight Morrow died 
in 1931, tragically ending a promising political career, had Gum-
berg experienced such a grievous personal loss. 31 
Davies witnessed, as one of his first diplomatic functions, the 
trial and uncritically accepted the defendant's confessions. He re-
turned to the United States briefly in April 1937 and attended a 
dinner with Gumberg at the Washington home of Rachel and 
Robert La Follette, Jr. After cocktails had been served, the ambas-
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sador spellbound his hosts with a recounting of the recent Moscow 
trial. Gumberg, however, suddenly became violently ill. He later 
explained to his hosts: 
Joe Davies' story of the trial had a strange effect upon me. I was 
tensely interested in his very realistic and vivid description. When 
he told of the testimony of Serebriakov and described how he non-
chalantly concurred in Piatakoff's damaging testimony, not even 
coming to the microphone; how he yawned after he concluded his 
few words of testimony which sealed his death warrant. [sic] Then 
he sat down and crossed his legs. Joe described his voice and man-
ner as very indifferent. Somehow when that part of the story was 
told, the whole picture came before my eyes. Serebriakov was as in-
different to death as he was in his life since he lost out as Secretary 
of the party and was succeeded by Stalin. He was one of the best 
friends I have had and one of the finest people that I knew. I guess 
Joe's story brought back to me vividly a picture of my friend and it 
did something to me to make me sick. Suddenly I broke out in a cold 
sweat and felt as though I were going to faint. 32 
Despite his family's problems and the execution or disappear-
ance of so many of his Soviet friends, Gumberg retained his re-
spect for the results of the Russian Revolution. Since he had not 
lived in the ussR and had not shared all the problems of Soviet life, 
he refused to condemn those steps Stalin took to protect and pre-
serve the revolution. Gumberg's memory of czarist oppression and 
of the promise raised by the near-bloodless Bolshevik insurrection, 
blinded him to Stalin's despotic rule. After holding a consistent 
position on Soviet Russia for nearly twenty years, Gumberg found 
it easier to rationalize than to criticize. Several of his American lib-
eral acquaintances from the Nation and the New Republic did not 
share Gumberg's constancy and formed a committee which sought 
to discredit the Moscow trials by seeking the testimony of Trotsky, 
who allegedly directed the conspiracy against Stalin and the party. 
Gumberg did not join the group. In fact he tried for four hours to 
convince the committee's chairman, John Dewey, that an attack on 
Stalin's purges weakened Russia's position as the leading oppo-
nent of fascist-militarist Germany, Italy, and }apan.33 
Perhaps unfortunately, Gumberg lived long enough to find 
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many of his former associates placing Stalin in the same class as 
Hitler or Mussolini. Columnist and radio broadcaster Dorothy 
Thompson in February 1939 speculated that the famous an-
tagonists, Hitler and Stalin, might reach an accord. In one of his 
last letters to Robins, Gum berg dismissed Thompson's story as a 
smear campaign against Russia and Stalin: "If Hitler made a deal 
with Stalin he would lose his biggest talking point both at home 
and abroad. He started off to destroy Communism in Germany and 
to save the rest of the world from it. How would it look if he made a 
deal with those Communists? As for Stalin, it just does not fit the 
book at all, although Russians would not hesitate to sign another 
Brest-Litowsk. " 34 
Less than three months after Gumberg died the two dictators 
agreed to the so-called Nazi-Soviet Pact freeing Hitler to engage in 
war without fear of Soviet reprisal. Soviet Russia signed a second 
Brest-Litovsk treaty which gave her a breathing spell to recuperate 
from the self-inflicted wounds caused by the purges. 
In many respects the Pravda affair and Russian recognition 
marked contemporaries' recognition of Gumberg's total dedication 
to the cause of reconciliation. Throughout a difficult sixteen-year 
period he had kept the spark of Russian-American relations alive 
in politics, business, and journalism. As a confidant, secretary, 
translator, adviser, correspondent, businessman, and impresario 
he was the focal point and bridge between the two countries. Dur-
ing his lifetime he saw his dedication rewarded when America and 
Russia exchanged notes in 1933. Gumberg also lived long enough, 
though, to see the limited value recognition seemed to bring. Only 
after he died and after Germany invaded Russia on June 22, 1941, 
could more Americans appreciate the fact that two extraordinary, 
large, and powerful countries could ill afford to be without official 
and unofficial lines of communication. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
SINCE ALEXANDER GUMBERG never wrote his memoirs, this 
volume would not have been possible had it not been for his habit 
of preserving his papers, which weJ.:e donated by his wife to the 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin eleven years after his death. 
The manuscript collection contains thirty-four boxes of materials 
divided unevenly into three component parts: Gum berg's corre-
spondence and memorabilia (twenty-seven boxes), papers pertain-
ing to the Atlas Corporation (three boxes) and to the American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce (four boxes). Coalescence of these 
groups of papers has had a debilitating effect on the scholarship of 
American business history and of American-Russian relations, for 
too few students of history have consulted the Gumberg MSS and 
thus even fewer have unlocked the abundant information found in 
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce Papers. 
William Appleman Williams suggested that "Gumberg left a 
record of his efforts because he realized that the historian, like 
other men, can never understand the present-or what occurred in 
the past-unless he also knows what could have happened." It 
would be easy to agree heartily with Williams's answer to this most 
perplexing question of why Gumberg bothered to save so many of 
the letters he received and sent. There are three less lofty and more 
prosaic reasons to explain Gumberg's "foresight." First, the num-
bers of letters Gumberg kept grew dramatically after the Russian 
Revolution and after V.I. Lenin asked him to play a role in inter-
preting the Revolution for the American people. Second, the Rus-
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sian-American found himself embroiled in controversies among 
radical Americans immediately after his return from Russia. Pres-
ervation of his papers, then and throughout his life, enabled Gum-
berg to confute and disarm his critics at home and abroad. Third, 
Gumberg saved his papers as a supreme act of flattery in mimick-
ing the actions of his mentor and lifelong friend Raymond Robins. 
Through the efforts of Williams, the Robins papers were recon-
structed and preserved from the ravages of the Florida clime and 
were also placed in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. This 
formidable collection of documents complements appropriately the 
Gumberg papers and numerous students of history including Wil-
liams, Raymond Kassab, Anne Vincent Meiburger, and Neil V. 
Salzman have used the Robins MSS as a basis for M.A. theses or 
Ph.D. dissertations. Despite all this scholarly activity with the 
Robins MSS, it is surprising that only two biographies, one out-
of-date and the other incomplete, of this colorful personality have 
been published: William Hard's Raymond Robins' Own Story (New 
York, 1920) and Meiburger's Efforts of Raymond Robins toward the 
Recognition of Soviet Russia and the Outlawry of War, 1917-1933 
(Washington, D.C., 1958). Additional manuscript collections held 
by the State Historical Society of Wisconsin and of some impor-
tance to this study were the papers of James A. Frear, Philip F. La 
Follette, DeWitt C. Poole, and Edward A. Ross. 
In some respects this Gumberg biography was undertaken 
twenty years too late. Many of Gumberg's contemporaries are 
dead or in their dotage. Nevertheless, a large number of people 
who knew Gumberg or possess special information about his activ-
ities wrote or told me of their observations: Paul B. Anderson, Lisa 
von Borowsky, John B. Davies, Jerome Davis, Abe Fortas, Harry 
Freeman, John I. Gaines, Vivian Garets, Walter Lippmann, Sergei 
Losev, Floyd B. Odlum, Zenaid Pelzer, Nadia Popov, David Sin-
clair, Jessica Smith, Edward Tripp, Francis B. Waters, E. Raymond 
Wilson, Avrahm Yarmolinsky. Finally, I tapped additional primary 
sources of information by viewing, or corresponding with directors 
of, over two dozen manuscript collections around the country. In 
most cases I gleaned material related to, but not necessarily about, 
Gumberg from the National Archives, Library of Congress, Ameri-
can Red Cross Headquarters, Swarthmore College, New York Pub-
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lie Library, Indiana State Library, and the special depositories of 
presidential papers held in Columbus, Ohio (Warren G. Harding), 
Hyde Park, New York (Franklin D. Roosevelt), and West Branch, 
Iowa (Herbert Hoover). At times, trying to find supplemental 
sources on Gumberg proved to be the chore of a sleuth. If future 
scholars locate a needle or two that I missed from the Gumberg 
haystack, their discoveries will be a welcome blessing and not an 
embarrassing oversight. 
In reconstructing Gumberg's life, I have been blessed by a for-
tuitous circumstance. Gumberg's contemporaries wrote most of 
their comments on the Russian-American's activities at the very 
time in his life when he kept the fewest personal documents. For 
example, all the Americans save Gumberg who made the famous 
truck ride through Petrograd composed and published their ver-
sions: John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (New York, 1919); 
Louise Bryant, Six Red Months in Russia (New York, 1918); Albert 
Rhys Williams, Through the Russian Revolution (New York, 1921); 
Bessie Beatty, The Red Heart of Russia (New York, 1918). Additional 
memoirs that shed some light on Gumberg's life in 1917-1918 in-
clude R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York, 1933); Edgar 
G. Sisson, One Hundred Red Days (New Haven, Conn., 1931); and 
Albert Rhys Williams, Journey into Revolution (Chicago, 1969). The 
latter is particularly important because Frankie Adams Gumberg 
helped edit the volume. Only a few other memoirs touch briefly on 
Gumberg's work after the 1917-1918 period: William Henry 
Chamberlin, The Confessions of an Individualist (New York, 1940); 
Max Eastman, Heroes I Have Known (New York, 1942); and Louis 
Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941). 
An extraordinarily large number of secondary sources devote 
one or more sentences to Gumberg. Generally and unfortunately 
scholars have come to rely too much on the research presented in 
William A. Williams's American Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New 
York, 1952) and in George F. Kennan's Russia Leaves the War (New 
York, 1956) and The Decision to Intervene (New York, 1958). It is not 
that these diplomatic historians are necessarily deficient in schol-
arship, but almost all later students of Soviet-American relations 
have not bothered to investigate the mountains of materials found 
in the Gumberg MSS. As a result, Gumberg jumps into the 
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scenario of some two dozen books as merely a stick figure or, even 
worse, as an unfathomable mystery man who resembles N. N. 
Sukhanov's famous characterization of Stalin ("a gray blur") dur-
ing the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, this study has benefited 
from the careful reading of numerous monographs and biog-
raphies and the notes give credit where credit is due. The most 
helpful published works have been Edward M. Bennett, Recogni-
tion of Russia (Waltham, Mass., 1970); Robert Paul Browder, The 
Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J., 1953); Thomas 
H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-
1922 (Knoxville, Tenn., 1970); Mikhail V. Condoide, Russian-Amer-
ican Trade (Columbus, Ohio, 1946); Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. 
Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington, Ind., 1967); Herbert Feis, 
The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919-1932 (New York, 1966); Peter G. 
Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967); Hermann Hagedorn, The Magnate (New York, 1935); 
Granville Hicks, John Reed (New York, 1937); Christopher Lasch, 
The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York, 1962); 
Robert J. Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy (Bat-
on Rouge, La., 1969); Robert K. Murray, Red Scare (New York, 
1964); Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935); Henry 
K. Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia (New York, 1923); 
Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 1917 
(New York, 1928); Leonid I. Strakhovsky, American Opinion about 
Russia, 1917-1920 (Toronto, 1961); Antony C. Sutton, Western 
Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917 to 1930 (Stanford, 
Calif., 1968); Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the 
Far East (New York, 1949); Betty Miller Unterberger, America's Sibe-
rian Expedition, 1918-1920 (Durham, N.C., 1956); John Chalmers 
Vinson, The Parchment Peace (Athens, Ga., 1955) and William E. 
Borah and the Outlawry of War (Athens, Ga., 1957); Robert D. Warth, 
The Allies and the Russian Revolution (Durham, N.C., 1954); Benja-
min Weissman, Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 
1921-1923 (Stanford, Calif., 1974); and Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology 
and Economics (Columbia, Mo., 1974). 
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